Portugal and her islandy| A study in strategic location by Curry, James Elliott
University of Montana 
ScholarWorks at University of Montana 
Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & 
Professional Papers Graduate School 
1977 
Portugal and her islandy| A study in strategic location 
James Elliott Curry 
The University of Montana 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd 
Let us know how access to this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Curry, James Elliott, "Portugal and her islandy| A study in strategic location" (1977). Graduate Student 
Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers. 3256. 
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd/3256 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at ScholarWorks at University of 
Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers by an 
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact 
scholarworks@mso.umt.edu. 
PORTUGAL AND HER ISLANDS: A STUDY 
IN STRATEGIC LOCATION 
by 
James E. Curry 
B.A., University of Montana, 1969 
Presented in partial fulfillment of 
the requirements for the degree of 
Master of Arts 
UNIVERSITY OF MONTANA 
1977 
Approved by: 
Chairman, Board of Examiners 
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ABSTRACT 
Curry, James E., M.A., Spring 1977 History 
Portugal and Her Islands: A Study in Strategic Location (177 pp.) 
Director: Paul Gordon Lauren f'cVL-
Strategic location is a concept which deserves systematic examina­
tion. The history of Portugal and her Atlantic island possessions 
offers an opportunity for such analysis. Strategic location is de­
fined as the quality of being situated on the earth's surface in such 
a way that location, alone or in combination with other factors, is 
of significance in international relations. 
Portugal's early history was largely shaped by her location. Her 
position on the western coast of the Iberian peninsula aided the Portu­
guese to escape incorporation into the Spanish state and encouraged 
them to embark on a program of oceanic exploration that profoundly in­
fluenced the history not only of Portugal but of the entire world. 
Early in their ventures into the Atlantic Ocean the Portuguese dis­
covered the Madeira and the Azores island groups--the latter them­
selves of immense strategic importance, since they l ie near the center 
of the North Atlantic. 
The strategic significance of continental Portugal and of the Azores 
has resulted in Portuguese involvement in most of the great European 
crises since the Hundred Years War. I t has also led to the longest-
lasting all iance in European history--the tie between Portugal and 
Britain. On many occasions British aid was crucial for the preserva­
tion of Portuguese independence. In return, Britain obtained great 
advantages—a useful entryway into the Iberian peninsula and a valuable 
naval base at Lisbon, as well as the assurance that the Azores would be 
in friendly hands. During the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth 
centuries, the British intervened to protect Portugal against i ts foes. 
Portugal, in turn, was able to exploit her strategic location, and 
keep the powerful ally needed to preserve her independence. 
Portugal's strategic location has played a major role in the twen­
tieth century. The country was involved in the First World War on the 
All ied side. Under the leadership of Antonio Salazar, who became dic­
tator in 1932, Portugal rendered valuable aid to the Nationalist side 
in the Spanish Civil War. During the Second World War, Salazar's 
Portugal remained neutral throughout, but granted the All ies base 
rights to the Azores in 1943 under the terms of the Anglo-Portuguese 
Alliance. That importance was underlined most recently during the 
1973 Arab-Israeli War, when the Azores base was indispensable to the 
American arms airl ift to Israel. The Portuguese Revolution of 1974 
aroused concern in other NATO capitals, proof that Portugal's location 
remains an important factor in world affairs. 
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PREFACE 
There are nations which have been small in size and 
lacking in resources, but nevertheless have managed to play 
an important role in history. Despite her lack of many of 
the attributes of power, Portugal's contribution to the de­
velopment of the states bordering on the Atlantic Ocean has 
been significant. Many diverse forces have been responsible 
for this, but one fact dominates all others: there can be 
few better examples in history of the importance of strategic 
location. 
Portugal's position on the map, her situation on the 
fringe of Europe and on the threshold of the Atlantic, made 
it possible in centuries past for her to make a mark on the 
world far out of proportion to her size. When her greatness 
was gone, her location kept the powers of Europe interested 
in her fate, particularly the foremost Atlantic power of 
Great Britain. Today, as a quick examination of a good news­
paper will attest, her location still makes Portugal a matter 
of concern to American strategists and foreign policy 
planners. After years of obscurity, Portugal and her stra­
tegic- location have been highlighted by the 1974 revolution 
and its consequences which are still unfolding. 
vi 
Geographically, there are really two Portugals--conti-
nental Portugal on the Iberian peninsula, and insular Portu­
gal, the archipelagoes that have been part o£ Portugal since 
their discovery. These are the Azores and Madeira. The 
islands contain only a fraction o£ the total Portuguese popu­
lation and land area, but their strategic significance has 
been far out of proportion to their size, matching if not ex­
ceeding that of the mainland. They play an imposing role in 
this study. 
In contrast, the other portions of Portugal's once-vast 
empire do not figure in any important way. Angola, Mozambique, 
and Guinea-Bissau have at last gone the way of the other 
European colonies in Africa, and Macao and Portuguese Timor--
Portugal's Asian remnants--lie outside the geographical 
limits which this study can comfortably include. Above all, 
the island groups ethnically and culturally are as Portuguese 
as Lisbon and their ties to the motherland appear permanent. 
For this reason it is reasonably safe to assume that their 
destinies will be linked in the future as in the past. 
Portugal's location has brought her both good and bad 
fortune. It has assured Portugal of powerful protectors--
yet it has also involved her in quarrels not truly her own. 
On the whole, however, location has given her advantages 
which have permitted her to keep some control over her own 
fate . 
vii 
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CHAPTER I 
THE CONCEPT OF "STRATEGIC LOCATION" 
The attempt to apply an abstract concept to a historical 
situation cannot succeed unless clarity exists as to what the 
concept means. Seemingly simple abstractions have an annoy­
ing habit o£ revealing ambiguities and complexities when they 
are analyzed. V/hat then is meant by "strategic location"? 
It may be best to begin by making clear what it is not. 
Strategic importance is not synonymous with the posses­
sion of natural resources (although any source of natural 
riches will tend to become important in strategic calcula­
tions) . The natural endowment of Portugal is and always has 
been unimpressive but the country is significant nonetheless. 
The Portuguese case suggests a brief definition of strategic 
importance--the quality of being situated on the earth's 
surface in such a way that location, alone or in combination 
with other factors, is of significance in international rela­
tionships • 
A strategic location is obviously geographical but other­
wise may be one of many kinds of physical feature. Barriers 
and passageways come first to mind when the word "strategy" 
is mentioned. Such features as mountain ranges and deserts. 
1 
2 
which serve to separate, or straits and navigable rivers, 
which assist communication, and thus tend to unite, are 
examples o£ barriers and passageways respectively. It is 
general geographical location, however, that often provides 
a state with its major influence over other states. As two 
recent scholars of international relations have asserted: 
The role a state can play in the world is 
strongly affected by its position on the 
map. Thanks to geographical location, 
certain states which are small in area 
have made a greater mark in history than 
larger nations endowed with far greater 
resources,1 
The word "communication" itself provides a clue to the 
meaning of the phrase, for in one way or another, almost any 
imaginable kind of strategic location is involved with the 
movement of people, goods, or information across the earth--
now perhaps also beyond it. Control of a strategic location 
gives the power to hasten or hinder communication and even to 
prevent it altogether. Since men live on the land and only 
travel on the ocean, maritime strategy is concerned first and 
foremost with the control of communication. 
It is only natural, then, that the first thinker to give 
systematic consideration to the importance of strategic loca­
tion was the dean of naval strategists, Alfred T. Mahan. In 
his famous list of the "six principal conditions affecting 
^Pierre Renouvin and Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, Introduc-
tion to the History of International Relations (New York: 
Praeger, 1967), p. 11. 
3 
the sea power o£ nations," "geographical location" comes 
first. Says Mahan: 
It may be pointed out, in the first place, 
that if a nation be so situated that it is 
neither forced to defend itself by land nor 
induced to seek extension of its territory 
by way of land, it has, by the very unity 
of its aim directed upon the sea, an advan­
tage as compared with a people one of whose 
boundaries is continental.^ 
By Mahan's standards, Portugal has always had the disadvan­
tage of a long land border, but in all otJier ways it is a 
maritime nation; its interests and efforts at expansion have 
always been directed seaward. This would not be so if its 
location were other than it is. Portugal's possession of 
island groups in the Atlantic has allowed her to claim some 
of the advantages accruing to island nations. In the words 
of Renouvin and Duroselle; 
Islands in the middle of an ocean are par­
ticularly valuable as bases --economically 
as ports of call on sea and air routes, 
strategically important as potential naval 
and air bases.^ 
The value of the Azores and Madeira is enhanced by the fact 
that oceanic islands are rare in the Atlantic. There are 
not a great many other islands in the area from which com­
parable economic and military advantages can be obtained. 
Also, since continental Portugal's seacoast faces the open 
2 Alfred T. Mahan, The Influence of Seapower Upon His­
tory (New York: Hill and Wang, 1957), p. 25. 
3 
Renouvin and Duroselle, p. 15. 
4 
Atlantic, it has much freer access to the outside world than 
it would i£ it faced an inland sea, which would make it much 
easier to blockade.^ 
Other writers on naval strategy have followed Mahan's 
lead. Thus the most recent major work on maritime history 
opens with this statement: 
Geography is the major determining factor in 
any nation's ability to utilize the sea com­
mercially and to defend its political and 
economic integrity from overseas attack. 
Thus each nation tends to orient its politi­
cal, economic and military life around the 
advantages of its geographical position 
vis-a-vis other nations.^ 
Earlier in this century one school of strategists went 
so far as to elevate geographical position to the key role 
in world history. These were the so-called "Geopoliticians." 
Although the founder of Geopolitics was an Englishman, Sir 
Halford Mackinder, the concept drew its largest following in 
Germany, particularly the circle associated with Karl Haus-
hofer. There Geopolitics was used as a justification for 
aggressive expansionist policies, and was otherwise so un­
sound theoretically that the word fell into disfavor after 
'^Edward Wegener, "Theory of Naval Strategy in the Nu­
clear Age," U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings 698 (May 1972) 
194. 
•^Clark G. Reynolds, Command of the Sea: The History and 
Strategy of Maritime Empires (New York: Wm. Morrow and Co., 
1974), p. 1. 
^For a good summary of Haushofer's ideas, see Derwent 
Whittlesey, "Haushofer, the Politician," in Makers of Modern 
Strategy, ed. Edward Mead Earle (Princeton: Princeton Uni­
versity Press, 1944), pp. 388-411. 
5 
World War II. The Haushofer school emphasized the need for 
geographical expansion by any state seeking world power, and 
argued that Germany must conquer the Eurasian "Heartland," 
i.e., the Soviet Union. Haushofer's doctrines were in addi­
tion tainted by the racialism of Nazi ideology. Also, the 
development of nuclear weapons and air transport persuaded 
some analysts that geography had become irrelevant to stra­
tegic problems. This notion is no more correct now than it 
has ever been. Not all discussions of the interrelationships 
of history and geography have been carried to Haushofer's 
extremes. Strategic location is only one of the aspects of 
this general theme, which is fascinating and deserves more 
7 
attention than it has generally received. 
Two more aspects of strategic location deserve mention. 
Strategic location may be either a temporary or a permanent 
condition. "Temporary," or short-term, strategic location 
is perhaps best exemplified in certain cases by military his­
tory. In war, the control of some insignificant crossroads, 
or some normally unnoticeable terrain feature during a brief 
battle may determine the fate of nations. This study is con­
cerned with the permanent type of strategic location or that 
7 Some useful studies available in English are: Harold 
and Margaret Sprout, Foundations of National Power (Prince­
ton: 0. Van Nostrand, 1944); Nicholas J. Spyckman, America's 
Strategy in World Politics (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1944); 
Derwent Whittlesey, The Earth and the State (New York: Holt, 
1944). It may be significant that all these were published 
during World War II. 
6 
extending over a long period o£ time and influencing a 
series of historical events. The strategic importance of 
Portugal is of this category for it has existed now for 
half a millennium. 
Also, strategic location is usually examined as a 
factor in national power, and regarded as an advantage for 
the state that controls it. (This is evident in the words 
of Mahan quoted above.) But unless the people who happen 
to inhabit some spot of strategic importance also possess 
such other assets as numbers, natural resources, industry, 
and commerce and skillful leadership, they may find their 
situation a misfortune. It can cost them their indepen­
dence, or their very existence. Except for the "Babylonian 
Captivity" under the Spanish Crown, a period (1580-1640) 
which approximates one lifetime, the Portuguese have es­
caped this fate. To discover how and why they managed to 
accomplish this, it is necessary to examine Portugal's 
origins and expansion. 
Portugal - Origins and Expansion 
Portugal is the oldest nation-state in Europe, having 
existed within its present boundaries (with only minor bor-
O 
der alterations) since the year 1250. It is not obvious 
why this should be so, since these boundaries do not follow 
g 
Don Stanislawski, The Individuality of Portugal (Austin; 
University of Texas Press, 1959), p. 177. 
7 
formidable natural barriers. The Iberian peninsula is cov­
ered with mountain ranges and its rivers are generally 
unnavigable but both mountains and rivers are oriented 
east-west, at right angles to Portugal's long border with 
Spain. 
Yet the region of western Iberia, in which Portugal 
lies, has always been somewhat apart from the rest of the 
Peninsula. The reasons for this are a matter of contro­
versy but the fact itself is indisputable. Before history 
began, the Neolithic and Bronze Age cultures in the area 
g 
differed from those dominant in most of Iberia. During the 
Roman Conquest, tlie province' of Lusitania corresponded sur­
prisingly to modern Portugal. After the Empire collapsed,, 
Lusitania became part of the Suevic Kingdom that rules 
northwestern Iberia rather than falling under control of 
the Visigoths as did most of the Peninsula. This kingdom 
regained a separate existence for more than a century before 
being absorbed into Visigothic Spain in 585 A.D. It was 
never forgotten, and was used as a basis for territorial 
claims by later Portuguese kings. 
Nearly all the Iberian peninsula was overrun by the 
Muslims early in the eighth century. Lusitania was not 
spared, being conquered as early as 713 A.D. (only two years 
®Ibid., p. 69. 
^^A. H. de Oliveira Marques, A History of Portugal. 2 
vols. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), 1:21-25. 
8 
after the Muslim invasion began). The only part o£ the 
Peninsula not conquered lay in the far north. Here some 
Christian principalities managed to cling to their indepen-
11 dence or win it back after a brief period of Muslim rule. 
The modern Portugal began as a county of one of these 
little kingdoms, when Alfonso III of Asturias (a state also 
called Leon) appointed a nobleman named Vomarano Peres to 
rule a frontier district around Portucale (modern Oporto) 
in the ninth century. By the year 938 this county had 
grown to a dukedom, already commonly called "Portugal." 
This dukedom, in 1096, came into the hands of a family of 
Burgundian descent. In 1143, the second duke of the line, 
Afonso Henriques, rebelled against his Leonese overlord and 
12 
claimed the title of king. Not until 1179, however, was 
13 
the title given recognition by the Papacy. 
The new kingdom occupied only the northern third of 
present-day Portugal, for the rest was still in the hands 
of the Muslims, ivrho were split up into quarrelling little 
states called "taifas." Until 1250, the central theme of 
Portuguese history was the gradual conquest of the taifas. 
This was, in turn, part of the general "Reconquista" of 
Iberia from the Muslims. In 1147 Afonso Henriques captured 
^^Ibid., 1:25. 
^^Ibid., 1:41. 
13 Stanley G. Payne, A History of Spain and Portugal. 
2 vols. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1972), 
1:117. 
9 
Lisbon with the assistance of a fleet of Crusaders (mostly 
English) who were on their way to Palestine, The Portuguese 
Reconquista was completed in 1250 by the capture of the 
Algarve (the southern-most province of modern Portugal). A 
treaty in 1267 between Portugal and Castile confirmed Portu­
guese possession of the Algarve and fixed Portugal's boun­
daries substantially as they are today. 
The little kingdom faced an uncertain future. Origi­
nally one of many Christian states, she saw her compatriots 
absorbed by the most powerful of the Iberian kingdoms, 
Castile and Aragon. A similar fate for Portugal seemed not 
unlikely, particularly since the country was confined to a 
narrow strip of coast and mountain, shut out from the great 
control tableland of Iberia by the power of Castile. Late 
in the fourteenth century Portugal found herself fighting 
for her existence against her mighty Castilian neighbor. 
Her independence was saved by a spectacular victory at 
Aljubarrota in October, 1385.^^ 
Small, remote, and hemmed in on her landward side, 
Portugal yet possessed an invaluable asset--her position 
on the Atlantic. Maritime activity had begun even before 
Portugal became independent. Crusaders from overseas aided 
the Reconquest, as has been recounted earlier. The connec-
^'^Oliveira Marques, 1:13-73. 
^ ̂Ib id. 
10 
tion with Britain, crucial in many periods o£ Portuguese 
history, can be traced to the capture o£ Lisbon in 1250, 
Aljubarrota was won with the assistance o£ English long-
bowmen and military advisors.^^ 
Portugal did not begin as a great seafaring nation, 
for the development of her maritime power was a slow and 
episodic process. The bulk of her population have always 
been peasant farmers, not seamen. Other regions in western 
Europe produced more ships and sailors, but according to 
one noted authority, "what compensated to some extent for 
the small size of the Portuguese fleet and the weakness of 
the economy was the Kingdom's strategic position at the 
outlet from the west Mediterranean to the Atlantic, central 
17 
axis of the sea lanes from Italy to Flanders." The coun-
18 
try was situated at the "street corner of Europe." 
If Portugal enjoyed a central location from the vantage 
point of the Atlantic, from the Iberian point of view she 
was isolated. This situation also had advantages. If some­
times threatened by her powerful Castilian neighbor (and by 
its successor, united Spain) more often she was ignored. 
Lying off the main pathway, she was left to manage her own 
affairs to suit herself. This "offside position" has been 
^^Ibid., 1:127. 
17 
Payne, 1:125. (Emphasis mine.) 
1 8 
J. H. Parry, The Discovery of the Sea (New York: Dial 
Press, 1974), p. 87. 
11 
compared to that o£ Holland, another sea-oriented nation, 
19 
in relation to Germany. 
To make the most o£ an advantage such as Portugal 
possessed, it is not enough simply to enjoy it passively. 
Instead, a natural asset should, become the basis of an 
active policy. This requires both foresight and energy. 
These qualities the Portuguese applied to a systematic 
program of maritime exploration. The fourteenth century 
had not ended when Portugal began her great adventure, the 
expansion into the Atlantic that would one day open up the 
oceans, and carry Portugal's flag to the shores of Japan. 
Like many great events, Portuguese expansion had tiny 
beginnings. Modest fishing ventures, conducted from tiny 
ports now deserted and clogged with silt, marked the birth 
of Portuguese maritime enterprise. Trade relations with 
other European nations also began very early. Portuguese 
merchants appeared in Flanders early in the tivrelfth century. 
Close trade relations with England were established in 
equally early times. 
The future of Portuguese seafaring lay to the west and 
south rather than to the north, however. In these directions 
lay the great mysteries and the great hopes of gain. Legends 
^^Stanislawski, p. 213. 
2 0 Bailey W. Diffie, Prelude to Empire: Portugal Over­
seas Before Henry the Navigator (Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1960), pp. 13-25. 
12 
o£ mysterious paradisiacal islands in the Atlantic Ocean 
had existed for centuries. Voyages down the African Coast 
might tap the rich gold mines whose product reached Europe 
by desert caravans. Hordes of pagans were known to live 
there, whose souls might be won for Christ. Expansion into 
these areas was made possible by a crucial technological 
breakthrough: the development of the caravel. This was the 
first true ocean-going vessel, the first ship sturdy and 
21 
versatile enough to sail anywhere. 
The early history of the caravel is obscure, as is the 
history of most technological advances before very recent 
times. But the evidence is conclusive that the caravel 
originated in western Iberia, quite likely in Portugal 
itself. The reasons for this have a great deal to do, once 
again, with Portugal's location. The caravel was essentially 
a crossbreed between two shipbuilding traditions, that of 
northern Europe and that of the Mediterranean. It combined 
the sternpost rudder, a northern development, with caravel 
hull construction and lateen sails which sprang from Mediter-
2 2 ranean (and Arab) origins. 
Portugal lay at a crossroads where ships built on the 
Atlantic coast met other ships from the Mediterranean. The 
Portuguese traded both with northern and Mediterranean 
21 C. R. Boxer, The Portuguese Seaborne Empire 1415-1825 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), p. 27. 
2 2 
J. H. Parry, The Age of Reconnaissance (New York: 
Praeger, 1963), p. 6W. 
13 
countries, particularly the maritime cities o£ Italy whose 
shipbuilding techniques were very advanced. From the Medi­
terranean also came the Mariner's Compass, which made 
direction-finding possible in the open ocean in all weather, 
2 3 and other advances in navigation. Portuguese shipbuilders 
were thus able to combine two disparate styles of seafaring 
and produce something revolutionary. Early in the fifteenth 
century the Portuguese began to use their new ships to sail 
to new places. 
For centuries myths and traditions of islands scattered 
throughout the Atlantic, "St. Brendan's Isle," "the Island of 
Brazil," and the "Fortunate Islands," had circulated in 
western Europe. Which of these were pure legend, which were 
based on actual discoveries in ancient or early medieval 
times, no one can any longer determine. But they provided 
a stimulus for Portuguese exploration. This led, in fact, 
to the first Portuguese voyage to the Canary Islands either 
in 1336 or 1341. Then early in the fifteenth century Portu­
guese voyages discovered the strategically important Atlantic 
24 
islands of the Azores and Madeira. 
The Atlantic Islands 
Some description of these two island groups is necessary. 
^^Diffie, p. 53. 
^'^Ibid. , pp. 56-59. 
14 
They are located far apart and differ in many ways but 
possess some underlying similarities. Both the Azores 
and the Madeiras are oceanic islands of volcanic origin, 
lying far from land and utterly uninhabited at the time of 
discovery. Both possessed considerable natural resources, 
were attractive to colonists, and soon came to play impor­
tant roles in the Portuguese economy. 
The Madeira group consists of five islands located 
575 miles southeast of Lisbon and about 300 miles due west 
2 5 
of the African coast. There are five islands in the 
group, only two of which--Madeira proper and Porto Santo--
are inhabited. Madeira itself, 286 square miles in extent, 
is by far the largest. Mountainous and rugged, it lacks 
decent harbors. But it is fertile. Its name derives from 
the Portuguese word for wood, because the island was heavily 
forested when discovered. Today it supports a population of 
266,000 persons. 
Madeira was discovered in 1419 by two sea captains 
named Zargo and Teixeira, acting under the orders of Prince 
Henry "the Navigator," the famous sponsor of Portuguese 
exploration. "The latter," in the words of one recent author, 
"perceiving the strategic location of the islands, immediately 
•2 5 
Great Britain, Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Divi-
sion. Geographical Handbook Series, Spain and Portugal, 4 vols. 
(London: H.M.S.O., 1945), 4 : 4 [TieTeaFter cited Spain and Portugal) 
2 6 
T. Bentley Duncan, Atlantic Islands: Madeira. Azores 
and the Cape Verdes in Seventeenth Century Commerce and 
Navigation (Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 1972), p. 25. 
2 7 ordered them colonized." 
First exploited for its lumber, Madeira later became 
a major source of sugar. Its cane fields \\?ere the first 
supply available outside the eastern Mediterranean. Many 
of the techniques for raising sugar cane, developed there, 
were later applied in the sugar-growing areas of the New 
World. Eventually the Madeiran sugar industry was killed 
by Brazilian competition and disappeared in the seventeenth 
century. Wine replaced sugar as Madeira's chief product. 
The superb wines named after the island, which travel un­
usually well, were exported widely (especially to Britain 
and America) and became a major item in Portuguese foreign 
trade. 
More importantly, this first of all European overseas 
colonies was useful as a base and a port of call for the 
Portuguese expeditions that gradually felt their way down 
2 9 the African coast. _ After the Portuguese reached India 
in 1498', Madeira lay on the route homeward from the east--
and on the main route from Europe to Latin America. 
Portuguese vessels coming back from the Indian Ocean were 
actually required by law to call at Funchal, Madeira's port 
and capital. 
•2 7 
James H. Guill, A History of the Azores Islands (Menlo 
Park, Calif.: By the author, 1972)., p. xxvi. 
2  8  2 9  
Duncan, pp. 26-35, Guill, p. xxx. 
^^Duncan, p. 25. ^^Oliveira Marques, 1:28. 
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Whatever the importance of Madeira in Portuguese eco­
nomic and imperial history, it is overshadowed in strategic 
importance by the Azores. There are nine islands in the 
Azores group, "the sole islands which exist near the center 
3 2 
of the North Atlantic." They lie about eight hundred 
miles west of Portugal. The Azores, named after the hawks 
(ag^ores) that abounded there, are ranged in a ragged line 
stretching roughly northeast-southwest, the westernmost 
islands, Flores and Corvo, 125 miles from the west. Their 
total area is 888 square miles. All are rugged volcanic 
peaks of the submerged Mid-Atlantic Ridge, and one island, 
3 3 Pico, rises 7,600 feet above the sea. 
The colonization of the Azores began later than in 
Madeira--logically, in view of their remoteness--under the 
sponsorship of Flenry the Navigator. He sent Gongalo Velho 
de Cabral, a gentleman of his household, to lead the first 
colonizing expedition to the Azores in 1439. He "realized 
the Azores would be ideal as advanced supply bases. Using 
Madeira as a forward base on the outward voyage and the 
Azores on the return, he could send his caravels much far­
ther down the African coast than before. 
The colonists in the Azores were soon able to export 
commercial quantities of a variety of products. Lumber, 
^^Guill, p. 18. 
^^Spain and Portugal, 4:4. 
^^Guill, p. 58. 
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as in Madeira, was early exploited, and so were the fish 
caught in surrounding seas. Different islands came to 
specialize in different commodities. Sao Miguel grew wood 
plants (from which dye was made), oranges, and wheat. 
From the steep slopes of Pico came the best wine produced 
in the Azores. Terceira, the most populous island, raised 
large wheat crops for export. After trans-Atlantic com­
merce began, the islands developed a thriving provision 
trade, selling food to passing ships. 
Many ships passed the Azoreans' way for a reason which 
was a key to their strategic as well as their economic im­
portance. Because of the patterns of winds and currents in 
the North Atlantic the Azores lie on the quickest and easiest 
route eastwards for a sailing ship bound from America to 
Europe. Moreover, the Atlantic westerlies blow directly 
across them. Columbus, on his very first voyage, stopped 
3 7 
at the Azores on his way back to Spain. Over the cen­
turies many sailing vessels followed in his wake. Inevi­
tably the Azores were of interest to naval planners as well 
as merchant seamen hoping to pick up fresh provisions. Con­
trol of the Azores contributed to the control of the Atlantic 
Sea lanes as a whole, since their strategic location was such 
3 5 
Duncan, p. 86. 
^^Ibid., p. 131. 
^^Ibid., pp. 23-24. 
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that they could be used to protect (or to cut) the routes 
to Europe from overseas. The thick concentration o£ ship­
ping around the islands created a tempting target for the 
priva;teers who were a part of naval warfare in the age of 
sail--as in the Anglo-Spanish sea battles during the age 
of Queen Elizabeth. The strategic importance of the Azores 
developed even further as European powers built empires in 
the New World. Before the fifteenth century ended, the 
Azores were the crossroads of the nascent Portuguese empire. 
"More than any other geographical unit," the Azores "aided 
3 8 
in solving many of the riddles of the Atlantic ocean." 
Portuguese expansion rapidly carried their dominion to 
regions never penetrated by European man. In search first 
of gold, then of slaves (the Portuguese began the Atlantic 
slave trade, which had such momentous consequences for 
American history), then of a way to India, the seaworthy 
little caravels had made their way down to the Cape of Good 
Hope in 1488. The rounding of the Cape by Bartolomeu Dias 
opened the greatest age in Portuguese history. In a decade 
Vasco Da Gama sailed all the way to India. He was followed 
by the seagoing conquistadores, Almeida and Albuquerque, 
who employed the technological advantages of their cannon-
armed vessels and a native talent for naval strategy to 
create the world's first oceanic empire. They seized control 
^^Guill, p. 18. 
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of the seaborne commerce of the Indian Ocean, operating 
from a network of islands and coastal bases that reached 
from Mozambique to the Moluccas, and whose linchpin was 
the Indian port of Goa. The first major western penetra­
tion of Asia, the Portuguese ventures began a new age in 
39 
world history. All in all, it was quite an achievement 
for a small people on the western rim of Europe. It is un­
likely that the expansion could have taken place if the 
Portuguese had not arisen in a location well suited to 
encourage maritime adventurousness and to take advantage 
of the advances in maritime technology that were made in 
late medieval Europe. 
Creating such an imposing structure, the Portuguese 
were to discover in the sixteenth century, was far less 
different than the endless task of maintaining it. The 
empire they built was so magnificent that their small popu­
lation and scanty resources were stretched to the limit 
just to keep it in being. Against these difficulties, to 
v\?hich ambitious rivals were soon added, the advantages con­
ferred by strategic location temporarily were to prove in­
sufficient . 
3 9 
For more discussion of this fascinating story, see 
J. H.- Parry and C. R. Boxer. The Portuguese technological 
advantages are well explained in Carlo Cipolla, Guns, Sails, 
and Empires (New York: Pantheon, 1966). 
CHAPTER II 
BRITAIN AND PORTUGAL: THE ANCIENT ALLIANCE 
Portugal's closest ties have historically been main­
tained with Britain, another maritime Atlantic power. Like 
any long-standing diplomatic relationship, the Anglo-
Portuguese tie was complex. It included important economic 
elements and some degree o£ political influence, despite 
the enormous differences in political culture between the 
two nations. The basis of the relationship, however, was 
strategic. It was of vital importance to Britain, once she 
became mistress of the Atlantic, that Portugal and the Portu­
guese islands be in friendly hands. 
The Anglo-Portuguese Alliance actually predates Brit­
ain's emergence as a seapower. Romantically inclined his­
torians are fond of tracing it back to the year 1147, when 
a band of crusaders led by Anglo-Norman barons provided aid 
to the Portuguese King Afonso Henriques in his attack upon 
Lisbon. The crusaders' contribution proved decisive to the 
seizure of the future Portuguese capital. But neither this 
"^H. A. R. Gibb, "English Crusaders in Portugal," in 
Chapters in Anglo-Portuguese Relations, edited by Edgar 
Prestage (London: Voss and Michael, 1935, reprint ed., 
Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1971), p. 13. 
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episode nor several later instances of participation by 
English crusaders in the reconquest of Portugal was the 
result of any alliance or other kind of official arrange­
ment between the English and Portuguese kingdoms. The 
crusaders involved were private adventurers and the pacts 
they made with the Portuguese did not concern or commit 
the English government. 
The first official link between England and Portugal 
was not formed until more than two centuries after the fall 
of Lisbon. It was part of a sizable English intervention 
in the Iberian peninsula, which was in turn a by-product of 
the long Anglo-French struggle known as the Hundred Years 
War. This was more than a rivalry of two royal houses. The 
Hundred Years War was the first of the great duels between 
England and France that were to convulse the European scene 
until Waterloo. Like those later struggles, the Hundred 
Years War developed ramifications all over Western Europe 
and spilled over into the Iberian peninsula. 
In order to enhance their respective positions, both 
England and France sought allies among the Iberian kingdoms. 
Tlic great prize was the friendship oC Castile, tlic most 
powerful of the peninsular states. Castile's sizable navy, 
operating out of Biscayan and Galician ports, was in a posi­
tion to, threaten communications between England and her foot­
holds in France, and even to raid the English coast itself. 
In 1338, for instance, a joint Franco-Castilian fleet ravaged 
2 2 
2 ports along the English Channel,, In this conflict England 
and France found themselves backing rival candidates for 
Castile's unsteady throne. The first alliance between Eng­
land and Portugal was an offshoot of what originally was an 
effort in 1367 to replace a pro-French usurper on the Castilian 
throne. Military success (the great English victory at Majera 
3 
3 April 1367) proved barren, however, when relations between 
the English Commander, Edward the Black Prince, and King Pedro 
the Cruel of Castile, broke down. The English left the penin­
sula, Pedro was overthrown and murdered,^ and the pro-French 
Enrique of Trastamara resumed the Castilian throne. 
Portugal became embroiled only after its rash King Fer­
nando fought and lost a war with the restored Enrique of 
Trastamara.^ The possibility of an Anglo-Portuguese alliance 
first appeared when the Black Prince's younger brother, John 
of Gaunt, the Duke of Lancaster, who had advanced a claim to 
the Castilian throne (based partly on his marriage to King 
Pedro's daughter)^ saw Portuguese assistance as the key to 
7 realizing his ambitions. Fernando resented the disadvanta-
2 Maurice Collis, The Hurling Time (London: Faber and 
Faber, 1958), p. 106. 
3 P. E. Russell, The English Intervention in Spain and 
Portugal in the Time of Edward III and Richard II (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1955), p. 105. 
Ibid. , P- 148. 
Ibid., P- 152. 
Ibid., P- 174. 
7 
C. H. Williams, "The Expedition of John of Gaunt to 
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geous peace terms that he had been forced to accept. On 
the tenth of July, 1372, Fernando signed a treaty of alli­
ance with John of Gaunt (signed by John as "King of Cas­
tile") . The Portuguese were to attack Castile from the 
g 
west as soon as John invaded from Navana. 
Unfortunately for Fernando, the English suffered a 
devastating naval defeat off La Rochelle before they could 
launch this invasion, leaving Fernando to face Castile 
alone. Portugal was invaded, leaving Fernando to send des­
perate appeals to London. The English offered to send help 
(in return for a formal treaty of alliance between Fernando 
and Edward III) but their aid of only 600 men came too late. 
Fernando was forced to make peace with Castile and France 
g 
and became their ally instead. 
Thus it appeared that Portugal had been forced into the 
Franco-Castilian camp. Yet the first formal alliance between 
England and Portugal, the "Treaty of Saint Paul's," was signed 
only three months later! The treaty was referred to even in 
the twentieth century as the "oldest alliance in the world" 
by the government of Portugal 15 March 1912, in the person 
of Dr. Augusto de Vasconcelos, Prime Minister and Foreign 
Minister of Portugal. 
the Peninsula," in Chapters of Anglo-Portuguese Relations, 
edited by Edgar Prestage, p. 34. 
^Russell, p. 193. 
9lbid., p. 198. 
lOPortugal, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Plain Speaking: 
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Fernando was playing a double game. While pretending 
to change sides, the Portuguese King let his envoys in Lon­
don negotiate as if nothing had happened. The immediate 
result of Fernando's machination was a bizarre situation in 
which Portuguese warships took part in attacks on the English 
coast although a treaty of alliance existed between the two 
countries. Still the English kept on good terms with the 
Portuguese; in September, 1373, the English government di­
r e c t e d  t h a t  P o r t u g u e s e  w e r e  t o  b e  t r e a t e d  a s  f r i e n d s . A  
thriving trade between the two countries was not interrupted. 
After Enrique of Trastamara's death in 1379, Fernando 
lost no time in moving over to the English side. On 15 July 
1380, the Treaty of Saint Paul's was formally renewed. King 
Fernando promised to assist a force of 2,000 Englishmen under 
Edmund, Earl of Cambridge, a younger son of Edward III, who 
were to land in Portugal and march on Castile. He also prom­
ised to marry his daughter to the infant English Prince Ed-
12 
ward of Cambridge. 
In July, 1381, the first English army ever to land in 
Portugal arrived at Lisbon. Edmund of Cambridge was a mis­
erable commander and the expedition accomplished nothing. 
Reasons for the Intervention of Portugal in the European 
War -(London: Eyre and Spotiswoode, English translation, 
1917) , p. 6. 
^^Russell, p. 201. 
^^Ibid., p. 299. 
25 
dawdling about Lisbon for months, plundering the Portuguese 
13 
peasantry. The Castilians, the original objective of the 
expedition, were never seriously attacked. But this fiasco 
illustrated for the first time one of the two ways Portugal 
was to figure in English strategy for years to come. In 
wars on the Continent, and specifically in the Iberian penin­
sula, Portugal was extremely useful to England as a "sally 
port." It provided convenient access (especially since 
Lisbon was the finest harbor in the peninsula) for English 
seaborne expeditions. Lisbon lies in estuary of the Tagus 
River, one of the few in Iberia that is navigable for any 
distance. Only Cadiz is at all comparable. 
After Fernando's death in October, 1383, King Juan I 
of Castile made an all-out effort to conquer Portugal. The 
attempt aroused an immediate outburst of patriotic anti-
Castilian fervor in Portugal, based on the mercantile in­
terests in Lisbon, and signaled by the seizure of the throne 
by the candidate they supported, Joao (John) I, first of the 
14 House of Aviz. The new king immediately sought English aid. 
The response of the English government was unenthusiastic, 
but the Portuguese were allowed to recruit English troops for 
mercenary service. Somewhere between 400 and 700 of the^e 
troops were present at the battle of Aljubarrota in August, 
^^Ibid. , p. 323. 
^^Ibid. , p. 365. 
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1385, where a spectacular Portuguese victory saved the na­
tion's independence,^^ 
In the following years on 17 May 1386 , tlie famous Treaty 
of Windsor established a lasting alliance between England and 
Portugal. The terms of the treaty included a clause guaran­
teeing the House of Aviz against Castilian aggression, as well 
as providing that nationals of either country could trade and 
travel in the other country on the same basis as nationals of 
that country.A Portuguese naval squadron was sent to assist 
in the defense of the English coast. 
A great many alliance treaties have been concluded after 
the real need for them was past, and so it was in the case of 
the Treaty of Windsor. Portugal's independence was effec­
tively confirmed at Aljubarrota, and was not seriously threat­
ened again for almost two centuries. The most important 
immediate result of the treaty was not particularly beneficial 
to Portuguese interests. In 1387 the Portuguese found them­
selves aiding another futile effort by John of Gaunt to make 
good his claim to the Castilian throne. In 1398 the Portu­
guese were aided by an Englisli force in a successful defense 
17 
against another Castilian invasion. 
^^Ibid., p. 386. 
^^Ibid., p. 414. (Terms of the treaty are quoted in 
full in Eduardo Brazao, The Anglo-Portuguese Alliance [Lon­
don: Sylvan Press, 1957], pp. 31~34.) 
17 Edgar Prestage, "The Anglo-Portuguese Alliance," in 
Transactions of the Royal Historical Society. Fourth Series, 
17 (London: Office of the Society, 1934), p. 75. 
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Although the two kingdoms remained on friendly terms, 
fostered a flourishing trade, and linked their royal families 
and aristocracies by marriage, the political relations be­
tween England and Portugal diminished briefly during the 
fifteenth century. Portugal's great age had begun. Secure 
at home, the Portuguese launched their drive into the Atlan­
tic, exploring and colonizing. For the next century and a 
half, Portugal stood less in need of outside support than at 
any other period of her history. 
As Portugal turned outward, England turned inward. Eng­
lish interest in the Iberian peninsula waned after the death 
of John the Gaunt and his Castilian ambitions. After the 
death of Henry V, the English in France were forced onto the 
defensive. Eventually their efforts to subdue France ended 
in disaster, only their toehold at Calais remaining after 
1453. Then came the thirty years of civil strife remembered 
as the "War of the Roses." Henry VII, who ended this era in 
1485 and founded the new Tudor dynasty, was preoccupied with 
establishing his power at home and had no taste for renewed 
adventures on the Continent. His son, Henry VIII, was more 
venturesome and intervened in wars on tlie Continent during 
the early part of his reign, but Henry VIII's energies were 
fully occupied at home after his divorce of Catherine of 
Aragon and break with the Pope. The internal difficulties 
caused by England's religious transformation kept England 
too weak and divided to play much part in international 
28 
affairs throughout the reigns of Henry VIII's immediate 
successors, Edward V and Mary. (The eventual triumph of 
Protestantism in England introduced a factor that compli­
cated relations with Portugal as long as religious differ­
ences mattered in international politics. Portugal, unaf­
fected by the Reformation, remained and remains today 
staunchly Catholic.) 
Stability at home was reestablished during the reign 
of Elizabeth I. Hitherto England had played only a minor 
role in overseas exploration and trade but now English 
energies were diverted to maritime enterprise on an unpre­
cedented scale. No new era of renewed Anglo-Portuguese 
cooperation occurred, however, largely on account of develop­
ments within Portugal itself. Portugal reached its zenith 
in the early sixteenth century and thereafter went into a 
rapid decline. It was plagued by the same economic back­
wardness and religious bigotry that afflicted its Spanish 
neighbors. The quality of its leadership deteriorated. The 
Portuguese lost their lead in maritime technology to the 
Dutch and English and actually seem to have retrogressed in 
18 
shipbuilding and navigation. The basic cause of Portu­
guese decline was simple overextension. The small kingdom 
had neither the manpower nor the resources to maintain a 
18 
James Duffy, Shipwreck and Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1955), p. 166. See also, Tragic 
History of the Sea, edited by C. R. Boxer (Cambridge: Publi­
cation of the Hakluyt Society, 2nd series, CXII, 1959). 
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worldwide maritime empire. The revenues generated by Portu­
gal's monopoly o£ seaborne trade in the Indian Ocean were 
eaten up by the costs o£ enforcing the monopoly. Yet the 
garrisons the Portuguese could afford to maintain in their 
bases were tiny, and the naval forces inadequate to hunt 
down the interlopers and pirates from other European coun­
tries who trespassed on the Portuguese domain with increas­
ing impunity. 
Portugal was once again in need of foreign support, and 
England was one possible candidate for the role, although the 
success of the English Reformation had opened an ideological 
rift bet\\reen the two countries. The Treaty of Windsor, after 
all, was still legally in force. But before any such develop­
ment could come about the course of Portuguese history was 
drastically changed. 
In 1568 Sebastian I, who had inherited the Portuguese 
19 throne in 1557, came of age and acceded to power. The new 
king was a romantic incompetent whose one aim was to crusade 
against the infidel. In 1578 he fulfilled his ambition by 
leading an invasion of Morocco. On 4 August 1578, Sebastian 
(whose meager talents did not include generalsliip) led his 
army against a vastly larger Moorish force at Alcazar-Kebir. 
The Portuguese force was wiped out and Sebastian himself 
1 q 
E. W. Bovill, The Battle of Alcazar (London: The 
Batchworth Press, 1955), p. 6. 
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kilied.^ ̂ 
Alcazar-Kebir was a national calamity, not a mere 
military defeat. Sebastian had neglected to supply his 
kingdom with an heir before marching off on crusade. His 
immediate successor was his uncle, the Cardinal Henry. 
Being elderly and a Prince of the Church, Henry was obviously 
unable to carry on the line of Aviz. Henry died in January, 
21 1580. The strongest legal claim to the vacant throne be­
longed to another of Sebastian's uncles, none other than 
Philip II of Spain. Philip not only had the law on his side, 
but more importantly under the circumstances, Europe's best 
army. After careful preparations Philip sent the Spanish 
forces, commanded by the fearsome Duke of Alva, into Portu­
gal, where they swiftly crushed all resistance. On 16 April 
2 2 
1580, Philip II formally assumed the Portuguese throne. 
Thus began the sixty-year period under the Spanish monarchy 
23 
which the Portuguese call the "Babylonian Captivity." 
It should be noted that Philip's seizure of the Portu-
2 0 Ibid., p. 129. (Although Sebastian's body was later 
recovered from the Moors, a story soon spread that he had 
survived the battle, and imposters claiming to be Sebastian 
turned up in the following years. A cult of "Sebastianism" 
in which the King figured as a "sleeping hero" on the order 
of King Arthur or Barbarossa persisted in Portugal for cen­
turies. See Boville, pp. 155-57.) 
^^Ibid., p. 151. 
^^Ibid. , p. 155. 
^^Charles E. Nowell, A History of Portugal (New York: 
Van Nostrand, 1952), p. 133"^ 
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guese throne was not quite a "Spanish conquest." Portugal 
remained a separate entity, one of the collection of king­
doms and principalities over which Philip ruled. On assuming 
the throne Philip made pledges (whicli he observed scrupu­
lously) to respect all Portuguese laws and to appoint only 
Portuguese to positions of authority within the kingdom. 
Philip was generally supported by the Portuguese nobility 
24 and clergy. The Portuguese could at least hope that they 
had secured the powerful ally they needed--although they had 
paid an exceedingly high price for his help. 
Under the circumstances, however, Portugal and Portu­
guese interests were inevitably subordinated to her great 
neighbor. Portugal was dragged into Spanish quarrels, no 
longer pursuing any foreign policy of her own. Philip II 
was quite aware of the resources and strategic advantages 
he would obtain by absorbing Portugal into his empire and 
gaining them may have been his main objective from tlie begin-
25 
ning. 
The international repercussions of Philip's seizure 
were enormous, and nowhere better appreciated than in London. 
The English could only stand by hcl])lessly and watcli as 
Philip swallowed Portugal, much as they opposed and dreaded 
2 6 
any Luso-Spanish union. The future would prove that 
^'^Boville, p. 154. 
^^Ibid. , p. 153. 
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Elizabeth had justifiable cause for concern. Sebastian's 
death occurred at exactly the wrong time, from the English 
viewpoint. Hostility between Spain and England had not 
yet reached a crisis pitch, sufficient to spur the cautious 
Elizabeth into making an effort to revive the Portuguese 
alliance. The growing hostility was far enough advanced, 
however, to insure that a Portugal controlled by Spain 
would create worrisome security problems for England. 
In 1585 the great war between Spain and England that 
had been impending for a decade finally broke out. The 
acquisition of Portugal by Philip was an important if not 
indispensable prelude to his decision to risk open war with 
the English. "The acquisition of Portugal meant a great 
increase in Spanish strength in the Atlantic," wrote the 
2 7 foremost authority on the Spanish Armada. 
The important role of Portugal in the story of the 
Spanish Armada is frequently overlooked in accounts of that 
ill-fated expedition. It is a demonstration of the role of 
"strategic location" since no other port on Iberia's Atlantic 
coast could have been used by such a large fleet. If the 
port of Lisbon was a useful entryway into the Iberian penin­
sula, it was no less useful as a point of departure for an 
enemy bent on the invasion of England. The fleet assembled 
in the Tagus estuary and sailed from Lisbon harbor on 9 May 
2 7 
Garrett Mattingly, The Armada (Boston: Houghton Miff­
lin, 1959), p. 75. 
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1588. 
The Portuguese not only provided the staging base for 
the "Enterprise of England," but a considerable proportion 
of its total strength. Ten galleons (as many as were pro­
vided by Gastile) were included, as were four Portuguese 
galleys. Portuguese ships thus made up more than 10 per­
cent of the Armada's total, and a much higher proportion of 
effective fighting units in a force that actually consisted 
2 9 mostly of armed merchantmen. There is no need to recount 
the well-known tale of the Armada. One need only note that 
the Portuguese contributed their share of the heavy losses 
suffered by the Armada; three of the ten Portuguese galleons 
3 0 never got home. This was the first taste of the many mis­
fortunes that Spanish domination would bring. 
The destruction of the Armada (as is often forgotten) 
was only the beginning of a long war, whose end neither 
Elizabeth nor Philip II lived to see. The Portuguese found 
themselves in the "front line" of this the first great naval 
war to be waged between western European powers. 
As subjects of Philip II, the Portuguese were fair 
game for English privateers. Their merchant fleet was 
31 
preyed upon by Drake, Hawkins and tlieir host of imitators. 
•^^Ibid. , p. 245. 
2^Ibid. , p.- 247. 
30ibid., p. 370. 
^^Kenneth R. Andrews, Elizabethan Privateering (Cam­
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964} , p~i 2 06. 
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The English government did not merely aim at plundering 
Portuguese commerce as an incidental by-product o£ the 
assault on the Spanish. Portugal played a much more impor­
tant role in its strategy. This is shown by their ambitious 
riposte to the Armada, the "Portugal Expedition" o£ 1589. 
The English government was very conscious o£ the great 
advantages it would enjoy i£ it could somehow detach Portu­
gal from the Spanish empire and recreate the alliance of 
1386. At a stroke Spain's naval powers would be reduced. 
Her sea communications with the Americas would be imperiled 
by a hostile power in control of the Azores. At home Spanish 
resources would be diverted to defense of her own borders. 
And it happened there was in England a person who claimed to 
be able to do just that. 
This man was Dom Antonio, the Prior of Crato, the only 
serious rival to Philip II for the Portuguese throne. Since 
he was a bastard son of Sebastian's predecessor, his claim 
was marred by illegitimacy. But he v\fas preferred by many 
Portuguese (especially among the lower classes) as a native 
32 
over the foreigner Philip II. As was related earlier, his 
adherents were easily beaten by A.lvas Tercios, but the tena­
cious Antonio did not give up. Going first to France, he 
persuaded Catherine de Medici (the real ruler of France at 
the time) to lend him a fleet for an attempt to seize the 
^^Oliveira Marques, 1:313. 
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Azores. He planned to use the Azores as his base in a bid 
to reconquer Portugal. (Antonio had many supporters in the 
islands; not for the last time the Azores were a center of 
dissidence in Portuguese politics.) But no sooner had 
Antonio's fleet reached the Azores than it was attacked 
and utterly destroyed by a Portuguese loyalist fleet (led 
by a great Spanish Admiral, the Marquis of Santa Cruz) off 
3 3 Terceira, in 1583. Antonio himself escaped. 
Undaunted, Dom Antonio came to England after war began 
with Spain. There he made many friends among the English 
seadogs (including Francis Drake) and persuaded the English 
government that if he arrived within Portugal with an army 
and a fleet, the Portuguese people would rise in his be-
34 
half. This was to be one of the three objectives (the 
others: to destroy the remnants of the Armada in the ports 
of north Spain, and to seize one or another of the Azores) 
of the English counteroffensive. This took the form of a 
huge amphibious expedition, as large as the Spanish Armada 
had been with Drake himself as naval commander and "Black 
John" Norris, the most distinguished soldier in England, as 
3 5 commander on the land, 
3 3 A. L. Rowse, The Expansion of Elizabethan England 
(New "York; Scribners, n.d.), p. 259. 
Ibid., p. 28 3. 
3 5 R. B. Wernham, "Queen Elizabeth and the Portugal 
Expedition of 1589," English Historical Review 66 (1951) 
(2 parts); 1:1. 
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After numerous delays, the English armada departed in 
April, 1589. With such strength and such commanders it 
seemed assured of success. But it proved to be as complete 
a failure as the Spanish Armada, altliough less costly in 
life. It suffered from the fundamental military faults of 
multiple objectives and divided command (there were constant 
disputes between the cautious Norris and the daring Drake). 
The overcrowded, under-provisioned English ships were ravaged 
by disease. The attempt to attack the Armada remnants in 
Corunna proved abortive. 
The total failure of the operation was assured when the 
English army landed in Portugal (fifty miles from Lisbon) and 
the Portuguese people failed to rise up against the Spaniards. 
Like many a political emigre seeking foreign support, Dom 
Antonio had promised far more than he could deliver. The 
Spaniards held Portugal in an iron grip, and Dom Antonio 
looked little like a national liberator when he handed in 
37 
Portugal behind an army of heretical foreigners. The Eng­
lish army was too small to seize Lisbon by itself, and was 
forced to withdraw without accomplishing anything. An attempt 
to sail to the Azores was thwarted by fierce storms. All tlie 
English had to show for their great effort was the capture of 
eighty foreign merchant ships who sailed into the Tagus estuary 
^^Rowse, p. 285. 
37 Prestage, "Anglo-Portuguese Alliance," p. 88. 
3 8 at tlie wrong time. 
This fiasco ended any chance for an early or decisive 
end to the Anglo-Spanish war. A long, exhausting struggle, 
gradually locking the contestants into stalemate, was the 
inevitable result. The English were normally on the offen­
sive, the Spanish on the defensive, with the protection of 
their shipping as a primary concern and they both wanted 
Portugal and her islands. To accomplish this, they built 
up an imposing system of commerce protection, involving con­
voys, patrolling fleets, and fortified harbors. One of the 
most important features of this system was the Spanish con­
trol of the Azores. Terceira was turned into a great island 
fortress, in whose harbor the Spanish treasure fleets could 
3 9 
shelter. For reasons explained in Chapter 1, eastbound 
ships normally passed near the Azores. 
The Azores were a risky, but profitable, hunting ground 
for English commerce raiders who swarmed about the islands 
4 0 throughout the war. As the Portugal Expedition demon­
strated, the English were quite aware of the importance of 
the Azores. In 1589 John Hawkins, Drake's greatest rival, 
proposed a plan which England would attempt to cut off 
Spanish trade by keeping a squadron on station near the 
^^Wernham, 2:212-213. 
39 
Rowse, p. 2 89. 
40 
Andrews, p. 34. 
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Azores to intercept all ships sailing from the islands to 
Spain.This scheme was never adopted as it required more 
ships and better organization than were available in Eliza­
bethan England. But it testifies to the acute conscious­
ness o£ the Azores' crucial role in the minds o£ England's 
pioneer naval strategists. 
The last major English operation o£ the war was the 
"Island Voyage" of 1597. A fleet led by the Earl of Essex 
with Lord Thomas Howard and Sir Walter Raleigh each in a 
command of a squadron, sailed to attack the Azores (after 
an abortive attack on the Spanish port of Ferrol) with the 
intention of seizing all except the heavily fortified 
Terceira.Then they would lay in wait for the annual 
Spanish treasure fleet, the "flota." Raleigh landed in 
Rayal and captured the island, while a force of Dutch troops 
sailing with the expedition ravaged Pico. But the expedi­
tion, hampered by quarrels between Raleigh and Essex, missed 
the flota by only twelve hours. Largely because of Essex's 
43 
bungling, the treasure ships sailed into Terceira unscathed. 
A  s u b s e q u e n t  a t t e m p t  t o  s e i z e  S a o  M i g u e l  a l s o  f a i l e d . T h e  
Essex's fleet tlicn sailed liome. 
The increasingly pointless war dragged on until 160.4, 
when .the new King of Great Britain, James I, made it his 
41lbid., p. 19. 
42sir Julian Corbett, The Successors of Drake (London: 
Longmans, Green and Co., 1916), p. 193. 
43ibid., pp. 196-203. '^'^Ibid., p. 208. 
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first order o£ business to end the conflict. Portugal's 
status was unaffected by the peace. It was still a firmly 
held vassal state. The English, during the war, had re­
ceived many object lessons of the dangers created by a 
hostile power in control of Portugal; the Portuguese learned 
the dire results of incurring English hostility. The les­
sons learned would shape the relations of the two countries 
in the next century after Portugal once again gained the 
power to pursue its own foreign policy. 
Renewal of Alliance 
The long Spanish domination of Portugal ended abruptly 
in 1640. Whatever support the Spanish monarchy had in Portu­
gal had withered away in the total absence of Spanish protec­
tion for Portugal's overseas possessions. The Dutch particu­
larly had preyed on the Portuguese empire, completely destroy­
ing its domination of the Indian Ocean. They had also come 
near conquering Portugal's richest remaining colony, Brazil. 
The Dutch were finally frustrated but by Portuguese efforts 
alone. The Spanish provided very little aid.^^ 
The Spanish government also whittled away at Portugal's 
local autonomy, which Philip II had solemnly promised and 
generally protected. His successors were less scrupulous. 
The Count-Duke of Olivares, Chief Minister of Philip IV (and 
^^See C. R. Boxer, The Dutcii in Brazil (Oxford: The 
Clarendon Press, 1957). 
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real ruler o£ Spain) bent on reforming and centralizing the 
creaking .Spanish empire, was especially guilty of infringing 
on Portuguese privileges. Olivares' policies were resented 
throughout non-Castilian regions of the Iberian peninsula. 
In 1640 the Catalans (in the northeastern corner of Spain) 
were driven to revolt. The Portuguese, called upon to sup­
ply troops to help in the suppression of the rising, instead 
46 revolted themselves. On 1 December 1640, the end of Spanish 
domination was proclaimed and a few days later the head of the 
great House of Bragan^a assumed the Portuguese throne as Joas 
(John) IV. 
Portugal's renewed independence was precarious, pro­
tected more by Spanish weakness than by the nation's own 
strength. The Spaniards were preoccupied for many years in 
putting down the stubborn Catalans, and had no resources to 
spare for the reconquest of Portugal, The Portuguese needed 
foreign assistance if they were to retain their sovereignty. 
This assistance they received not from England, but rather 
from France. Cardinal Richelieu, the archenemy of the 
Spanish Habsburgs, was already backing the Catalan rebels 
and regarded the Portuguese secession as another opportunity 
to weaken Spain. He was the first to recognize Portuguese 
46 
J. H. Elliott, The Revolt of the Catalans (Cambridge; 
Cambridge University Press, 1963), p. 517. 
'^^Edgar Prestage, "The Treaties of 1642 , 1654 , and 1661," 
in Chapters in Anglo-Portuguese Relations, edited by Edgar 
Prestage, p. 130. 
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independence, although he made no formal alliance with 
r. 1 48 Portugal. 
In 1640 relations between Spain and England were ami­
able and the Portuguese neither expected nor received Eng­
lish aid. But King Charles I received a Portuguese ambassa­
dor in April, 1641, and on 24 January 1642, a treaty was 
49 signed between the two countries. Although Article 20 o£ 
this treaty referred to a "peace and alliance" between the 
two kingdoms, this agreement was primarily a commercial 
treaty, allowing English merchants access to the Portuguese 
dominions and guaranteeing religious toleration to English 
subjects traveling or residing in Portugal. 
The year when Anglo-Portuguese ties ivere renewed, 1642 , 
was also the year in which the long quarrel between the 
Stuarts and Parliament finally precipitated civil war. For 
many years to come the English (as in the fifteenth century) 
concentrated their energies on internal revolution and had 
little time to spare for foreign problems. Development of 
the Anglo-Portuguese relationship was effectively stalled 
for a dozen years. 
Joao IV was sympathetic to the Stuart causc and even 
involved himself in the English civil war to a small degree. 
The Portuguese ambassador to England, Sousa de Macedo, arranged 
'^^Ibid., p. 133. 
49 
Brazao, p. 36. 
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for the supply of munitions to the Royalist forces, and 
served as an intermediary for Charles I's correspondence 
with his queen and other supporters on the continent. 
Sousa de Macedo left England in 1646 and for five years 
thereafter there were no diplomatic relations between Portu­
gal and Britain,After the Royalist defeat in England 
and the execution of Charles I in 1649, a Royalist fleet 
under Prince Rupert (the great Royalist cavalry commander) 
arrived in Portuguese waters. Despite Portuguese efforts 
to maintain a neutral stance, Rupert's ships used Lisbon as 
a base to attack Parliament's shipping. The inevitable re­
sult was the arrival of a Parliamentary fleet (under Robert 
Blake, another soldier turned admiral) off the Portuguese 
coast. The Portuguese ports were blockaded and shots ex­
changed between Blake's ships and the forts guarding Lisbon 
5 2 
harbor. After some further hostilities Joao IV realized 
he could not afford enmity with the new masters of England. 
Prince Rupert was forced to leave Portuguese waters, and a 
Portuguese envoy was commissioned to negotiate a treaty 
with Parliament, It took three years of hard negotiations 
before a treaty was finally signed on 10 July (O.S.) 1654, 
and this agreement represented a near total capitulation of 
^'^Px'estage, "Treaties of 1642, 1654, and 1661, p. 137. 
^^Ibid., p. 140. 
R, Powell, Robert Blake, General-At-Sea (New York: 
Crane, Russak, 1971), pp. 90-92. 
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Portugal to England's demands. Once again the main issues 
were the commercial and religious rights of Englishmen in 
Portugal. Englishmen were given virtual extra-territorial 
rights on Portuguese soil, and the Portuguese government 
agreed to limit customs duties to 23 percent and not raise 
5 3 them without the agreement of the English merchants. The 
treaty of 1654 represented the beginning of a trend--the 
inexorable passage of Portugal into the English economic 
orbit, the development of Portugal into an economic appendage 
of the British empire--which would reach fulfillment in the 
following century. In return for their concessions the Portu­
guese received nothing substantial. Not surprisingly, Joao 
IV refused to ratify the treaty until April, 1657, finally 
doing so only after another visit by Blake's fleet. 
In the meantime, the Spanish, having finally suppressed 
the rebellion in Catalonia, made a serious effort to reconquer 
Portugal. Cromwell's government could not and would not tol­
erate any Spanish reconquest of Portugal. This, in turn, 
illuminated another enduring element in the Anglo-Portuguese 
relationship; if Britain bullied Portugal, it also protected 
her. The strategic importance of Portugal permitted Britain 
no other course of policy. 
.Blake's fleet, having twice visited Lisbon to intimidate 
^^Prestage, "Treaties of 1642, 1654, and 1661," p. 145. 
^^Powell, p. 282. 
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the Portuguese, arrived a third time to protect them (11 
July 1657).^^ Shortly thereafter Blake died, but his mis­
sion proved successful. This great (if little known) 
British admiral always realized that the loss of Lisbon as 
a strategic base to careen and water his ships wpuld make 
it impossible to carry on Cromwell's cherished crusade 
against Spain. 
Blake's visit removed the Spanish threat to Portugal 
only temporarily. As an additional measure of support, the 
Portuguese were permitted to recruit 12,000 mercenary troops 
in the British Isles (a policy harking back to the fourteenth 
century treaties) by a treaty signed at Whitehall on 18 April 
5 7 1660. Before this treaty could be ratified, Charles II was 
restored to the English throne. 
The "Marriage Treaty" of 23 June 1661, is one of the 
most important, if not the most important, of the pacts nego­
tiated between Britain and Portugal. Political upheaval in 
England, for once, operated in Portugal's favor. The new 
king had reason to be grateful for Portuguese support during 
the Civil V/ar, and he was betrothed to Catherine of Braganga, 
the daughter of Joao IV. Charles II's accession was soon 
followed by important developments in Anglo-Portuguese rela­
tions for nearly three centuries, but it also remains in 
S^Ibid., p. 308. 
56ibid., p. 282, 
57Brazao, p. 39. 
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force to this day. It ratified all the treaties between the 
two countries going back to 1641 but went much farther than 
any of them. The treaty provided for an unconditional alli­
ance between Britain and Portugal, binding Charles II to 
provide troops for Portugal's defense, to send a fleet of at 
least ten ships to guard the Portuguese coast, and to make, 
no treaty of peace with Spain prejudicing Portuguese inter­
ests. In a secret article Charles also promised to mediate 
the long war between Portugal and the Netherlands, and fail­
ing that, to defend Portuguese territory against Dutch 
5 8 attacks just as if it were English. In return, the Portu­
guese promised a large dowry for Catherine, the cession of 
Tangier and Bombay, and confirmation of English commercial 
5 9 privileges. (Tangier, which the English only occupied for 
twenty-two years, lay on the Mediterranean coast of Morocco 
and served England, while she held it somewhat as Gibralter 
did later; and Bombay proved to be a useful point of pene­
tration into western India.) These territorial cessions 
were unpopular in Portugal but the results of the treaty 
proved well worth the price. English troops sent to Portu­
gal helped beat off yet another invasion, and by a treaty 
signed 13 February 1668 (largely negotiated by the Earl of 
Sandwich) Spain at last recognized the independence of 
^^Keith Foiling, British Foreign Policy, 1660-1672 
(London: Frank Cass, 1968), p. 49. 
^^Prestage, "Treaties of 1642, 1654, and 1661," p. 149. 
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T i  .  , 6 0  Portugal. 
The three decades following 1668 were a relatively 
peaceful time for Portugal. As a neutral under British 
protection, she avoided involvement in the earlier phases 
of the long struggle between Louis XIV and the other powers 
of Europe. Not until 1703 was the little country dragged 
back into the European power struggle. Portugal was rein-
volved by the Spanish Succession crisis. The central issue 
of the crisis--whether the Spanish throne would be allowed 
to pass to a Bourbon, and the Spanish empire to be united 
with the power and vitality of France--had obvious implica­
tions for Portugal. Her independence, so recently redeemed, 
would be endangered if the decrepit government of Charles 
the Bewitched were replaced by a monarchy backed by French 
might. The first course of action adopted by the current 
Portuguese King, Pedro II, was a policy of appeasement. In 
June of 1701 he signed a treaty with France by which he 
agreed to acknowledge Philip V (Louis XIV's nephew) as right­
ful King of Spain, and to close his ports to the ships of 
Philip's enemies. In return, he received a French promise 
of aid against any state who objected to the treaty. 
Pedro was driven to this step bccause lie felt unsure of 
^'^Prestage, "Anglo-Portuguese Alliance," p. 90. 
^^Sir Richard Lodge, "The Treaties of 1703," in Chapters 
of Anglo-Portuguese Relations, edited by Edgar Prestage, 
pp. 157-158. 
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British support since Britain had not yet made up its mind 
to" oppose by force a Bourbon accession to the throne of 
Spain. In a matter of months, however, the British formed 
the Grand Alliance with Austria and the Netherlands. Britain 
regarded the Franco-Portuguese arrangement of 1701 as an 
intolerable obstacle to the effective cooperation of the 
Grand Alliance. A war against France in cooperation with 
Austria would necessarily involve major naval operations in 
the western Mediterranean. Lacking any other base in the 
region since Tangier had already been abandoned, the British 
fleet was utterly dependent upon access to Portuguese ports 
6 2 for supplies and repair facilities. Portugal's location, 
whose relative remoteness from earlier struggles between 
Louis XIV and his foes (which had been waged mostly in 
Flanders and the Rhineland) had made possible years of peace; 
now plunged her into a very dangerous dilemma. If she of­
fended Philip V and his mighty uncle, she would be exposed 
to invasion by French and Spanish forces. If she held to the 
treaty with France, she would be attacked from the sea, her 
colonies and commerce in peril from the same British seapower 
that formerly had protected them. 
The. dilemma was solved by a vigorous British diplomatic 
offensive. Britain was not prepared to tolerate a French-
dominated Portugal and was determined to dismantle Pedro II's 
^^Ibid., p. 158. 
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entente with France by diplomacy if possible, or force if 
necessary. To accomplish their ends the British were able 
to call upon the talents of a remarkable father-and-son 
team, John and Paul Methuen. In 17 02 Paul Methuen was the 
British Envoy Extraordinary in Portugal, a post in which he 
had succeeded his father in 1697. Both men had long exper­
ience in Portugal, both diplomatic and commercial, and wide 
contacts within the country. The British government sent 
Lord John Methuen (then Chancellor of Ireland) back to Portu­
gal in 17 03 with the rank of Ambassador. Lord John's primary 
mission was to demand the opening of Portuguese harbors to 
British ships. He was instructed to warn Pedro II that 
friendship with France would mean an inevitable break with 
Britain. He was to urge Pedro to join the Grand Alliance, 
offering to accept any "reasonable demands" for an increase 
in Portuguese territory, as well as to give Portugal the 
same security guarantees that France had extended. 
The Methuens had no great difficulty in persuading 
Portugal to come over into the British camp. Pedro's agree­
ment with France, inspired mostly by fear, was unnecessary 
now that Portugal was assured of British support. His change 
of front was formalized by the two "Methuen Treaties" of 1703. 
The first of these, a treaty of military and political' alliance 
A. D. Francis, The Methuens and Portugal (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1966), p. 51. 
^^Lodge, p. 159. 
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by which Portugal adhered to the anti-French coalition, was 
signed on 16 May 1703; the second, a short commercial treaty 
which allowed free trade in English wool and Portuguese 
6 5 wines, on 27 December, By a quirk of circumstance, this 
treaty is much more famous than the Alliance, to which it 
was a mere epilogue. It soon resulted in the replacement 
of French claret by Portuguese port and madeira as the 
accustomed drink of English gentlemen. Hence it was remem­
bered long after the War of the Spanish Succession and the 
diplomacy that was inspired had faded into the mists of 
time. It has been called "the most famous of all commercial 
treaties. 
At the time, however, the signing of this treaty was 
nearly lost in the struggles of the War of the Spanish Suc­
cession. A spectacular British-Dutch naval victory off 
Vigo, on the north Spanish coast, on 23 September 1702, re­
moved the last Portuguese qualms about joining the Grand 
6 7 Alliance. The Iberian peninsula, logically enough, was 
to be a major theater in the War of the Spanish Succession, 
and Portugal played an important role in the strategy of 
the"Allies. A central war aim of the Grand Alliance was to 
^^Brazao, p. 44. 
^^Lodge, pp. 165-66. 
^^Francis, p. 151. 
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drive Philip V from Spain and replace him with his Austrian 
rival for the Spanish throne, the Archduke Charles. This 
necessitated major campaigning by the Allies within Spain 
itself. For the first time since the Hundred Years War, 
British troops were committed on land in the Peninsula not 
only to protect or liberate Portugal, but to conquer Spain 
as well. This aim they could not hope to achieve without 
Portuguese assistance. They needed Lisbon as a base, access 
to Portuguese supplies, and Portuguese troops to reinforce 
them. 
Before this project could be attempted, the Franco-
Spanish forces, led by Philip V and the French Commander, 
6 8 
the Duke of Berwick, invaded Portugal in March of 17 04, 
intending to conquer Lisbon, and was stopped in the summer 
more by logistical difficulties and hot weather than by 
Portuguese resistance.In the spring of 1704 some 21,000 
British and Dutch troops landed in Portugal. The British 
troops were led by the Earl of Galway under the supreme com-
7 0 mand of the Marquis das Minas, a Portuguese general. In 
1706 this army marched on Madrid (most of the French troops 
6 8 Actually an Englishman, tlie bastard son of the exiled 
King James II and nephew of the Duke of Marlborough, some of 
whose military talent he inherited. 
6 9 Henry Kamen, The War of Succession in Spain 1700-15 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1969) , p~! 12. 
7 0 The French forces in Spain were led by an English 
expatriate, the English forces by a Frenchman--Galway was 
a French Haguenot refugee (Kamen, p. 19). 
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in Spain were then besieging Barcelona) and took the capital 
71 o£ Spain on 27 June. But the people o£ Madrid refused to 
accept the Archduke Charles as King o£ Spain, and a British 
force led by the brilliant but erratic Earl of Peterborough, 
for reasons unclear to this day, failed to unite witn. Galway 
after a march from Valencia on the east coast of Spain. 
Galway, cut off from Portugal, had to abandon Madrid and 
withdraw to Valencia. The Allies' great chance to conquer 
Spain was wasted. The following year Galvvfay's army was 
destroyed by Berwick's forces at the battle of Almansa, 25 
April 1707.^^ 
The record of British military operations in Spain from 
the fourteenth century until the year 1808 is enough to con­
vince the superstitious that they were conducted under some 
kind of curse. Again and again during the Hundred Years War, 
the Elizabethan wars, and now again in the War of the Spanish 
Succession, ambitious British military expeditions marched 
into the peninsula only to be undone by logistical breakdowns, 
quarrels between allied commanders, poor generalship, or any 
> 
combination of the three. Never was failure more resounding 
than in 17 07. 
Despite defeats in Spain, the Allies won the war. Marl­
borough's brilliant victories in Germany and Flanders, and 
^^Kamen, p. 17. 
^^Ibid., p. 19. 
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Allied control o£ the sea (in which their control o£ Portu­
gal's harbors played no small part) canceled out failures 
in the peninsula. What fighting occurred in Iberia after 
1707 took place mostly in Aragon. France, fighting for its 
life on other fronts, was unable to spare troops to attack 
73 Portugal. In the end Philip V, by the treaty of Utrecht, 
was recognized as King of Spain, but no union between France 
and Spain was permitted. Britain, now in control of Minorca 
and Gibralter, depended less than before on the use of Portu­
guese harbors, but was also better placed than before to 
assist Portugal if the need arose. Nearly a hundred years 
passed before the nation's security was seriously threatened 
again. 
Portugal stayed out of European conflicts for the re­
mainder of the century, assisted by the fact that the epi­
centers of these conflicts were safely remote. "Portugal's 
distant but axial geographic position, togethr with its 
alliance with Europe's premier maritime power, enabled it 
74 to avoid major involvement." Portugal was involved very 
briefly in the last stage of the Seven Years War. Spain 
was foolish enougli to enter the war on France's side after 
France had effectively lost it. As a result, Portugal as 
Britain's ally was threatened with invasion in 1762. The 
^^Ibid,, p. 23. 
^'^Stanley G. Payne, History of Spain and Portugal, 2:404. 
Alliance Treaty with Britain was invoked and a British force 
o£ six infantry and one cavalry regiments landed at Lisbon 
to assist in the country's defense. The whole episode was 
minor, important only in that it conformed with an already 
established pattern of active British intervention whenever 
7 5 Portugal seemed threatened. 
On the whole the eighteenth century was a prosperous 
7 
period for Portugal. Trade with Britain flourished. For 
many years the ruthless but efficient Marquis de Pombal 
ruled as a dictator. Almost the only event in Portugal 
noticed by the outside world was the disastrous Lisbon earth­
quake of 1755, the worst ever to strike a western European 
c ity. 
Like the earlier upheavals involving France, the wars 
of the French Revolution affected Portugal rather late. 
Significantly, Portugal was drawn in Britain's wake. A 
treaty signed between the two on 26 September 1793, required 
Portugal to close her ports to French ships. At first Spain 
and Portugal fought France together as allies, but in 1795 
Spain made peace with France, changed sides, and in 1797 
invaded Portugal once again. Once more a British force 
7 7 landed in Portugal, Unfortunately for Portugal, the British 
• 7 5 
Harold Livermore, A History of Portugal (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1947), pp. 368-69. 
^^See H. E. S. Fisher, The Portugal Trade (London: 
Methuen,1971). 
7 7 Prestage, "Anglo-Portuguese Alliance," p. 93. 
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were too hard pressed elsewhere to send aid when Spain, 
still a French satellite, invaded again in 1801. The Portu­
guese were forced to sue for peace, and yield the district 
of Olivenga on their eastern border to Spain, cede some 
Brazilian territory to French Guiana, and pay France a large 
indemnity. When Britain signed a peace treaty with France 
at Amiens in 1802, she failed to demand the restoration of 
7 8 Oliven^a to Portugal and Spain has kept it ever since. 
This humiliation was followed by five years of peace 
for Portugal. In 1807 the country faced an ominous new 
threat to her existence, the most menacing to arise since 
1661--the wrath of Napoleon himself. The Emperor of France 
was irritated by the large hole Portugal opened in his 
Continent-wide boycott of Britain known as the Continental 
System. Portugal in 1807 was the only continental country 
not dominated by Napoleon. Portugal's ports served as entry 
points for British goods into the Iberian peninsula, whence 
they were smuggled all over Europe, undermining Napoleon's 
grand scheme to wreck the prosperity of the "nation of shop­
keepers." The Portuguese refused to close their ports to 
7 9 British shipping and Napoleon decided to resort to force. 
Napoleon's only access to Portugal was through Spanish 
territory. Spain was an ally of Franco, albeit a reluctant 
Ibid. , p . 93. 
7 9 R. B. Mowat, The Diplomacy of Napoleon (New York: 
Longmans, Green and Co., 1924), p. 209. 
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one. To gain Spanish assent to an attack on Portugal, 
Napoleon signed the treaty of Fontainebleau with Manual de 
Godoy, the Chief Minister and actual ruler of Spain, on 27 
October 1807. This treaty provided for the partition of 
Portugal. The northern provinces were to be handed over to 
an Italian relative of the Spanish Bourbons, the King of 
Etruria, who was to become King of "Northern Lusitania," 
the southern province to Godoy himself as "King of the 
Algarves," and central Portugal to be held until the peace 
treaty, whereupon it would be given back to the House of 
Braganca if Britain restored Gibralter and Trinidad to 
c - 8 0 Spain. 
Napoleon never intended to abide by the provisions of 
this treaty as will shortly be seen. He had other plans 
for the Spanish Bourbons. Fontainebleau won for Napoleon 
what he needed, a pretext to introduce large French forces 
into Spain. On 18 October 1807 the French general Junot 
led a French army across the Pyrennes and on 13 November 
it was announced in le Moniteur, Napoleon's official news­
paper, that "the regent of Portugal (Prince Joao of Braganga) 
is losing his tlironc." The Portuguese were lielplcss in the 
face of French might. On 29 November the Portuguese count 
boarded ship and sailed off to Brazil under the escort of 
81 
the British Navy. Junot entered Lisbon the next day. 
^^Ibid., p. 210. 
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Having disposed of the Bragancas, Napoleon turned his 
attention to the Spanish Bourbons. As soon as his troops 
had occupied Spain in force, he summoned Charles IV, the 
old King of Spain who had just abdicated, and his son 
Ferdinand VII to France and forced them to sign over the 
Spanish kingdom to Napoleon (the Treaty of Bayonne, 5 May 
8 2 
1808). Napoleon put his brother Joseph Bonaparte on the 
Spanish throne. This was a fatal blunder. Even before the 
treaty was signed at Bayonne, the people of Madrid rose in 
arms against the French on 2 May. The revolt was swiftly 
crushed, but the "Dos de Mayo" proved only the beginning of 
a savage guerrilla war, a war which involved the v\/hole of 
c • 83 Spain. 
The Spanish rising offered tempting opportunities to 
Great Britain. Spain, a long-time enemy, was suddenly con­
verted into an ally. By coincidence the British had just 
assembled an expeditionary force (ironically, to invade 
Spanish South America) under a promising general who had 
made a name for himself in India, Sir Arthur Wellesley. 
Wellesley's objective was abruptly diverted from Buenos 
Aires to the peninsula. Wellesley's orders originally were 
to land in northern Spain if possible, with Portugal as an 
alternative. The British Navy badly wanted to retake Lisbon 
^^Ibid., p. 213. 
8 3 
Gabriel H. Lovett, Napoleon and the Birth of Modern 
Spain (New York: New York University Press, 1965), 1:14. 
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8 4 harbor. The actual British beachhead on the peninsula 
was at Coimbra in the north of Portugal, where Wellesley's 
8 5 troops landed on 1 August 1808. Three weeks later 
Wellesley defeated Junot's troops so badly at the battle 
of Vimeiro that the French in Portugal were compelled to 
surrender. Immediately after Vimeiro Wellesley was super­
seded by two British generals senior to him, Sir Hew 
Dalrymple and Sir Harry Burrard. These gentlemen granted 
Junot unbelievably lenient terms by the Convention of Cintra, 
31 August 1808. The Convention caused a furor in Britain. 
Dalrymple and Burrard were promptly sacked and Wellesley 
8 6 
narrowly escaped the same fate. It did not greatly matter. 
The British now held Portugal. Their control of Lisbon har­
bor provided them once again their traditional sally port 
into the peninsula. This advantage was to prove of crucial 
importance to the outcome of the peninsular campaigns--and 
of the Napoleonic war as a whole. 
The campaigns of the Peninsular War covered a period 
of six years, and are far too complex and dramatic to sum­
marize here. (Two great British military historians. Sir 
Charles Napier and Sir Charles Oman, published liistorics oC 
^^Richard Glover, The Peninsular War 1807-1814 (London: 
David and Charles, 1974), p. 59. 
o r 
Elizabeth Longford, Wellington, The Years of the 
Sword (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), p. 148. 
^^Glover, p. 71. 
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the Peninsular War, and both required many volumes for the 
task.) The British owed their triumph in the peninsula to 
several advantages. There was the Spanish guerrilla resis­
tance, which normally tied down most French troops in the 
peninsula, draining their manpower and morale. There was 
the leadership of Arthur Wellesley (or the Duke of Welling­
ton as he was to become), a master of logistics and defensive 
tactics, who knew how to make the most of limited resources. 
And there was British control of Portugal, which when coupled 
with British control of the seas, assured the British of a 
secure base and dependable supply lines--an inestimable ad­
vantage over the French trying to live off the barren and 
war-ravaged countryside of Spain. Without Lisbon the British 
could not have fought in the peninsula. Here, as many times 
before, it proved the importance of strategic location. 
This fact was known by the French as well as by the 
British. After Vimiero they made two attempts to oust the 
British from Portugal. The first, in May of 1809, was frus­
trated by a British victory near Oporto, the battle of the 
o y 
Douro. The second, which was launched in 1810, was a much 
more massive affair, aimed at expelling the British from the 
peninsula once and for all. The invading army, heavily rein­
forced from France, was commanded by Andre Massena, one of 
most famous of Napoleon's marshals. He, too, recognized the 
^^Ibid., p. 98. 
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strategic importance o£ Portugal to all o£ Europe and im­
pressed its significance upon his men. As Jean Jacques 
Pelet, one o£ Massena's chief staff officers,• wrote later: 
At last we were starting on our long - announced 
expedition, closely watched by all of Eu­
rope. ... It was at Lisbon that the fate of 
the peninsula was to be decided and perhaps 
the destiny of the world; if the British were 
forced to abandon the capital they would lose 
all their influence in Spain [sic]. No other 
part of the country offered them the same 
resources and advantages, and they would lose 
the means of maintaining their army and 
fomenting insurrection. Portugal would sub­
mit and Spain, exhausted and discouraged, 
would follow its example as soon as it was 
abandoned. Then England would find itself 
isolated and blockaded on its island. It 
would lose hope of renewing its intrigues 
with the governments conjoined in the Conti­
nental System. Then France could preserve its 
preponderance in Europe which could only in­
crease with its excellent army of three hun­
dred thousand in Spain composed of the best 
corps available. Any other outcome of the 
expedition could only bring the opposite re­
sults . 88 
Massena's army of three corps of 7 0,000 men began its march 
into Portugal in August, 1810. Wellington's 50,000 British 
and Portuguese troops fell back before him, fighting a sue-
8 9 cessful delaying action at Busaco on 27 September 1810. 
As he retreated, Wellington adopted a scorched-earth policy, 
destroying crops, wrecking roads and bridges, burning vil­
lages, and driving off livestock. The Portuguese National 
8 8 Jean Jacques Pelet, The French Campaign in Portugal 
1810-1811. edited, annotated and translated by Donald W, 
Howard (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1973), 
pp. 157-158. 
89 
Glover, p. 137. 
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Militia known as "the Ordenanga," was called up, and waged 
guerrilla war against the invaders. Wellington planned to 
make his major stand at that one location he could not 
afford to lose--Lisbon. One year earlier, on 20 October 
1809, Wellington had ordered his engineer commander at 
Lisbon to construct a line of field fortifications outside 
the city, explaining that "the great object in Portugal is 
the possession of Lisbon and the Tagus, and all our mea-
9 0 sures must be directed to this object."' In accordance 
with Wellington's instructions the famous "Lines of Torres 
Vedras," an awesomely formidable set of defensive positions, 
was built up on the hills outside Lisbon, completely protect­
ing the city from land attack. 
Massena's advance turned into an ordeal of starvation 
and guerrilla harassment as Wellington's precautions took 
effect. The marshal had other troubles as well; quarrels 
with subordinates, incredibly bad intelligence (although 
the French had campaigned in Portugal twice in the previous 
three years, they still had no adequate maps of the country 
91 and took the wrong road to Lisbon) and lack of support 
from the other French armies in Spain. Massena himself was 
an old man well past his prime as a commander. Nevertheless 
he pushed stubbornly onward until his army arrived outside 
9 0 Pelet, p. 142 (quotation is from Wellington's Dis­
patches from the Peninsula, vol. 5, p. 234) . 
^^Ibid., p. 136. 
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Lisbon in October,1810, only to come face to face with the 
9 2 
Line of Torres Vedras. As Massena at once realized, the 
lines were so strong that his weakened army had no hope of 
breaking through them. For lack of any other alternatives, 
Massena sat down outside the fortifications, hoping Welling­
ton would attack. This Wellington had no intention of doing. 
His army,' plus a large percentage of the total population of 
Portugal, sat snugly behind the Line of Torres Vedras, assured 
of adequate supplies and reinforcements by British sea power. 
Meanwhile Massena's army, cut off from its bases by a hostile 
countryside, wasted away. The usual roles of besieges and 
besieged were reversed. Held together by Massena's iron 
determination, the French stuck it out for five months. In 
March of 1811 Massena finally gave in and ordered a retreat. 
Pursued by Wellington's men, the French reached safety in 
Spain in April. In the whole campaign Massena lost 25,000 
men of whom only 1,500 died in battle, the rest lost to 
93 starvation, disease, and guerrilla ambushes. 
Massena's failure decided the Peninsular War. The 
French were never able to mount another attack on Portugal. 
In Spain they were thrown back completely onto the defensive. 
In 1811 Wellington advanced into Spain, and although he suf­
fered some setbacks, he pressed steadily onward. The French 
position in Spain, always precarious, collapsed in 1814. 
S^Glover, p. 141. 
93ibid., p. 148. 
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Totally defeated at Vitoria, the French retreated over the 
Pyrenees and the final battles of the Peninsular War were 
fought in southern France. Catastrophe in Russia had broken 
Napoleon's power in central and eastern Europe. His empire 
was caught in an enormous pincers, one of whose arms was 
composed of a vengeful Austro-Prusso-Russian coalition 
descending on his northern frontier, and Wellington's army 
driving into France from the south composing the other. The 
First Empire was inexorably crushed between them. Napoleon 
was forced to abdicate and exiled to Elba. His attempt to 
regain power in 1815 proved only a dramatic epilog to a 
story already ended. 
It will always be a matter for controversy just how 
great the contribution of the British Peninsular campaign 
was to Napoleon's overthrow, particularly when compared with 
the disaster in Russia. That it was great, no one can deny. 
The Peninsular Campaign was the result of an error by 
Napoleon. By alienating the Spanish, Napoleon for the first 
time gave the British a chance to grapple effectively with 
his forces on land. The British would never have been able 
to take effective advantage of this opportunity--which they 
had not anticipated-- if they had been deprived of a secure 
base on the peninsula, easily accessible to British sea 
power, yet far from the center of French land power. This, 
their ally Portugal provided. It is as clear an illustration 
of the role of strategic location as any in history. 
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In the Age of Canning and Palmerston 
The end of the Napoleonic War did not restore to Por1:u-
gal the tranquil prosperity she had enjoyed in the eighteenth 
century. The country was spared external dangers. Indeed, 
Portugal has not been threatened seriously with foreign 
invasion from 1810 to this day. What she was not spared 
was internal strife. The causes of this dissension, which 
flared up into civil war, were very deep-rooted. The entire 
Hispanic world on both sides of the Atlantic, was plunged 
into a time of troubles by Napoleon's invasion of Spain in 
1807. Foreign invasion and occupation were followed by 
political chaos as deep regional and ideological rifts opened 
within the Iberian peninsula. On the other side of the 
Atlantic the long-lived Spanish empire disintegrated and 
Portugal parted company with her richest remaining colony, 
Brazil. Ultimately the problem faced by both Spain and 
Portugal was their inability to adjust comfortably to a 
rapidly changing world and to reach any kind of internal 
consensus on the unsettling new ideas introduced during the 
French Revolution. 
Britain, as the dominant Atlantic power, was deeply 
worried by the unrest that convulsed the Iberian peninsula 
in the 1820s and '30s, and Iberian problems were a major 
concern to her foreign policy makers. Upheavals in the 
peninsula had serious effects on both sides of the Atlantic 
Ocean, and important implications for Britain's overseas 
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trade and maritime security. It is important to note tHe 
differences between Britain's Spanish and Portuguese poli­
cies. In Spain Britain's main objective was to prevent 
intervention by other European powers. (Her efforts to 
prevent outside meddling had only indifferent success.) 
In Portugal Britain intervened quite freely, involving her­
self in Portuguese internal affairs to a degree unprece­
dented in times of general European peace. 
Events in Portugal ran in close parallel with those in 
Spain during the post-Napoleonic period. The liberal revolu­
tion in Spain against Ferdinand VII inspired a similar rising 
in Portugal. Its target was not King Joao VI (who with the 
entire Portuguese royal house had lived in Brazil since 1807) 
but his Regent in Portugal, Marshal Hugh Beresford (a British 
officer who had been placed in command of the Portuguese army 
during the Peninsular War). Beresford was forced to leave 
Portugal on 10 October 1820, and a constitutionalist regime 
94 
took power in the country. 
The British Foreign Secretary, Lord Castlereagh, was 
faced with a dilemma by the revolution in Portugal. Should 
he recognize the new regime? And was Britain obligated to 
intervene? The treaties of 1386 and 1661 included clauses 
that could be interpreted to mean that Britain was required 
to repress any revolution against the legitimate Portuguese 
government. A more recent treaty, signed in 1810, bound 
94 
Payne, 2:517. 
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Britain to recognize only a legitimate heir o£ the House of 
Braganca as King of Portugal. Castlereagh was able to dodge 
the problem o£ recognition by taking the position that Brit­
ain could not recognize the constitutionalist regime until 
it knew the attitude o£ King Joao^ across the Atlantic in 
Rio de Janeiro, towards it. Castlereagh, in keeping with 
his normal non-interventionist attitude in foreign affairs, 
refused to countenance active British opposition to the new 
Lisbon government. He regarded the obligations included in 
the earlier treaties to have lapsed due to disuse, and the 
1807 treaty to have been cancelled out by the Vienna settle­
ment of 1815. Castlereagh and his successor. Sir George 
Canning, argued that Britain was obligated to defend Portu-
9 5 gal only against foreign attack. While taking a "hands-
off" position, the British government privately put pressure 
on Joao VI to leave his luxurious haunts in Rio and return to 
the mother country, pointing out that if he did not do so 
quickly he might lose his throne. In July of 1824 the King 
returned to Portugal and swore to observe the new constitu-
96 tion. 
But Portugal's troubles were only beginning. In 18 22 
Brazil declared its independence, setting up as a separate 
empire under Joao IV's eldest son, Dom Pedro. The French 
^^Harold Temperly, The Foreign Policy of Canning 1822-
18 2 7. 2nd cd. (London: Frank Cass and Co., 1966), pp. 193-94 
^'^Ibid., p. 195. 
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invasion o£ Spain in 1823 badly frightened Portugal, for 
obvious reasons. But Canning, on 31 March 1823, promised 
to carry out British treaty obligations. The French, for 
97 their part, made no aggressive moves against Portugal. 
Portugal's worst troubles, however, stemmed from the 
fact that the split between the liberal constitutionalists 
and traditional absolutists in Portuguese society ran right 
through the House of Braganga. Joao himself was quite 
willing to be a constitutional monarch, but his queen (a 
sister of the arch-reactionary Spanish King Ferdinand VII) 
was bitterly opposed, refusing to sign the constitution, and 
his second son, Dom Miguel, was a dedicated traditionalist. 
In May, 1823, Miguel supported by some Portuguese 
troops, frightened his father into disavowing the constitu-
9 8 tion. This led to nearly a year of uncertainty, during 
which Palmella, the Portuguese Foreign Minister, asked Can­
ning to send a force to Lisbon to put down the reactionaries. 
Canning refused, in keeping with the principle of non­
intervention, but did send a naval squadron into the Tagus, 
where it could keep an eye on developments without getting 
9 9 involved in Portuguese internal affairs. On 30 April 1824, 
Dom Miguel carried out a coup d'etat, and made his father a 
^^Ibid. , p. 197 . 
98 Livermore, p. 413. 
99 
Temperley, p. 198. 
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p r i s o n e r .  ̂ I n  M a y  t h e  o l d  K i n g  e s c a p e d  t o  t h e  B r i t i s h  
fleet moored in Lisbon harbor and was able to force Dom 
Miguel to resign command of the army and go into exile. 
Without formally intervening, Canning liad taken measures 
by which Miguel's coup, which Britain opposed, could be 
frustrated. In 1825 Canning was able to diminish French 
influence in Portugal (which was reaching proportions the 
British disliked) by having his ambassador in Portugal, 
William A. Court, persuade Joao to dismiss his pro-French 
minister, Subserra, and reassign him as ambassador to Lon­
don.  
In 1826 Joao VI died, setting off a succession crisis. 
The legal heir, Dom Pedro, was already Emperor of Brazil, 
which he had no desire to leave. Instead of assuming the 
Portuguese throne himself, he assigned his rights to his 
daughter, who was to marry Dom Miguel, provided Miguel swore 
allegiance to the new Portuguese constitution, the proposed 
"Charter of 1826." This arrangement was to be guaranteed by 
Britain and Austria. Canning, originally lukewarm to Pedro's 
proposal, decided to back it and was able to get it approved 
by the Conference of the Four Ambassadors in Paris on 24 July 
1826. Within Portugal General Saldanha, Governor of Oporto 
and strongest man in the country, compelled acceptance of the 
^^^Livermore, p. 414. 
1 m 
Temperley, p. 201. 
^^^Ibid., p. 207. 
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•  4 -  • 103 new Constitution. 
Many Portuguese still supported absolutism, o£_course, 
and one entire regiment of the Portuguese army demonstrated 
their sentiments by deserting, colonel and all, over the 
Spanisli frontier. The Spaniards, in violation not only of 
international law but of a treaty signed with Portugal in 
1778, did not disarm and return the deserters but allowed 
them to remain under arms in Spain, a standing threat to the 
new Constitution.^®^ The suspicion grew that the absolutist 
government of Ferdinand VII intended to back the deserters 
in an attempt to overthrow liberalism in Portugal. Canning's 
reaction to this Spanish maneuver (which sounds familiar to 
the twentieth century) was forceful. Britain would permit 
no Spanish domination in Portugal, even by such subtle means 
as these. When Spain permitted the armed deserters to attack 
Portuguese territory, Canning invoked the casus foederis of 
the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance. On 12 December 1826 Canning 
defended his policy in these memorable words: 
Let us fly to the aid of Portugal, by whom­
soever attacked; because it is our duty to 
do so; and let us cease our interference 
where that duty ends. We go to Portugal not 
to rule, not to dictate, not to prescribe 
constitutions--but to defend and to preserve 
the independence of an ally. We go to plant 
the standard of England on the well-known 
heights of Lisbon. Where that standard is 
planted, foreign dominion shall not come.lO^ 
lOSjbid., pp. 370-372 . 
104i5i^i, ̂ p, 373, 
105]p ,  582. 
69 
So saying, Canning dispatched British troops to Portugal, 
the first to land since the Napoleonic wars. The arrival 
of the Redcoats brought immediate peace. The border viola­
tions ceased at once. Since Canning had succeeded in obtain­
ing Miguel's reluctant agreement to abide by the new Charter, 
the succession crisis appeared to be settled. It stayed 
settled only as long as the 4,000 British troops remained 
in Portugal, however. In 1828 the force was withdrawn. 
Immediately, Dom Miguel repudiated his oath to the Constitu-
X 0 6 tion, assumed command of the army, and seized the throne. 
Miguel was solidly in control of mainland Portugal for 
three years, but the Azores refused to submit to his rule. 
The independent-minded islanders, in constant contact with 
foreign ideas because of their crossroads position, never 
recognized Miguel as King. When a Miguelist landing force 
was driven off by the inhabitants of Angra on Terceira on 
11 August 1829, the islands became a rallying point for 
107 Portuguese liberals. 
In 1831 Pedro I, the Emperor of Brazil, resigned his 
throne, intending to establish his niece Maria Isabella in 
place of his usurping brother. Pedro received active en­
couragement from both Britain and France, itself now a sup­
porter of liberalism after the July Revolution in 1830. The 
^°^Duffy, 2:521. 
^^^Cuill, p. 137. 
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new British Foreign Secretary, Lord Palmerston, favored a 
much more activist course in foreign policy than his pred­
ecessor Canning. For this reason in 1831 and 1832 Portu­
guese problems took up more of Palmerston's attention than 
• r 108 any others in Lurope, 
With British assistance, Pedro's supporters set up a 
"government in exile" in the Azores, whose constitutionalist 
policies provided an attractive alternative to Miguel's 
brutal regime. With the Azores as a base and the tacit sup­
port of Palmerston, who allowed him to buy supplies and hire 
men in Britain, Pedro was able to raise a force of 7,500 
troops which landed in 1832 at the liberal center in northern 
Portugal, Oporto. Palmerston, who had refused to recog­
nize Miguel as king effectively prevented Miguel's fleet from 
interfering with Pedro's invasion by blocking his way with 
the British squadron stationed in the Tagus,^^*^ Pedro's force 
was immediately besieged in Oporto by Miguel's army but 
managed to keep its foothold. Miguel, losing his support 
from Spain when the absolutist Ferdinand VII died, was unable 
to cope with a second landing by liberal forces in southern 
Portugal. In July of 1833 Lisbon fell after Miguel's fleet 
was largely destroyed by a liberal squadron commanded by an 
10 8 
Sir Charles Webster, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston. 
1830-1841. 2 vols. (London: G. Bell and Sons, 1951), 1:337. 
lO^Duffy, 2:522. 
^^'^Webster, 1:241. 
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English volunteer, Sir Charles Napier. 
Miguel fought on for awhile, but was completely de­
feated in May of 1834. The new constitutionalist govern­
ment under the young queen Maria Isabella restored the 
constitution of 1826. Its victory would have been impossible 
without British aid, formalized by the Quadruple Alliance of 
1834 which included Britain, France, Portugal, and the new 
112 liberal government in Spain. Liberal constitutional 
monarchy remained the dominant political force in Portugal 
for the rest of the nineteenth century. Its position was 
always precarious, however, the country never enjoyed real 
political stability. In 1846 civil war broke out once more. 
Palmerston, in his third term as Foreign Secretary, sent a 
fleet once more into the Tagus in 1847 to protect Queen 
Maria's government against left-wing insurgents. In a 
letter written to Lord John Russell on 9 August 1847, 
Palmerston explained the British interest in preserving the 
independence of Portugal, and the strategic advantages 
Britain derived from Portugal's location: 
Those advantages are many, great and obvious: 
commercial, military and naval, and if we 
were to lose them, some of them would not be 
mere loss, but would become formidable wea­
pons of attack against us in the hands of a 
hostile power. For instance, the naval 
position of the Tagus ought never to be in 
the hands of any power . . . which might be­
come hostile to England, and it is only by 
maintaining Portugal in its separate 
llllbid., 1:370. 
2:523. 
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existence, and in its intimate and pro­
tected state o£ alliance with England, that 
we can be sure o£ having the Tagus as a 
friendly instead of its being a hostile 
naval station. Only £ancy £or a moment 
Portugal forming part o£ Spain, and Spain 
led away by France into war with England, 
and what would be our naval condition with 
all the ports £rom Calais to Marseilles 
hostile to us . . . and with nothing between 
us and Malta but Gibralter. ... If on the 
contrary the Tagus were at our command, we 
should occupy an intermediate position 
greatly impeding the naval movements of 
France and Spain. 
Centuries of experience lay behind Palmerston's words. 
Portugal mattered because o£ her location. Even in periods 
o£ "splendid isolation" Britain maintained with Portugal 
relations closer and more continuous than with,any other 
Continental state. The British intervention in Portugal 
in 1847 marked the last in the series of overt interferences 
in Portuguese a££airs. Portuguese politics remained as 
turbulent as ever, but Anglo-Portuguese relations became 
less eventful. This quiet period lasted most of what re­
mained of the nineteenth century. 
^^^Russell MSS. P. R. 0, 30/22/6, extract in Kenneth 
Bourne, The Foreign Policy of Victorian England, 1850-1902 
(Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1970), p. 276. 
CHAPTER III 
PORTUGAL IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR 
Portugal Before the Outbreak of War, 1890-1914 
Throughout most of the nineteenth century, Portugal 
enjoyed a period of relative quiet in her international re­
lations. But this era was to end before the twentieth cen­
tury dawned. Portugal remained poor and in fact constantly 
skirted bankruptcy. Political instability, never overcome 
for long, was to reach a climax in 1910. Even the vast 
empire that Portugal still retained, and on the African 
continent extended somewhat, proved very much a mixed 
blessing. Portugal had not the resources to administer her 
possessions properly, or to develop their natural wealth. 
The Portuguese colonies were backward and scandalously run--
a situation very tempting to stronger powers disappointed by 
their gains in the sharing-out of Africa during the 1880s 
and 18 90s. 
The guiding principle of Portuguese foreign policy re­
mained as it had been for years--the Alliance with Britain. 
Relations between the two countries were not always harmon­
ious but no Portuguese government was willing to forego the 
protection that the tic with Britain provided. Not only did 
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dizzying changes in Portuguese cabinets leave the Alliance 
untouched, but the revolution o£ 1910, whicli ended the 
ancient Portuguese monarchy forever, harmed it not at all. 
For Britain the Alliance with Portugal remained an 
important element in a complex, worldwide foreign policy. 
The strategic basis of the Anglo-Portuguese connection re­
mained as valid as ever despite revolutionary changes in 
technology. In fact it took on a new importance when a new 
naval threat arose--the rising maritime power of Germany. 
The strategic importance of Portugal and its islands made 
it a tenet of British foreign policy that Germany must be 
prevented from gaining undue influence in Portugal, which 
might lead to Germany obtaining bases in Portuguese terri­
tory that could threaten Britain's sea lanes. 
The publication in 1890 of Alfred T. Mahan's The Influ­
ence of Seapower Upon History heightened British awareness 
of strategic location as an element of seapower. Mahan's 
teachings, based mostly upon British experience, were widely 
read in Britain and had enormous influence there.^ For the 
first time naval history emerged as a field of study in its 
own right as Mahan traced Britain's rise to maritime dominion, 
Mahan emphasized the value of "geographical position" as an 
element of seapower, ranking it first among six principal 
determinants of naval power. He referred specifically to the 
^Arthur J. jMarder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, 
4 vols. (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), 1:4. 
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strategic advantages Britain had enjoyed because o£ its al-
2 liance with Portugal in more than one place in his book. 
Mahan's view of "geographical location" as an advantage to 
a nation seeking power on the seas emphasized the location 
to that nation itself. But his keen awareness of the impor­
tance of overseas bases, and of denying such bases to a po­
tential foe showed that the concept did not apply only to a 
sea power's native soil. Portugal and her islands were 
obvious cases of strategic base areas. 
In this connection the timing of a new Anglo-Portuguese 
treaty is significant. This Anglo-Portuguese secret Declara­
tion was signed on 14 October 1899, just as the new threat 
from across the North Sea became susceptible in Britain. The 
agreement was short. It simply reaffirmed that the treaties 
3 
of 1642 and 1661 remained in force. The British, then en­
gaged in the Boer War, obtained an immediate advantage from 
the treaty for it contained a clause forbidding the passage 
of arms and munitions from Mozambique into the territory of 
the Boers.^ 
Even as the British tightened their alliance with Portu­
gal, they showed themselves willing to bargain away their 
country's African colonies over the heads of the Portuguese. 
^Mahan, pp. 185, 190. 
3 Great Britain, Foreign Office, British Documents on the 
Origin of the War, 1898-1914, G. P. Gooch and H. V. Temperly, 
eds,, 11 vols. (London: H.M.S.O., 1927), 1:95. 
4 
"Anglo-Portuguese Secret Declaration," as cited in ibid., 
1:75. 
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Portugal was in dire financial straits and Germany was dis­
satisfied with her own unprepossessing collection of African 
colonies. The possibility arose that Portugal might be 
granted the wherewithal to solve or at least alleviate her 
money problems at the price of ceding part of her African 
dominions to Germany. After negotiations which began the 
previous May, Britain and Germany signed a secret note on 
30 August 1898, setting the boundaries of territory in 
Angola which would be assigned to Germany as security for a 
loan.^ The Portuguese were not consulted about the disposi­
tion of their territory, although A. J, Balfour, who had 
signed the agreement for Britain, piously remarked that "I 
have al\\?ays, as you know, been of the opinion that this was 
quite as much for the interests of Portugal as for those of 
the other powers concerned." In fact, Portugal managed to 
scrape by without raising any loans against her African terri­
tory and the agreement never came into force. But it remains 
significant for two reasons. 
First, the arrangement points up one important charac­
teristic of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance, or of any client-
state relationship. Britain needed Portugal and Portugal 
needed Britain, but their alliance was not a partnership of 
equals. In any conflict Portuguese interests would run a 
poor second to those of her mighty partner. No matter how 
^Marquess of Salisbury to Sir H. MacDonell (enclosure 
in dispatch from A. J. Balfour to Sir F. Lascelles), as 
cited in ibid., 1:80. 
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much they resented the fact, the Portuguese could not defy 
the will of Britain. 
Second, the British willingness to accommodate Germany 
in Africa did not extend to any other part of Portuguese 
territory except tiny Portuguese Timor, far away in the East 
Indies. Most especially it did not extend to Portugal's 
Atlantic islands. When the possibility arose that a French 
loan to Portugal might be secured by a lien on the customs 
revenues of Portugal and the Azores, the British reaction 
was immediate and uncompromising. In a dispatch sent to 
Sir Herbert MacDonell, then British Minister to Portugal, on 
29 November 1898, Lord Salisbury, then both Prime Minister 
and Foreign Secretary, explained the British position: 
The enclosure in your dispatch No. 99 Secret, 
of the 15th instant, shows that, among the 
revenues to be assigned to the service of 
the loan for which the Portuguese Government 
is negotiating in Paris, are included those 
of the islands adjacent to Portugal. The 
expression "adjacent islands" may include 
the Azores. If it does the matter assumes 
an aspect to which Her Majesty's Government 
cannot be indifferent. They have no desire 
to interfere unnecessarily with the arrange­
ments which the Portuguese government may 
make with a view to placing their finances 
on a satisfactory basis.^ 
Salisbury asked MacDonell to warn the Portuguese that the. 
Alliance with Britain committed Portugal to maintain the ter­
ritorial status quo, and that the treaty engagements would 
be imperiled if the Azores were allowed to pass directly or 
^Ibid. 
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indirectly under the control of any third power. "Since the 
creation of a lien on the revenues of the islands might con­
ceivably permit such a situation to arise," Salisbury in­
structed MacDonell to "call the attention of the Portuguese 
Minister for Foreign Affairs to the matter and state that Her 
Majesty's Government feels bound to ask the Portuguese Govern­
ment to give an undertaking in writing that the Azores, without 
the written consent of the country, pass under the control of 
7 any third power." 
Although the loan in question was French, Salisbury took 
good care to let the German Ambassador to Britain, Count 
Hatzfeldt, know of Britain's objection to outside meddling in 
the Azores. The matter of the strategic location and impor­
tance of the Portuguese Islands was too great an issue to 
leave to chances of misinterpretation. Salisbury noted that 
Hatzfeldt "received this information with a rather discon­
certed manner, and did not return for some little time to the 
easy indifference by which his conversation up to this moment 
g 
had been distinguished." 
This ivas not the end of British concern over Portugal's 
Atlantic islands. In 1906 the British government was again 
worried by reports that "certain foreign powers" were at­
tempting to obtain a coaling station, or special facilities 
7 
Despatch of Marquess of Salisbury to Sir F. Lascelles, 
as cited in ibid., 1:80. 
g 
Memorandum by Lord Bertie, as cited in ibid. 
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for coal ing at Horta in the Azores. Sir Francis Villiers, 
then British Minister at Lisbon, was directed by Sir Edward 
Grey, the Foreign Secretary, to check into these rumors. 
Villiers received prompt Portuguese assurances "that no con­
cessions had been given nor was there any intention of grant­
ing one, and that if an attempt were made to obtain a foot­
hold in the Azores or elsewhere. His Majesty's government 
9 
would certainly be informed." 
In 1908 a German naval squadron on maneuvers called at 
the Azores and Madeira, giving the Portuguese government very 
little advance warning of their visit. The Portuguese were 
especially annoyed at the German visit to Madeira, where the 
Germans showed ivhat the Portuguese government considered a 
suspicious eagerness to ingratiate themselves with the Ma-
deirans. The Portuguese Foreign Minister, Wenceslas de Lima, 
passed the Portuguese complaints on to the British Minister, 
Ernest Rennie, who informed London. In a minute attached 
to Ronnie's dispatch, W. A. Stewart, a Foreign Office clerk, 
remarked that, "The Germans seem to have behaved in a some­
what clumsy way in connexion with the naval visit to the 
Azores. They probably regard the Portuguese people as too 
insignificant and too Anglophile to be treated with defer­
ence by such a great power as Germany.In spite of Ger­
many's domineering attitude towards Portugal (all too 
^Despatch of Sir F. Villiers to Sir Edward Grey, No. 32, 
as cited in ibid., 8:51. 
lODespatcli of Ernest Rennie to Sir Edward Grey, No. 51, 
as cited in ibid., 8:65. 
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typical o£ Wilhelinine bumptiousness towards other nations) 
Britain never quite lost her fear o£ a dangerous degree of 
German influence there. 
Where the Atlantic islands were concerned, the British 
could becoinc concerned over quite minor matters, such as the 
possibility that negotiations between Portugal and Germany 
over a canceled concession for a German-owned sanatorium in 
11 Madeira might lead to a German foothold there. When Wil-
helm II stopped off at Lisbon in 1905 on his way to visit 
Morocco, Sir M. DeBunsen, the British Minister, noted with 
some relief that while the German Kaiser was "received with 
considerable pomp and splendour, it would be too much to 
say . . . that his Imperial Majesty's presence in Lisbon 
12 
worked much popular enthusiasm." In the light of current 
Portuguese events, it seems the British worried too much over 
German influence in Portugal. Political turmoil in the coun­
try rose towards a climax as King Carlos I and his eldest son 
were murdered on 1 February 1908. Carlos' successor, his 
second son Manoel, was overthrown in 1910; since then no king 
has reigned in Portugal, which immediately became a Republic. 
The Republic was proclaimed on 5 October 1910, and on 9 Octo­
ber the British Minister, Sir Francis Villiers, received a 
note from the Republic's Foreign Minister, Doctor Bernardino 
^^Despatch of Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Villiers, No. 52, 
as cited in ibid., 8:65. 
12 Despatch of Sir M. DeBunsen to the Marquess of Lans-
downe. No. 30, as cited in ibid., 8:49. 
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Machado, informing Britain that the provisional government 
would abide by all existing treaties and desired "to main­
tain and even to strengthen the friendly relations which 
1 3 exist between Portugal and Great Britain." No Portuguese 
government, whatever its political complexion, could afford 
to dispense with the British alliance. 
Villiers was immediately instructed to carry on rela­
tions with the new Portuguese regime on a de facto basis 
(total nonrecognition would probably have been fatal to the 
Portuguese Republic). Britain wanted all powers to recognize 
Portugal's Republic simultaneously. Full ̂  jure recognition 
did not come until 11 September 1911. In the meanwhile, 
Britain sought assurances that the new government would allow 
no third party any footholds in its overseas possessions. As 
early as 18 November 1910 Machado assured Villiers that "the 
Provisional Government had no intention whatever of parting 
with any of the Portuguese colonies. If any were acquired by 
a foreign power it could only be by force.On 28 August 
1911, Grey, the Foreign Secretary, sent the British Charge 
d'affaires at the Lisbon legation a telegram inquiring into a 
report received by the Admiralty that a German company was 
13 Despatch of Villiers to Grey, No. 64, as cited in 
ibid., 8:72-73. 
14 
Despatch of Villiers to Grey, No. 79, as cited in 
ibid., 8:79. 
^^Despatch of Grey to Gaisford, No. 70, as cited in 
ibid., 8:76. 
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16 
trying to purchase two of the Azores. On 25 October, a re­
ply came from the legation that the new Portuguese Foreign 
Minister, Dr. Vasconcellos, confirmed Machado's assurances 
that no third power would be allowed facilities in the Azores. 
As for the sale of any islands, the Portuguese government had 
no confirmation of such a deal, but if such a report were true, 
"the necessary measures would be taken to prevent the occur-
17 rence of any difficulty." Nothing further transpired, and 
the report seems to have been groundless. 
Late in 1912 the Admiralty suggested that the Portuguese 
Alliance could be abandoned, since no enemy could attack Portu­
gal's strategic possessions in the face of British sea power. 
The Admiralty's arguments provoked a devastating counterblast 
by Sir Eyre Crowe, one of the principal policy planners in 
the Foreign Office. Crowe argued: 
The Admiralty argument practically amounts to say­
ing that the Alliance is of little, if any, value 
to us and that we may safely give it up, provided 
Portugal remains independent and her Atlantic is­
lands are not acquired by any maritime power. 
But by what other means than the Alliance is it 
suggested that this condition can be fulfilled? 
At the present moment there can be no question. 
I think that the Alliance and the Alliance alone 
stands in the way of the islands falling into 
other hands.18 
^^Despatch of Gaisford to Grey, No. 71, as cited in 
ibid., 8:77. 
1 7 Despatch of Hardinge to Grey, No. 80, as cited in 
ibid.,8:80. 
18 
Memorandum by Sir Eyre Crowe on Admiralty, Memorandum 
of 18 December 1912, F.O./367, 343 X/L41. Unpublished MSS. 
London; Public Record Office. 
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Crowe's arguments quashed any proposal to abandon the Portu­
guese Alliance. 
Whatever other benefits the new regime brought Portugal, 
it did not restore solvency. The turbulent Republic, like 
the decrepit monarchy before it, seemed chronically on the 
verge of financial breakdown. Once again, the possibility 
arose of Portugal leasing or selling her African colonies. 
In December of 1911 the Germans began unofficial overtures 
to Britain for new negotiations to arrange a possible Anglo-
German partition of Portuguese Africa. Actual negotiations 
began in March of 1912, and after months of hard bargaining 
a new Anglo-German Convention was agreed upon on 20 October 
1913.^^ This treaty once again restricted any cession of 
Portuguese territory to parts of Mozambique, Angola, and 
Portuguese Guinea. No possibility existed that Portugal 
could be forced to yield the Azores or Madeira. 
Portugal and the Great War 
The first war in a century to involve all Europe could 
not be ignored by any European state--not even little Portu­
gal, far out on the Continent's western edge. Because of the 
British Alliance, Portugal found herself inevitably aligned 
with the Entente. Neither the terms of the Alliance, nor the 
interests of Britain, nor the interests of Portugal, however, 
19 Despatch of Grey to Lichnowsky, "Draft Convention" 
enclosure. No. 341, as cited in ibid., 10:538-540. 
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required Portuguese entry into the war as an active bellig­
erent. The Portuguese armed forces were in very poor shape 
2 0 and could make no major contribution to the Allied cause. 
Britain wanted to have Portugal remain nonbelligerent, since 
the services Portugal could render the Alliance had much more 
to do with Portugal's place on the map than with her military 
strength. 
For their part the Portuguese remained loyal to the 
British Alliance, but had no desire to participate actively 
in the war. On 7 August 1914 Bernardino Machado, then the 
Premier of Portugal, announced in the Portuguese Congress 
that the country would continue to adhere to the Alliance 
2 1 with Britain. This declaration was repeated and reaffirmed 
2 2 several months later. Portugal's military and economic 
weakness was more recognizable in Portugal than anywhere else. 
Deep political divisions made a united national war effort 
impossible. Nevertheless, there were powerful elements on 
Portugal's political left that did favor belligerency. 
The Portuguese did not fear German reprisals because they 
held hostages. At the outbreak of war more than seventy 
2 0 
John Vincent-Smith, "Britain, Portugal and the First 
World War, 1914-16," European Studies Review, 4 (July 1974): 
210. 
21 Republic of Portugal, Plain Speaking: Reasons for 
the Intervention in the European War (English translation) 
(London: Eyre and Spottswoode, 1917)', p. 7, 
22 
Times, London, The Times History of the War, 22 vols. 
(London: The Times , 1916)~ 9:321. 
German merchant ships took refuge in Portuguese harbors. 
Drastic action by Germany would mean the loss of all these 
vessels. In addition, the Germans did not want the Portu­
guese in Africa (hotli Angola and Mozambique bordered on 
German territory) added to their already formidable array 
2 3 
of enemies there. 
Although the Germans had given evidence of interest in 
the Portuguese islands, any attempt by them to use them as 
bases was out of the question. Portugal took such a pro-
Allied line that there was no possibility of German raiders 
being allowed access to harbors in the Azores or Madeira. 
As for the German Migh Seas Fleet, it was imprisoned in the 
North Sea throughout the war by stronger British forces, and 
had no access to the open Atlantic. 
The way of a nonbelligerent ally, however, is not smooth. 
Such a state is in an ambiguous situation, neither truly at 
war or truly neutral, which has its own peculiar disadvantages. 
Belligerent allies are likely to make demands which arouse 
resentment, especially when the disparity of strength between 
belligerent and nonbelligerent is as great as it was between 
Britain and Portugal. Belligerent enemies, on the other hand, 
are likely to regard nonbelligerency as no more than thinly 
concealed enmity and treat nonbelligerent states (if they dare) 
with even less forbearance than they show to genuine neutrals. 
^^Ibid., 9:322. 
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All this the Portuguese were soon to discover. 
Initially, armed conflict between the Germans and Portu-
•24 guese occurred only in the colonial areas of Africa, As 
early as the summer of 1914, shortly after the battle of the 
Marne, the Portuguese were presented with a request by Marshal 
Joffre (the French Commander-in-Chief) for artillery and gun­
ners to reinforce France's depleted artillery reserves. Al­
though Portugal had no obligations to France and agreement 
with Joffre's proposal would have made Portuguese belligerency 
2 5 inevitable, this request had British support. In the end, 
some guns were quietly sent to France, although no Portuguese 
personnel accompanied them. 
The Portuguese role in the war soon became a bitterly 
disputed issue in Portugal's internal politics. The extreme 
Republicans (Democrats) favored active belligerency, in part 
because they believed that Portugal would be treated with 
2 ̂  
greater respect by the British if it were an active ally. 
The conservative Republicans (Unionists) and the Portuguese 
Monarchists opposed involvement, many of the latter actually 
2 7 pro-German. Portugal's eventual entry into the war was 
more a result of internal political maneuverings than of ex­
ternal events. The strongly pro-allied Premier Azeuedo 
^^See ibid., 9:351. 
^^Vincent-Smith, p. 217. 
^^Ibid., p. 218. 
^'^Times History, 9:339. 
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Coutinho was replaced in January, 1915, by a conservative 
general, Pimenta de Castro, who swung Portuguese policy into 
2 8 
a more neutral (or even pro-German) direction. Castro, 
however, did not last four months. On 19 May 1915 a naval 
mutiny in the Tagus sparked a revolution which ended with 
2 9 his overthrow. Castro's regime was replaced by a govern­
ment dominated by the war-like Democrats. In June of 1915 
the new government offered Britain free use of all harbors in 
30 
Portugal and its possessions, asking nothing in return. The 
British government was no more than lukewarm to their ally's 
embarrassing eagerness. Sir Lancelot Carnegie, the British 
Minister to Lisbon, had never favored Portuguese belliger­
ency, regarding the country as too poor and politically un­
stable to be an effective fighting ally. The British govern­
ment feared that Portugal might soon ask for a loan, which 
Britain would have difficulty providing. There was also the 
distasteful prospect that "if Portugal remains neutral she 
will probably, and if she becomes a belligerent, will cer­
tainly, count on our support in making good her claim to have 
a voice in the general settlement after the war and to in-
31 crease her territories in West and East Africa." 
In fact, the Portuguese government had no expanionist 
^^Vincent-Smith, p. 235. 
^^Times History, 9:359. 
3(1 
Vincent-Smith, p. 227. 
31 
Carnegie to Grey, 19 June 1915, Despatch No. 72, secret, 
F.O. 371/2440 (cjuotcd in Vincent-Smith, p. 228). 
8 8 
ambitions. It hoped only to safeguard the territories it 
already held which it feared might be bargained away in a 
future peace settlement. The Portuguese remembered the 
Anglo-German agreement of 1913. Only if Portugal intervened, 
3 2 it was thought, would her empire be completely safe. The 
British government refused to do anything to encourage Portu­
guese intervention, or the Germans to provoke it. On 5 
August 1915 Grey obtained approval for a British policy re­
garding Portuguese belligerency. If Portugal entered the 
war as a result of anything but the most flagrant German 
provocation, Britain would contribute the absolute minimum, 
under the terms of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance, protecting 
Portugal's coasts but providing no financial or material 
33 
assistance. The British Admiralty took a much more posi­
tive attitude towards the "Portuguese than did the Foreign 
Office. It lost no time at all taking the Portuguese up on 
their offer of free use of Portuguese harbors, since it 
wanted to use Oporto and Lagos as bases to fight against the 
growing German submarine menace. In wartime conditions the 
34 
Admiralty invariably got its way. Portugal's strategic lo­
cation was to be utilized whether the country was formally 
belligerent or not. 
The Germans quite naturally were upset that Portugal's 
Vincent-Smith, pp. 229-230. 
^^Ibid. , p. 231. 
^^Ibid., pp. 232-233. 
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strategic location now would be utilized by the British Navy 
rather than their own. Nevertheless they did nothing that 
would provide the Portuguese a pretext for declaring" war. 
Although the German community in Lisbon did whatever it could 
to undermine the Democratic regime and stir up dissension in 
35 
the country, it accomplished little. 
Nevertheless, Portugal's entry into the war was becoming 
imminent. In serious financial straits, the Portuguese gov­
ernment desperately needed a loan. Britain in its turn was 
suffering from a severe shortage of shipping tonnage, and 
wanted very much to get its hands on the seventy-six German 
ships interned in Portuguese ports. At the urging of Sir 
Herbert Kitchener, the War Minister, the British decided to 
ask Portugal to requisition the ships, assuring her of the 
support of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance if she needed it. 
Linked with this request was the offer of a two-million pound 
credit. This offer was amended: the two million pounds would 
be loaned unconditionally, with a further million added if 
Portugal seized the ships. The Portuguese premier, Alfonso 
Costa, agreed to this proposition with a show of reluctance, 
after Britain consented to make a formal appeal to the terms 
of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance. On 24 February 1916 the 
ships were seized. They passed under British control although 
3 6 
they flew the Portuguese flag. 
^^Times History, 9:346. 
^Vincent-Smith, pp. 235-236. 
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Strong German counteraction to this very unneutral move 
was predictable. A sharp protest note was followed by a 
3 7 declaration of war upon Portugal on 9 March 1916. At last 
Portugal was in the war. This, in turn, immediately raised 
a new problem: what kind of belligerent role could Portugal 
play? 
It would not have been surprising if Portugal, like 
many of the minor Allied states in both world wars, had 
become only a nominal participant, declaring war but taking 
no warlike action. This course the Portuguese government 
immediately rejected. They were determined to send a Portu­
guese fighting force to the main front in France. The Portu­
guese interventionists, long before Portugal was brought into 
the war, had planned to send an expeditionary force to the 
3 8 
Western Front. This decision was partly the result of na­
tional pride, partly of a calculation that Portugal would be 
taken more seriously, and her prestige in the Alliance en­
hanced, if her troops were actually fighting. The fate of 
the Portuguese empire, the interventionists argued, might 
39 
depend upon a Portuguese contingent fighting in Flanders. 
With the interventionists in power a force was soon dispatched. 
On 3 February 1917 the first troops of the Portuguese Expedi­
tionary Force landed in France--a force that consisted of two 
^^Times History, 17:335. 
^^Vincent-Smith, p. 220. 
^^Ibid., p. 230. 
4 0 
divisions or about 30,000 men. By this time the Allies 
were liappy to see reinforcements from any source, and even 
this small and ill-equipped corps was welcome. It was as­
signed a sector on the British front, on l)Oth banks of the 
l.ys River in !• landers. 
Unfortunately for everyone concerned, the Portuguese 
Expeditionary Force was composed not of the Democratic fire­
brands who had been eager to see Portugal at war, but of 
bewildered peasant conscripts who were sent off to the trenches 
in cloudy, muddy Flanders with no idea why they were there, or 
enmity for the Germans they were supposed to fight. Soon the 
British developed serious doubts about the combat value of the 
Portuguese, On 15 January 1918 Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, 
the British Commander-in-Chief, recorded in his diary that, 
"General Home, (Commander First Army) to which the Portuguese 
were attached ... is anxious about the state of the Portu­
guese."^^ Within a few months these doubts were confirmed. 
On 9 April 1918 the Portuguese made their one mark on the his­
tory of the Western Front when one of their two divisions broke 
and ran under a heavy German onslaught, opening a dangerous 
hole in the Allied line.^^ They did not seem to have been 
employed in combat again. 
^^Times History, 17:357. 
'^^Sir Douglas Haig, Private Papers 1914-1919, ed. Robert 
Blake (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1952), p. 279. 
^^John Keegan, "The Battle of the Lys," in History of 
the First World War, 7 vols. (London: Purnell, 1971) , 7: 2696-
26 97. 
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On the seas the Portuguese entry into the war exposed 
their merchant marine and fishing fleet to the ravages of 
the German submarines. The first Portuguese ships were 
sunk in December of 1916; in the same month two U-boats 
actually sailed into Funchal harbor and bombarded the 
43 town. 
Internally the Portuguese participation in the war 
worsened the country's economic and social problems. Food 
riots broke out in Lisbon and Oporto in April of 1916, and 
were followed by strikes. Economic hardship led to politi­
cal strife. In December of 1917 the Democrats were forced 
from power, and replaced by a new government, a coalition 
led by Doctor Sidonio Paes.^^ Although this new regime re­
mained in the war, it was noticeably less enthusiastic about 
engaging in it actively than its predecessors. The lukewarm 
attitude of the Sidonio Paes government may have contributed 
something to the Portuguese debacle in Flanders the following 
April. 
The only real contribution the Portuguese were able to 
make to the Allied cause was providing bases in the Atlantic 
for the struggle against the U-boats. The opening of Portu­
guese ports to British war vessels, mentioned earlier, gave 
^^Times History, 17:356. 
"^^Ibid. , 17:358. 
'^^Ibid., 17:360. 
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the British Navy access to harbors in the Azores. Following 
a pattern centuries old, the underwater successors of the 
privateers found rich pickings around the islands. A secret 
order to an American Admiral escorting transports in the 
iiuropean war zone stated, "reports of enemy submarine activ­
ity indicate that the area of greatest danger is East of 
longitude twenty West and within a circle radius five hun­
dred miles from Fayal, Azores. After the United States 
entered the war in April of 1917, American naval vessels were 
sent to the Azores, and by the Armistice the squadron there 
numbered twelve vessels.This was to be the precedent for 
much greater American utilization of the Azores as a base in 
later years. Not long after the war ended, a new kind of 
strategic significance for the islands was revealed when the 
U. S. Navy flying boat NC-4, making the first airplane flight 
4 8 across the Atlantic, landed in the Azores in 1919. 
After the war was over almost all Portuguese were agreed 
that their participation in it had been a mistake. If non­
belligerent ally status had been uncomfortable, belligerency 
had been costly and embarrassing. Portugal was too small to 
participate effectively in a battle of giants. The one real 
asset she had to offer her allies--bases (in fact her strategic 
location)--she could and did provide before she became a bellig-
^^Thomas G. Frothingham, The Naval History of the World 
War (Cambridge, Mass.; Harvard Univers ity Press, 1926) , jT! 7̂. 
"^^Ibid. , p. 285. 
4 8 
Guill, p. 1S4. 
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erent. The tiny fraction, three-fourths of 1 percent, of 
German reparations, which Portugal obtained by the terms of 
the Treaty of Versailles, and a tiny piece of German East 
Africa, were Iiardly adequate compensation for the cost in-
4 9 
curred by her involvement in the war. It was a lesson 
which the Portuguese were to remember, and profoundly influ­
enced the policy they would follow in the next great world 
conflict. 
49 
U. S. Department of State, The Treaty of Versailles 
and After (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
T947), p. 44. 
CHAPTER IV 
PORTUGAL AND WORLD WAR II 
The Rise of Salazar and the Spanish Civil .War 
The end of the First World War did nothing to ease Portu­
gal's chronic political turbulence, which lasted far into the 
next decade. Over the course of time unceasing instability 
had its repercussions on the Anglo - Portuguese Alliance. Rela­
tions with Britain deteriorated to the point that in 1927 
Austin Chamberlain, the Foreign Secretary, began to doubt 
whether the Alliance was worth preserving. If there was any 
doubt on this matter, the Foreign Office's reply to a query 
on the subject strongly reaffirmed the Alliance's value. The 
tie with Portugal guaranteed Portuguese assistance in wartime 
which had been of value in the Boer War and the Great War, 
despite Portugal's weakness. The fact that Portugal was 
linked with Britain removed her as a possible enemy, easing 
the burdens of Britain's defense planners. Above all, the 
Alliance guaranteed Britain the use of Lisbon harbor and the 
Portuguese islands as naval and air bases in wartime, and 
barred foreigners from obtaining footholds in the islands 
without prior British consent. The Foreign Office argued 
tliat Britain's situation in 1914 would have been "immeasurably 
9 5 
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more dangerous and difficult" if Portugal had been on the 
German side, or even completely neutral. Such a situation 
1 "might indeed have cost Britain the war." 
These arguiiicnts plus the contention that Britain would 
be on very shaky legal grounds if slie denounced the treaty 
unilaterally, changed Chamberlain's mind completely, and in 
November of 1927 the British Cabinet concurred in Chamber­
lain's new view. On 21 December 1927 Chamberlain replied to 
a question on the Alliance in the House of Commons with the 
statement that the British government liad "every intention of 
maintaining in force the ancient Alliance between this country 
2 
and Portugal." 
The question of the usefulness of the Alliance came up 
once again in the interwar years, when in 1936 the retired 
Ambassador to Portugal, Claude Russell, wrote a memorandum 
on the subject at the prompting of Sir Samuel Hoare, recently 
Foreign Secretary. Reflecting the mood of the British govern­
ment during that melancholy decade, Russell assumed that 
Britain's primary aim was to reduce her risks and limit her 
involvements abroad. Russell expressed the fear that pro­
tecting Portugal's colonies might embroil Britain with one 
of her own dominions. South Africa, as well as with Germany, 
^Austin Chamberlain to Sir W. Tyrell, PRO CAB 24/189 
C.P. 255. 
2 Great Britain, House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, 
vol. 212 , 11, 1927 (London: H.M.S.O., 1948), p. 386. 
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Japan, or Italy. Nevertheless Russell clearly noted that 
Britain did derive an advantage from the Alliance--in time 
of war Britain would have the use of the Tagus and the 
Atlantic islands. This advantage was hypotlietical but by 
3 no means negligible. 
Once again the Foreign Office spoke up in defense of 
the Alliance. An official of the Western Department, C. A. E, 
Shuckbrugh, reiterated the arguments that had convinced 
Chamberlain in 1927 and added to them the assertion that 
Britain could expect no special rights in the Atlantic islands 
(even in return for a British guarantee of Portuguese posses­
sion) if she terminated the Alliance. Shuckbrugh believed 
that the military value of the Alliance had increased since 
1927, and the naval value of Lisbon and the islands had been 
supplemental by their new use, as landing places for planes 
flying the British Empire's air routes. If Spain went com­
munist (at this time the strongly left-wing Popular Front 
was in power in Madrid), a friendly Portugal would be a defi­
nite asset to Britain, even if she had once more to be guarded 
4 from invasion. Shuckbrugh's arguments were supported by Sir 
George Maunsey, Permanent Assistant Under Secretary at the 
Foreign Office, a higher-ranking official. The question 
3 
Memorandum by Claude Russell to Anthony Eden, 29 Jan­
uary 1936, FO 371/20512. 
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appeared to be settled.^ 
Only a few months later, however, civil war erupted in 
Spain. The conflict was not merely a crisis in internal 
Spanish politics l:iut in the international affairs' of all 
Europe. Portugal was destined to play an important if gen­
erally overlooked role in the Spanish Civil War. Portuguese 
policy toward the Spanish displeased Britain, but Portugal 
clung to it nevertheless. To understand Portugal's position 
in the Spanish crisis--and in much else that was to happen 
later, one must backtrack a few years to 1932, when a funda­
mental change occurred in Portuguese politics--the coming to 
power of Antonio de Oliveira Salazar. 
The instability, at times verging on anarchy, that had 
plagued the Portuguese Republic since its inception worsened 
during the 1920s. Political turmoil resulted in economic 
collapse. In desperation the current military junta appointed 
Salazar, then a professor of political economy at the Univer­
sity of Coimbra, Minister of Finance in June, 1926.^ Salazar's 
first term in office was short, but he was reappointed in 1928 
by the Acting President, General Carmona. Salazar's policies 
proved so successful in restoring financial stability to the 
country that he soon dominated the government. On 5 July 1932 
Salazar became Prime Minister and the following year a new 
^Ibid. , p. 738. 
^Hugh Kay, Salazar and Modern Portugal (New York; Haw­
thorne Books, 1970), p. 38. 
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7 
constitution granted him dictatorial powers. In this unusual 
fashion despotism, the usual cure for anarchy, came to Portu­
gal and one of the most durable regimes in modern European 
history began its Jong reign. Unlike most of its contempo­
raries in liurope and out, the "Estado Novo," as Salazar's 
government was called, was the creation not of a popular dema­
gogue or a military dictator, but of a professor. It reflected 
Salazar's own mild-mannered but iron-willed personality. As 
dictators go, Salazar was neither very ruthless nor very cruel, 
although his power rested ultimately upon armed force and an 
efficient secret police, the P.l.D.E. 
Salazar's own political beliefs were strongly and unmis­
takably right-wing. He himself was a devout Catholic, and 
Catholic doctrine colored his economic and political beliefs. 
Corporatism, a basic principle of his regime, was drawn partly 
from Catholic thought, partly from Mussolini's Fascist state. 
Salazar himself was then and later often called a "fascist," 
g 
and he did admire Mussolini. In the prewar years Salazar's 
government took on some typical fascist trappings, such as a 
uniformed youth movement.' But if it resembled any other Eu­
ropean dictatorship it was not Fascist Italy, and still less 
Nazi Germany, but the short-lived Austrian state of Dolfuss 
and Schuschnigg. Salazar did share with the Italians and 
German dictatorships a loathing for Marxism and Communism in 
^l b id . , pp. 48 - 49. 
^Ibid., p. 67. 
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all its forms. Anti-Communism was one of Salazar's deepest 
9 beliefs, never abandoned or relaxed throughout his lifetime. 
This belief helps explain not only his domestic policies, but 
his foreign policy as well. 
Given Salazar's views, it should surprise no one that 
Portugal openly backed the Nationalist side in the Spanish 
Civil War from the very beginning. Salazar actually sent a 
force of 20,000 "volunteers" to fight on Franco's side. This 
force was one of the least-known, but by no means the smallest 
or least effective of the various foreign legions engaged on 
either side in the Spanish struggle.As many as 50 percent 
of the Portuguese force became casualties.Salazar's help 
to Franco's forces went far beyond contributing troops. He 
provided diplomatic and moral support, and what few munitions 
he could spare. The most important assistance Portugal pro­
vided was to serve as a conduit for the aid sent the Nation­
alists by their powerful foreign allies, especially Germany. 
The foremost historian of the Spanish Civil War writes, "It 
was through Portugal that the greater part of German aid was 
12 at first sent." The Civil War was not a month old when the 
Spanish Nationalists made their first requests for aircraft 
^Ibid,, p. 68. 
^^Ilugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War (New York; Harper 
and Brotliers, 1961), p. 232. 
^^New York Times, 6 May 1939. 
^^Thomas, p. 231. 
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to be delivered via Portugal. 
On 22 August 1936 the German Charge in Lisbon, Count 
Du Moulin, reported to his government that a shipment o£ 
arms had been passed on to the Spanish rebels after being 
landed in Lisbon from German vessels. He noted that "Prime 
Minister Salazar removed all difficulties within a very-
short time by his personal initiative and personal handling 
14 of details." Salazar's action set the pattern for future 
arms shipments. Once again, Portugal was serving as a sally 
port into the peninsula for outside forces. Her location 
was once again a factor in world history. Due to Portugal's 
easy access to the outside world and the circumstance that 
Nationalist forces quickly won control of most of the Spanish 
territory on her borders, she was ideally situated to foster 
outside intervention in the Spanish fratricide. Signifi­
cantly, until Germany formally recognized the Franco regime 
on 18 November 1936, the German Minister in Lisbon also 
functioned as the unofficial envoy to Nationalist Spain. 
There was one major alteration in the pattern of cen­
turies. This time Britain was not the foreign power inter­
vening in Iberia. The British government feared that the 
S., Department of State, "Charge d'Affairs in Portu­
gal to (German) Foreign Ministry," in Documents on German 
Foreign Policy, Series D (Washington, D.C.: Government Print­
ing Office, 1950), 3:14 (hereafter cited as D.G.F.P.) 
l^ibid., 3:53. 
15"Foreign Minister to Legation in Portugal," as cited 
in ibid. , 3:132. 
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Spanish War might be the trigger that would set o££ the long-
expected, long-dreaded world war. Her primary objective was 
to keep out of the conflict herself and as far as possible to 
keep other powers out as well. It was impossible to recon­
cile Britain's aims with Salazar's wholehearted support of 
tlie Nationalist rebels. The result, inevitably, was strain 
on the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance. 
When Britain and France sponsored an international effort 
to prevent outside meddling in Spain, Portugal had to be 
pressured heavily by Britain before she would agree to par­
ticipate. On 18 August 1936 Salazar issued a decree embargo­
ing the export of munitions to Spain, but included a clause 
which provided "that the prohibition is to be suspended 
should any nation adhering to the agreement enlist, directly 
or indirectly volunteers for either side, open subscrip­
tions . . . , or send funds publicly subscribed. . . 
Since various outside powers--Germany and Italy on one side, 
the U.S.S.R. and Mexico on the other--were doing just that, 
a loophole was left through which Portugal could send any aid 
to Franco she desired. 
Portugal did make a show thereafter of adhering to non­
intervention. The country had a seat on the International 
Great Britain, Foreign Office, "Spain No. 2, pp. 15-17," 
quoted in William E. Watters, An International Affair: Non­
intervention in the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939 (New York: 
Exposition Press, 1971), p. 58. 
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17 Non-intervention Committee, but its participation was 
always reluctant and balky, conditioned on strict adherence 
to nonintervention by all other powers, which never occurred. 
At times the U.S.S.R. used Portuguese involvement as a justi-
18 fication for its own aid to the Spanish Republicans, Portu­
gal contributed its share to the atmosphere o£ hypocrisy and 
sham that constantly surrounded "nonintervention." 
Salazar's attitude toward the Spanish War, combined with 
demands for greater military assistance from Britain, brought 
the British government once again to reassess the Anglo-
Portuguese Alliance. After Portugal in 1937 requested larger 
arms shipments and the dispatch of a British military mission 
to Lisbon, the British Foreign Office sought the views of the 
Committee of Imperial Defence. The Committee replied by 
ordering a report by the Chiefs of Staff Sub - Committee on the 
Alliance, and then passing the report to the Foreign Office 
with its endorsement. Once again the value of the Alliance 
was reaffirmed on strategic grounds. In the last decade the 
importance of Portugal's strategic location had in fact in­
creased. Germany's rearmament, the growth of hostility be­
tween Britain and Italy, and the Spanish Civil War had raised 
the value of the Alliance to British naval strategy. If a 
hostile government aligned with Germany and Italy came to 
^^Dante A. Puzzo, Spain and the Great Powers, 1936-1941 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), p. 116. 
1 R 
Watters, p. 86. 
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power in Spain, Gibralter might become untenable. In that 
event access to Portuguese ports would be invaluable to the 
Royal Navy. The use of air bases in the Azores, Madeira, 
and the Cajie Vcrdes IsJands (off the western bulge of Africa) 
would be-of great use for shipping protection since they 
formed a triangle through which much of Britain's maritime 
commerce must pass. The Chiefs of Staff concluded by stres­
sing the importance of the Anglo-Portuguese tie to Britain's 
strategy and confirming that its maintenance was extremely 
^ ^ 19 important. 
On 21 July 1937 the Cabinet approved the conclusions of 
the C.I.D., including its recommendation that a British mili­
tary mission be sent to Lisbon to counteract German and 
Italian influence. The sending of the mission helped keep 
2 0  
Portugal within the British political orbit. Britain's 
assessment of Portugal's strategic value thus overrode any 
differences caused by the two nations' profoundly divergent 
attitude toward the Spanish Civil War. Any danger that a 
rift in the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance might develop was there­
fore averted. 
Two other factors operated to preserve the Anglo-
Portuguese tie--the course of the Spanish Civil War and the 
diplomatic astuteness of Antonio Salazar. Portuguese help 
to the Nationalists, crucial in the early stages of the 
^^CAB 24/270 C.P. 189, COS 602C10 1336-B. 
^'^Stone, p. 740. 
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"Crusade," became less essential as the war went on. As 
they moved on from victory to victory, slowly grinding down 
their Republican opponents, the Nationalists won both German 
and Italian recognition, and tlie control of such major ports 
as Cadiz and Cartagena. Thereafter the Axis powers could 
send the men and supplies so important to Franco directly 
i\fith no need to use Portugal as an intermediary. Portugal, 
whose essential contribution had been her service as an entry-
way for aid from Germany, could then move discreetly to the 
sidelines without fear that she would thereby weaken her 
friends. This reduced friction with Britain. 
Salazar, whose expertise in foreign affairs was to serve 
his country well throughout his lifetime, never put a foot 
wrong. He helped the Nationalists all he could when his 
help was most necessary, but did so quietly enough that he 
avoided openly offending Britain. His adherence to noninter­
vention, however insincere, allowed Britain to ignore his 
actual support of the Nationalists. With the total victory 
of Franco's armies in March of 1939, Salazar could feel that 
he had won the best of all possible diplomatic worlds. A 
neighboring regime which Salazar regarded as a menace had 
been overthrown and replaced by one which was not only 
friendly but in Salazar's debt. Indeed, for this reason, 
one of Franco's first actions as dictator of Spain was a 
friendship treaty with Portugal on 17 March 1939, called 
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the Iberian Pact. Salazar had managed to make a vital 
contribution to Franco's cause without alienating the 
JVritisli in the process. Shortly after the Spanish crisis 
Salazar had publicly reaffirmed tJie value of the Alliance 
2 2 to Portugal in a speech delivered on 22 May 1939. It was, 
as Salazar knew full well, Portugal's mainstay in an increas­
ingly perilous world. The Alliance was left unshaken, even 
strengthened, by the cataclysm in Spain. 
Salazar's principal biographer, Hugh Ka/, argues that 
his Spanish Civil War policy was not merely aimed at destroy­
ing the Spanish Republic, but was in fact "constructive and 
2 3 
almost visionary." Kay sees Salazar's ultimate aim as the 
creation of an Iberian bloc which would interlock with the 
Anglo-Portuguese Alliance, and draw Franco away from the-
Axis. Britain would help Portugal to rearm, while Portugal 
would safeguard British interests diplomatically in the 
peninsula, strategically by his control of the Atlantic is­
lands and important portions of Africa. 
The European holocaust had been averted in Spain only 
to erupt, a few months after the end of the Civil War, in 
^^Kay, p. 461. 
2 2 Antonio De Oliveira Salazar's Speech to the National 
Assembly, 22 May 1939, Portugal, Secretariado da Propaganda 
Nacional, Portugal (Lisbon, 20 June 1939), pp. 5-6. 
^^Kay, p. 110. 
24 Royal Institute of International Affairs, Survey of 
International Affairs 1939-46 (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1956), 9:319. 
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Poland. World conflict once again presented Portugal with 
difficult problems similar to those she had faced in 1914. 
Her ruler, who had seen his policies triumph a few scant 
months before, faced new and difficult tests. Portugal was 
oncc again on the edge of a vortex. It was a foregone con­
clusion that Portugal's location would, unless the war 
proved very short or very localized (and neither circumstance 
was in prospect), become a factor in the struggle. 
Portugal and the Allies 
In 1939, unlike 1914, the foreign policy of Portugal 
was guided by the decisions of one man. It would not be­
come an issue between political factions as it had during 
the Great War. This time there was no sentiment for inter­
vention by any significant section of the Portuguese; the 
memories of the costly humiliations that followed Portugal's 
entry into war in 1916 were still painful. The first announce­
ment of neutrality appeared in the Portuguese press on 2 
September 1939. If ever Salazar spoke for his people, he 
did so on 6 October 1939 when he proclaimed Portuguese neu­
trality to the world in a speech before the National Assembly. 
Immediately after announcing "deliberation to be neutral and 
[the Portuguese government's] hope of maintaining peace for 
the Portuguese people, unless the honor of the country, her 
interests or obligations, should cause us to abandon that 
position," Salazar added, "however, we should not have re­
108 
mained at peace with our conscience (for friends should not 
turn away at times of need) if we had not reaffirmed at 
that grave moment our feelings of friendship and our full 
2 5 fidelity to the British Alliance." Salazar's neutrality 
was thus neither absolute nor unqualified. There was no 
question of abandoning the British Alliance. 
The British in turn had no desire to see Portugal be­
come an active belligerent since any assistance she might 
offer would be in the form of access to strategic bases 
which she did not have to be a belligerent to provide. The 
Foreign Office had decided in 1938, when an Anglo-German war 
over Czechoslovakia seemed imminent, that Portugal should 
2 6 
remain neutral, and this decision was upheld in 1939. 
Salazar himself had few illusions about Hitler, whose 
pagan racism had little in common with his own Catholic out-
2 7 look. The Portuguese dictator might sympathize with Hit­
ler's anti-communism, but even this had been compromised by 
the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact that had preceded the war's out­
break. Britain need have no fear that Salazar would fall 
under Hitler's spell. 
Sir Walford Selby, British Ambassador to Portugal from 
2 5 
Antonio Oliveira de Salazar, Speech to the National 
Assembly, 6 October 1939, Portugal, Secretariado da Propaganda 
Nacional, Portugal (Lisbon, 22 December 1939), pp. 4-5. 
^^Sir Walford Selby, Diplomatic Twilight 1930-1940 
(London: John Murray, 195377 PP• 109-1107 
^^Kay, p. 67. 
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December, 1938 to December, 1940, did fear German influence 
on otlier elements of Portuguese society. The country was 
full of German agents and attempts were being made to infil­
trate such strategic Portuguese organizations as the Mocidade, 
tlie official youth movement, and even more ominously, the 
2 8 
secret police and the armed forces. The Germans were en­
trenched in the Portuguese economy and their efficiency 
29 
earned them much admiration in Portugal. The British de­
voted much effort to combating German penetration, resorting 
to such measures as supplying munitions to the Portuguese 
army and opening an air route between London and Lisbon to 
compete with the German-run airline between Lisbon and 
Madr id . ̂ 
Salazar, if sympathetic to Britain, was yet a strongly 
nationalist ruler who was determined to uphold Portuguese 
sovereignty and adhere more strictly to neutrality than 
Britain preferred. Friction inevitably developed between 
Portugal and her protector. The old problem of the First 
World War--the relationship between two allies, one of whom 
was a belligerent and the other at peace--returned to plague 
Anglo-Portuguese relations. 
By 1940 dissension between the two nations had become 
serious enough that Selby was asked to pass a personal 
^^Selby, p. 89. 
29 
Kay, p. 128. 
^'^Selby, p. 107. 
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message to Salazar from Lord Halifax, then British Foreign 
Secretary, detailing the British position on issues that 
had arisen bet\veen the two countries. Salazar returned "a 
courteous but firm reply which emphasized his good will, 
but insisted on the Portuguese right to interpret her neu­
trality in her own best interests. On this point Salazar 
made clear he must reserve his complete liberty of action. 
Halifax pronounced himself satisfied with this reply. 
Relations between the two states might have continued 
in this sometimes inharmonious but basically uneventful 
fashion if the war had not changed so drastically between 
April and June in 1940. In three months Germany's sudden 
triumphs in Scandinavia, the Low Countries, and France 
made her masters of all western Europe except the British 
Isles and Iberia. The arrival of German troops at the 
Pyrenees passes raised the possibility, distant but discern­
ible, that the Wehrmacht might invade Portugal. Great Brit­
ain, which Portugal for centuries had regarded as her in­
vincible protector, was in dire peril, faced with invasion 
itself. Germany was now master of most of Europe's Atlantic 
seaboard, a position far more advantageous than she had ever 
enjoyed in 1914-18. (Lisbon was the only important port on 
the Continent between Stockholm and Cadiz still outside 
German control.) Not only Portugal herself, but her islands 
in the Atlantic were potential victims of German attack. 
^^Ibid., p. 111. 
Ill 
The German victories and fears of a German-inspired 
coup in Lisbon or a Spanish attack on Portugal caused the 
British War Cabinet on 15 May 1940 to ask the Chiefs of 
Staff, especially the Admiralty, to prepare a plan for Brit­
ish action if it should be necessary to occupy strategic 
points in Continental Portugal, the Azores, or the Cape 
Verdes. The Admiralty replied that Portugal itself would 
not be of much value to Germany since before taking the 
country she would have had to obtain control of Spanish air­
fields and harbors which would suffice to meet German needs 
in Iberia. No action in Portugal itself was recommended. 
The Azores and Cape Verdes must, however, be denied to the 
enemy since enemy forces in the islands would threaten 
32 
British sea communications. 
The occupation of the French Biscay ports by German 
troops in June of 1940 increased the atmosphere of stark 
danger felt in the Admiralty. Germany now had the bases 
from which she could launch raids or amphibious expeditions 
against the Atlantic islands. Force H, the British naval 
squadron stationed at Gibralter, was given the mission of 
protecting them. On 10 October 1940 Admiral Sir James 
Somerville, Commander of Force H, was diverted from an 
attempt to intercept the Vichy French battleship Richelieu 
by warning of a possible German landing. Two troop trans­
ports were kept ready to land troops in the Azores if 
^^Stone, p. 740. 
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Spain or Portugal were invaded; the British would on no ac-
33 
count risk a German foothold in the islands. Hitler 
realized that the probable consequence of an invasion of 
Iberia was a British seizure of the Azores and, as will be 
seen, this influenced his own plans for the Iberian penin­
sula . 
The British War Cabinet, in a desperate but resolute 
frame of mind inspired by the threat they faced in the sum­
mer of 1940, actually considered the pre-emptive seizure of 
the Atlantic islands. This course of action was rejected 
on 22 July since it would be unwise to precipitate matters 
and incur the hostility of either Iberian government. Only 
if actual hostilities with them broke out, or if it were 
clear beyond reasonable doubt that either country was about 
to join the Axis against Britain, would the islands be 
seized. Only the Cabinet itself could make the decision 
for such an operation.The question thus was settled for 
the time being, but would come up again. 
Meanwhile, still another power became concerned by the 
fate of the Azores. The fall of France had created worri­
some new problems for the United States. For the first time 
Roosevelt's administration had to consider whether or not it 
was necessary that the United States intervene in the war, 
^^Captain S. W. Roskill, The War at Sea 1939-1945 (Lon­
don; H.M.S.O., 1954), 1:272-273. 
R. M. Butler, Grand Strategy (London: H.M.S.O., 
1957), 2:239. 
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Even if the United States kept out of the conflict she could 
not ignore the threat raised by a potential enemy in control 
of the entire European contineilt. It might become necessary 
to keep Germany from gaining footholds in the Americas, 
Keeping the Atlantic islands, especially the Azores, out of 
German hands would be vital to any such effort. Air and 
naval bases in the Azores, once in German hands, could be 
utilized to cover an actual invasion of the Western Hemi­
sphere. As early as July of 1940 the Americans warned Portu­
gal and Spain (who owned the Canary Islands) of its concern 
over the status of the Atlantic islands and received assur­
ances from both countries that neither would allow any 
, 35 changes. 
In 1940 the U. S, Government concentrated above all on 
keeping Britain in the war. Once it was evident, by the 
end of the year, that Britain's immediate crisis had been 
overcome and that the conflict would be prolonged, the U. S. 
Government took steps to support the British by all means 
short--just barely short--of war. In rapid succession came 
the "destroyers for bases" deal and the passage of the Lend-
Lease Act. These measures resulted in increasingly intimate 
Anglo-American cooperation and a slow but inexorable drift 
towards actual American involvement in the war. 
Interestingly enough, the very first military operation 
^^William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Chal­
lenge to Isolation 1937-1940 (New York: Harper and Bros., 
1952) , p. 738. 
outside the Western Hemisphere the United States planned 
during the Second World War was the occupation of the 
3 6 
Azores. The idea for the project was actually inspired 
by Winston Churchill in a private message to Roosevelt sent 
11 April 1941 warning that Germany might soon occupy Spain 
and Portugal. If that happened Britain would dispatch ex­
peditions to the Azores and Cape Verdes. Fearing that Ger­
mans might move in before the British could arrive, Churchill 
suggested that Roosevelt send a U. S. naval squadron "for a 
3 7 friendly cruise" in the vicinity of the islands. The naval 
cruise was canceled after Salazar, fearing an American visit 
might be interpreted as a breach of neutrality, refused to 
issue an invitation. Roosevelt, however, informed Churchill 
on 29 April 1941 that the U. S. was setting up a naval patrol 
which would cover the "westerly side" of the Azores and Cape 
Verdes, although no planes would be flown over the islands 
themselves. In the same message he asked Churchill to "make 
it very clear to the American people" that if Britain did 
occupy the Azores it would be for British wartime defense 
only, and that Portuguese sovereignty would be restored after 
the war. Roosevelt's exaggerated suspicions of "British 
imperialism" may have been the real reason for this request, 
but the ostensible reason was "that as you know, most of the 
^^Richard W. Steele, Tlie First Offensive 1942 (Blooming-
ton: Indiana University PresF̂  ̂ 1973) , p~!̂  IT] 
3 7 
U. S., Department of State, Foreign Relations of the 
United States 1941 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
1959), 2:839 (hereaIter cited as F.R.U.S. 1941). 
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Azores are in Western Hemisphere under my longitudinal map 
reading." In his reply Churchill assented readily to 
Roosevelt's wish, although he complained that any prior 
warning of a British occupation miglit mean tliat "we shall 
be forestalled," since the Germans, "will try to synchronize 
any decisive move from Spain or Portugal with a stroke on 
the islands. 
On 27 May 1941 Roosevelt delivered a speech in which 
he proclaimed an "Unlimited National Emergency." In the 
course of this long and important address he stated: 
They [the Germans] also have the armed power 
at any moment to occupy Spain and Portugal, 
and that threat extends not only to French 
North Africa and the western end of the 
Mediterranean but it extends also to the 
Atlantic fortress of Oakes (a port on the 
westernmost bulge of Africa, the capital of 
present-day Senegal) and to the island out­
posts of the New World--the Azores and the 
Cape Verde Islands.39 
Roosevelt returned to the subject of the islands several times 
during this speech. Me warned; 
Equally, the Azores or the Cape Verde Is­
lands, if occupied or controlled by Germany, 
would directly endanger the freedom of the 
Atlantic and our own American physical 
safety. Under German domination these is­
lands would become bases for submarines, 
warships and airplanes raising the waters 
that lie immediately off our own coasts 
and attacking the shipping in the South 
Atlantic. They would provide a springboard 
^^Ibid., 2:839-841. 
3 9 
Franklin U. Roosevelt, The Public Papers and Addresses 
of Franklin D. Roosevelt, edited by Samuel I. Rosenman (New 
York: Harper and Brothers, 1950), 10:185. 
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for actual attack against the integrity and 
the independence of Brazil and her neighbor­
ing Republics.40 
Roosevelt proclaimed that American policy was to resist any 
attempt by Hitler to expand towards the Western Ilemispliere 
or to threaten it. Germany would not be allowed to control 
the seas. "We insist upon the vital importance of keeping 
Hitlerism away from any point in the world which could be 
used or would be used as a base of attack against the Ameri­
cas.The Portuguese islands, as Roosevelt's earlier 
passages demonstrate, were prominent among these points. 
Military planning already backed up Roosevelt's 
rhetoric. On 22 May Roosevelt met with his senior military 
advisors, Admiral Harold Stark and General George C. Marshall, 
and ordered them to prepare at once for an occupation of the 
Azores. Although the President believed that the landing 
would merely be a peaceful "takeover from the Portuguese or 
the British," Marshall responded that any American force 
should be ready to fight. Roosevelt gave Stark and Marshall 
"thirty days in which to have ready an expedition to sail 
42 
for, and take, the Azores." 
It would have been ironic if the United States had 
opened its active participation in World War II by the inva­
sion of the territory of another neutral. No such drastic 
40lbid., p. 188. 
41lbid., p. 190. 
4 2steele, p. 14. 
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step, fortunately, turned out to be necessary. The Portu­
guese government made it clear that the islands would be 
defended against all comers. Alarmed by a statement by 
Claude Pepper, a Democratic Senator from Florida, that the 
United States should occupy, among other places, the Azores 
4 3 
and Cape Verdes, the Portuguese Minister in Washington, 
Joao de Bianchi, anxiously called on Cordell Hull, the Sec­
retary of State, on 9 May. Bianchi stressed that Portugal 
had neither promised nor granted bases to any other power, 
and was reinforcing the defenses of its island to resist 
attack from any quarter. Although Hull reassured the Portu­
guese Minister that Pepper spoke for himself only, Portugal's 
fears were not groundless. To underline their determination 
to keep any foreign forces out of the Azores, the Portuguese 
hastened to reinforce their garrison there. 
The American occupation of the Azores was destined never 
to take place. The Portuguese made it plain that they would 
resist fiercely any attempt to occupy any of their territory. 
It soon became apparent that neither Portugal nor its islands 
were in imminent danger. A month to the day after Roosevelt 
called in his Chiefs of Staff to plan the seizure of the Azores, 
Germany invaded Russia. At once the complexion of the war was 
S., Congress, Senate, Senator Pepper speaking on 
"America and the World Conflict," 77th Cong., 1st sess., 
6 May 1941, Congressional Record 87:3617. 
^^F.R.U.S. 1941, 10:841-42. 
"^^New York Times, 25 April 1941. 
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changed dramatically. With the strength of the Wehrmacht 
concentrated against Russia, Hitler had few resources to 
spare for adventures in the Atlantic. In the end the U. S. 
troops originally intended to occupy the Azores were sent 
to another island far to the north, relieving the British 
garrison in Iceland in July of 1941.'^^ 
Neither Allied concern for the fate of the Azores, 
nor Portuguese concern for the maintenance of their neutral­
ity entirely abated during 1941. Bianchi tenaciously sought, 
but never quite received, assuranced from Hull that the Amer­
icans would in no circumstances violate Portuguese sover-
4 7 eignty. The United States government was not willing to 
give any such assurance. Although Britain had sometimes 
tried to restrain the United States from excessive impetu-
4 8 
osity in the Atlantic. she was at least as unwilling as 
the United States to risk an/ German coup in the Azores, as 
is demonstrated by a message from Churchill passed through 
the British Embassy to Sumner Welles, Under-Secretary of 
State (and much closer to Roosevelt than Hull) on 18 June 
1941. "The British government," read the request, "desired 
to know whether the Government of the United States would be 
prepared immediately to undertake joint staff conversations 
with the British government to agree on plans covering the 
46steele, p. 16. 
"^^F.R.U.S. 1941 , 2:844- 848. 
4 8 
Kay, p. 162. 
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occupation o£ the Azores," to provide for a situation in 
which Salazar was unable or unwilling to request American 
or British protection. 
l^ooscvelt, For his part, took steps to improve the in­
creasingly prickly state of Luso-American relations. On 
14 July 1941 he dispatched a personal letter to Salazar. 
After assuring the Portuguese ruler of "the consistent de­
sire of the United States that there be no infringement of 
Portuguese sovereign control over those territories,^® 
Roosevelt offered to assist Portugal to defend her posses­
sions against German attack, with full assurances that 
Portuguese sovereignty would be respected, and American 
forces withdrawn immediately after the war's end. He sug­
gested that Brazil be asked to participate in any defense 
measures, apparently believing that Brazilian troops might 
be more welcome on the soil of their mother country than 
American forces. Roosevelt concluded by referring to his 
visit to the Azores in World War I when he was Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy. His mention of the U. S. bases then 
established in the Azores and of the "close and friendly" 
relationships between the American forces and the Portuguese 
population may have been intended as a gentle hint that simi-
51 
lar arrangements should be made again. 
"^^F.R.U.S. 1941 , 2:851. 
^°Ibid., 2:852. 
^^Ibid. , 2 : 853. 
120 
Salazar's reply was equally friendly in its tone. He 
wrote that "The Portuguese military authorities did not share 
the fear of an attack on the Azores by German forces, since 
5 2 
control of the Atlantic is not their's." The Portuguese 
government, with antiaircraft guns and aviation material 
supplied by Britain, was confident it could defend its islands 
against any attack. Salazar suggested that he would accept 
American aid if Britain could not provide adequate supplies. 
Although announcing his intention of preserving Portuguese 
neutrality, he left a door open for future cooperation--
"should [Portuguese neutrality] change in consequence of a 
violation of her sovereignty, the situation resulting there­
from would have to be examined in a different light and the 
5 3 new position would have to be defined." 
Thereafter the relations between Portugal and the United 
States warmed. The Azores problem lost its urgency for the 
time being, to be revived in a new context in 194 3. When the 
United States entered the war in December, 1941, one of the 
immediate results was the escalation of the German submarine 
offensive. Whereas the U-boats had previously largely con­
centrated their attack on the convoy routes near Britain, they 
now operated off the North American coast, in the Gulf of 
Mexico, and in the central Atlantic. The consequence was a 
tremendous slaughter of Allied merchant shipping. The sub-
^^Ibid. , 2 : 854. 
^^Ibid., 2:855. 
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marine menace, one of the most serious dangers the Allies 
had faced since the beginning of the war, reached crisis 
levels in 1942.^^ 
Although German submarines had lurked around the Azores 
since early in the war, the islands hitherto had lain well 
south of the main convoy battlegrounds. The expansion of 
the U-boat offensive now made them increasingly attractive 
as defensive bases. The Allies needed every available port 
to shelter convoys and their escorts, and every available 
airfield to fly protective patrols and hunt down submarines. 
The Azores were especially useful in one regard. One of the 
Allies' most serious handicaps was the so-called "Black Pit," 
an area in mid-Atlantic which could not be protected by 
patrol planes flying from bases on either side of the ocean. 
The Black Pit had been narrowed since the war began by the 
use of longer-ranged planes, but in 1942 it was still 600 
miles wide.^^ In this area, U-boats could operate with rela­
tive immunity to aircraft, and here they inflicted the heavi­
est losses on Allied shipping. Bases in the Azores could 
put an end to the "Black Pit." Patrols over the central 
Atlantic could be flown from the islands and provide air 
cover for convoys from one side of the Atlantic to the other. 
Use of the Azores would also make it possible to use convoy 
^^Samuel Eliot Morison, History of the United States 
Naval Operations in World War II, 15 vols. (Boston: Little, 
Brown, 1956), 10:8. 
^•''Dldward P. Von der Porten, The German Navy in World 
War II (New York: Crowell, 1969), p. 186. 
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routes further south than those currently available, a real 
advantage in the stormy north Atlantic winter. Convoy routes 
could be shortened, economizing shipping, and changed more 
easily to elude U-boats. Naval escorts could be refuelled 
in the Azores. Airfields in the Azores, besides strength­
ening the anti-submarine patrol, could be used as landing 
places for air transports. It was estimated that use of the 
Azores for this purpose alone could save yearly a million 
5 7 
tons of shipping, plus 100 million gallons of aviation fuel. 
Therefore, the Anglo-American objectives shifted from the 
negative aim of denying the use of the Azores to Germany, to 
the positive aim of obtaining the use of the islands them­
selves in the anti-submarine offensive. 
Nevertheless in 1942 Salazar was still unwilling to 
grant the Allies bases in the Azores. The possibility yet 
existed that Germany might retaliate for any such action by 
attacking continental Portugal. In 1943 the war had turned 
so decisively against the Germans that any invasion became 
very unlikely. The submarine menace had not yet been over­
come, the Battle of the Atlantic raged its fiercest in early 
1943, and British de.sire for bases in the Azores became pres­
sing. In March of 1943 the British Naval Staff recommended, 
as one of four measures necessary to gain victory over the 
^^Sir Anthony F.den (Earl of Avon), The Reckoning (Bos­
ton: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), p. 453. 
5 7 
Survey of International Affairs, 9:,336. 
5 8 
U-boats, access to the Azores. As the North African cam­
paign ended. Sir Dudley Pound, Chief of the British Naval 
Staff, revived a proposal that Britain should ask for the 
granting of bases in the Azores. The British were so anxious 
to obtain the bases that on 10 May: 
The Prime Minister sent the War Cabinet a mes­
sage saying that he would be prepared to ap­
proach the Portuguese Government for facilities 
and to let them knoiv, if they made difficulties, 
that we intended to take over the islands. He 
thought that Dr. Salazar . . . might find it 
easier to bow to force maj eur than to assent to 
such a violation of Portuguese neutrality. 
Sir Anthony Eden, the Foreign Secretary, vigorously objected 
to any such seizure, on the grounds that violation of Portu­
guese neutrality would alienate world opinion and tie up 
resources badly needed elsewhere. Eden, supported by Sir 
Ronald Campbell, the British Ambassador to Portugal, held 
that the Portuguese would respond favorably to an appeal 
based upon the Anglo - Portuguese Alliance. Churchill was not 
easily dissuaded from occupying the Azores outright. • On 
21 May 1943, he replied to Eden that "the Combined Chiefs of 
Staff strongly recommended that the Allies should have the 
use of the Azores as soon as possible, as a military neces­
sity."^*^ The War Cabinet insisted on a diplomatic approach 
first, arguing that no forces would be available to occupy 
^^Roskill, 2:370. 
^^Edeh, p. 453. 
'^^Ibid. , p . 454. 
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the Azores for two months at least.Churchill, then visit­
ing the United States, agreed to postpone any action until 
his return. Back in Britain Churchill maintained, at a 
Chiefs-of-Staff meeting held on 7 June, that the bases could 
not be obtained without force or the threat of force. Eden 
replied that he was not against a display of force, but that 
a few days must be allowed for diplomacy to be tried first. 
He was supported by the Chiefs of Staff, and "so diplomacy 
had its chance. 
The very next day Salazar asked Campbell for new Anglo-
Portuguese staff conversations because the military situation 
had changed. The British Ambassador interpreted this pro­
posal as a signal that Salazar might be ready to grant the 
bases. On 18 June, Eden called in Doctor Armindo Montiero, 
the Portuguese Ambassador, and laid before him a formal re­
quest for base rights. In return Britain would aid Portugal 
against any German air attacks on her mainland, protect Portu­
guese shipping and trade, and guarantee Portuguese sovereignty 
over all her colonies. The same day Campbell approached 
Salazar, who promised to consider sympathetically the British 
offer. On 23 June, Salazar agr.eed in principle to provide the 
facilities, but asked for further conversations on conditions 
^^Sir Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the 
Second World War (London: H.M.S.O., 1962), pT 379. 
^^Eden, p. 455. 
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for the grant.Detailed conversations began on 6 July.^^ 
Salazar's assent turned out to be only the beginning of 
weeks of hard bargaining. Salazar was willing to al-low bases 
only to British forces, and only under the terms of the Anglo-
I'ortugucsc Alliancc. 'I'he United States also wanted landing 
rights in the Azores, but Salazar was reluctant to let any 
American forces into the islands. There was nothing compar­
able to the tie xvith Britain between Portugal and the United 
States, and the Portuguese government had not forgotten the 
loud demands by influential voices in the United States only 
two years before, for American seizure of the Azores. Lin­
gering suspicions were not eased by American tardiness in ac­
cepting the same commitments as the British to unlimited 
Portuguese sovereignty over her possessions.^^ The U. S. 
government, in 1943, began to press for commercial landing 
rights (for Pan-American Airways) in the Azores, to "mate­
rially shorten our communications to the Mediterranean and 
the Middle and Far East."^^ Its request complicated the 
British negotiations for base rights. 
Churchill, not a patient man at the best of times, be­
came fretful at the pace of the negotiations. Eden recorded 
in his diary: 
'^^Ibid. , pp. 455- 56. 
^^Woodward, p. 380. 
^^Kay, p. 169. 
^^U.S., Department of State, Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 1943, 6 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1963-65), 2:529. 
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We had a row about this [the Azores negotia­
tions] last at Defence Committee. After dinner 
something of a shouting match going on for an 
hour or more. W. [Churchill] maintaining that 
we could have taken the islands in June, July 
or August but for my insistence on approaching 
Salazar, that he had himself been pleased with 
progress at first, but that now it was clear 
that S. was merely fooling me. I retorted that 
we had been absolutely right, that we had 
stopped him making unprovoked attack on an 
ally and that anyway he had not been in a posi­
tion to do the last until the end of August. 
Brooke [Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, Chief 
of the Imperial General Staff] said we had 
gained some ships for "Husky" [landing in 
Sicily] by my plan.67 
Churchill, as was his habit, apologized the next morning. His 
outbursts did result in the setting of 15 October as the dead­
line for the negotiations. The agreement was finally signed 
6 8 
on 18 August. Lengthy as the negotiation process had been, 
there was little chance that it would prove fruitless. Sala­
zar 's biographer presents personal testimony from General 
Santos Costa (then Portuguese Under-Secretary for War) that 
when Salazar first received the British request, he decided 
at once that "The Alliance had been invoked and Portugal 
69 could not refuse." The only question remaining was the 
terms on which the Alliance would be fulfilled. 
The Portuguese granted their aid to Britain in as low-
keyed a fashion as possible. They themselves remained neutral 
^^Eden, p. 464. 
^^Woodward, p. 3 81. 
6 9 
Kay, p. 168. 
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7 0 (a decision which suited the British perfectly) and allowed 
facilities at first only to the British. American requests 
to station 10,000 men in the islands were turned down, and 
when the Americans asked to send a naval air squadron to the 
islands, Salazar went so far as to threaten to resist its 
landing by force! After some months it was agreed that 
American aircraft could operate from the Azores--provided 
71 that they and their crews wore British insignia. Eventually 
the U. S. forces were able to build their own bases. New air­
fields were constructed at Santa Maria (Terceira) and Lagens 
by U. S. Navy Seabees.^^ 
By the time the Azores bases were finally obtained, the 
worst of the Battle of the Atlantic was over, the Allies gain­
ing a decisive upper hand in May, 1943. But the long struggle 
did not end until Germany itself was overrun, and Allied air­
craft based in the Azores played a key role in keeping the 
7 3 
German submarines at bay. "Thus, after more than four years 
of war, could reliable air cover be at last provided over the 
^^Woodward, p. 380. 
^^Ibid., pp. 381-383. 
^^George F. Kennan, Memoirs 1925-1950 (Boston: Little, 
Brown, 1967), pp. 142-162. George Kennan, the renowned Ameri­
can diplomat and historian, served as counselor in the Ameri­
can legation at Lisbon for a year and a half. After the 
death of the American Minister in 1943, Kennan, as Charge d'Af-
fairs was the executive head of the American legation for a 
considerable time, and played a major role in obtaining 
Salazar's consent to American forces in the Azores. 
^^Morison, 9:46. 
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whole Atlantic north of 30°N . . . the prosecution of the 
Atlantic struggle had been transformed, and the U-boats suf-
74 
tered further and drastic discomfiture." 
The Azores Agreement of 1943 was a landmark, but not 
the l;ist s Lgn i r i c;i n t diplomatic pact involving tlie Azores. 
Once LJ. S. naval forces were established in the islands, 
Salazar's suspicions that the Americans intended to seize 
the Azores were gradually overcome. On 27 March 1945 the 
U. S. and Portugal signed an "Agreement Regarding Air Trans­
port Command Service to Europe Through Portugal." This agree­
ment granted U. S. transport planes landing rights in Lisbon 
7 5 
by way of Santa Maria Airfield in the Azores. One scholar 
considers that the Agreement, and a later pact signed on 
6 December 1945, are of greater long-range importance than 
16 
the Azores Agreement of 1943. The ties between the U. S. 
and Portugal were strengthened, and the Azores assured of a 
role in the worldwide network of air routes being woven 
across the globe, routes of primary importance in postwar 
communications. 
The United States did not acquire base rights in the 
Azores easily or quickly, and having once gained them, was 
unwilling to give them up. On 10 September 1945 the British 
^^Roskill, 1:47. 
75 
U.S., Department of State, Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 1945, 9 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1967-68), 5:449-451. 
K. Sweeney, "Portugal, the United States, and 
Aviation, 1945," Rocky Mountain Social Science Journal 9 
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government notified the U. S. o£ its intention to terminate 
77 
the 1943 agreement with Portugal. This would mean the 
lapse of U. S. base privileges within nine months after termi­
nation. On 19 November the U. S. government asked British 
support in seeking postwar American bases in the Azores and 
Cape Verdes. In an aide memoire from James Byrnes, U. S. 
Secretary of State, to Ernest Bevin, the British Foreign Sec­
retary, it was stated, "It should be pointed out that the 
United States Chiefs of Staff attach the highest importance 
to the acquisition by the United States of rights to operate 
on a long-term basis, air and naval facilities in the 
7 8 
Azores." Bevin was reluctant to see the Azores used as 
military bases in the postwar vsforld, however, he wished to 
see the islands used only for civil aviation, and made avail-
79 able to the U. N. Security Council in the event of war. " The 
British insisted that if bases were set up; 
As regards the question of British participation 
quite apart from His Majesty's Government's 
vital interest in this part of the world from 
the strategic angle, their long-standing and 
intimate connection with Portugal makes it 
politically essential from their point of 
view that, if any base is to be set up in the 
Azores and the Cape Verde Islands before the 
coming into force of the World Security Orga­
nization, His Majesty's Government should 
participate in it as equal partners. Further­
more in view of the previous attitude of the 
^^F.R.U.S. 1945, 6:204 
^^Ibid., 6:212. 
^^Ibid., 6:217. 
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Portuguese government over the negotiations 
for the establishment of wartime bases in 
the Azores, His Majesty's Government cannot 
help feeling that if the United States Gov- • 
crnrnent wore to press for a base with which 
His Majesty's Government were not actively 
associated, they might well ii)eet witli a re­
cusal from Portugal.^" 
Even after its close wartime cooperation with the United States, 
Britain did not want it or any other power entrenched in the 
Azores. 
Portugal and Germany 
Salazar maintained diplomatic relations with Germany 
throughout the war. The tone of Luso-German relations was 
cordial (at least until the Azores Base agreement) and Sala­
zar was on excellent personal terms with Baron Oswald von 
81 
Hoynigen-Huene, the German Minister to Portugal. Toward 
Germany itself, however, Portugal clung to an attitude of 
arm-length neutrality. Salazar refused to provide any aid 
to the German war effort. When approached by Huene on 2 July 
1941 with a proposal that Portugal send a volunteer unit on 
the lines of the Spanish Blue Division to the Russian Front, 
Salazar returned an answer that deserves to rank as a classic 
example of the polite diplomatic rebuff. "Aside from the 
fact that Spain had a debt of gratitude to pay for the help 
^'^Ibid., 6:219. 
8 T 
J. K. Sweeney, "The Framework of Luso-American Diplo­
matic Relations During the Second World War," Rocky Mountain 
Social Science Journal 10 (October 1973):100. 
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in the Civil War," said Portugal's ruler, "the nature of the 
Spaniard was also more expansive and demonstrative than that 
8 2 
of the reserved Portuguese." Salazar might sympathize 
with Hitler's "anti-Bolshevist crusade" but he did not intend 
to contribute to it in any way. 
Given Salazar's policies, Portugal was unlikely to play 
any major role in German wartime diplomacy. Yet what kind 
of role might she play in the Reich's own military and naval 
strategy? Continental Portugal, far out on the western rim 
of the Iberian Peninsula, did have a place as a subsidiary 
factor in proposed German operations in Spain. Much greater 
attention was given, however, to Portugal's islands. 
In late 1940 the Germans made plans for an operation 
called "Felix" aimed at seizing the vital British base at 
8 3 
Gibraltar. One possible danger to "Felix" was a British 
riposte through Portugal. Control of Portugal was not ab­
solutely essential to a successful attack on Gibraltar, but 
Portugal might be used by Britain, as it had been many times 
in the past, as a sally port into the Peninsula, with serious 
consequences for any German troops campaigning there. The 
Germans considered both diplomatic and military steps to 
thwart any danger from the direction of Lisbon. Contingency 
plans were drawn up to cope with any British landings in 
82j:). c. F.P. , Scries D, 13:70. 
O T 
The German directions for Felix can be found in a 
collection of documents by Hans-Gunther Seraphim, "Felix and 
Isabella; Dokumente zu Hitlers Planungen bei Spanien und 
Portugal auf der Jahren 1940-41," Quellen zur Nuesten 
Gcsch ichtc 5 ( 1 95r.J , Heft I : r)«-82.' 
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Portugal. According to Fuehrer Directive 18, which stated 
the operational requirements for "Felix," "Mainly mobile 
formations" should be provided for the possible invasion of 
Portugal. A marginal note opposite this clause restricted 
the force to mountain troops, a relatively weak type of for-
84 
mation. Later the Germans decided a stronger reaction 
force was needed, and assigned three powerful divisions to 
. 1  , 85 the task. 
"Felix" never took place. It was frustrated by 
Francisco Franco's unwillingness to involve himself in a 
war not yet decided, the need to rescue Mussolini's forces 
from disaster in Greece and Libya, and Hitler's approaching 
invasion of Russia. On occasions thereafter the Germans did 
make plans to deal with possible Allied campaigns in Iberia. 
In May of 1941 an operation called "Isabella" was planned to 
seize western Spain and Portugal in the event of a British 
8 6 
landing. The Allied invasion of North Africa ("Torch") in 
November, 1942, caused special alarm, Hitler fearing that it 
8 7 
would be followed by an Anglo-American offensive in Iberia. 
'̂̂ U. S., War Department, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946), 6:959. 
^^Franz Haider, The Private War Journal 14 August 1939 to 
24 September 1942, edited by Arnold Lissance (English transla­
tion of the transcription of the original MSS, 1946) 9 vols. 
(Missoula: University of Montana Library), 5:7 (mimeographed). 
^^Ibid., 6:41. 
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But there was no longer much that Germany could do against 
the Allies in the Peninsula for she no longer had the forces 
to spare. 
German strategic interest however was by no means 
limited to the Iberian mainland. The Germans' concern with 
the Atlantic islands was at least as great, perhaps greater, 
than their interest in the Peninsula. It matched the con­
cern of the British and American governments whose preoccupa­
tion with the Azores has been examined earlier. The Azores 
alone were of greater importance than mainland Portugal. 
German interest in the Azores first appears in the 
record in September, 1940, when "Felix" was under considera­
tion. In a report to Hitler dated 6 September, Admiral Erich 
Raeder, the Commander in Chief of the German Navy, suggested 
that the United States might occupy the Portuguese islands 
(as well as the Spanish Canaries) in connection with American 
g  
entry into the war, an event Raeder believed to be imminent. 
On 26 September 1940 Hitler agreed that the y\zores. Cape 
Verdes, and Canaries might have to be seized by the Air Force 
In an attached memorandum Raeder pointed out the disadvantage 
which was to dog all German planning for operations in the 
Atlantic: 
8 8 
Conference of 6 September 1940, as cited in ibid., 
2:19-20. 
89 
Conference of 26 September 1940, as cited in ibid., 
2:25. 
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Lack o£ an adequate fleet will constitute 
a continual drawback in case of further 
extension of warfare, e.g., with regard 
to the occupation of the Canary Islands, 
tirê Cape Verde Islands, the Azores, Dakas, 
Iceland, etc.90 
A n  i  n  t o  r e s  t  i  n i ' ,  r e a s o n  f o r  H i t l e r ' s  k e e n  i n t e r e s t  i n  t h e  A z o r e s  
was revealed at another conference between Hitler and Raeder 
on 20 April 1941. Using the Azores as a base, the Germans 
could attack America with a modern plane of the Messerschmitt 
91 type. This would compel the United States to build up its 
92 own defenses and curtail supplies to Great Britain. Mean­
while, Raeder himself had cooled considerably toward the idea 
of an Azores occupation. He stated the operation would be 
9 3 risky, "but with luck could succeed." Then the real diffi­
culties would begin. 
A massive British counterattack was certain. The navy 
would be diverted from its proper offensive role to defensive 
escort. Even the U-boats, the main German naval offensive 
arm, would be tied down, effectively ending the submarine 
campaign. It was very doubtful whether harbor facilities in 
the Azores were at all adequate to speedy unloading, or whether 
94 
there was adequate shelter for aircraft and supplies. Raeder 
^^Conference of 14 November 1940, as cited in ibid., 
2 : 41. 
91 Possibly the Messerschmitt 264, a long-range bomber 
which never went into production. See William Green, War-
planes of the Third Reich (New York: Doubleday, 1970). 
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Conference of 14 November 1940, as cited in Germany, 
Naval High Command, Fuehrer Conferences, 2:41. 
-^^Ibid. 
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advocated that Germany should not occupy the Azores herself, 
but influence Portugal to fortify the islands and defend them 
against British or American incursions--steps Portugal took 
without German encouragement. 
Still, Hitler clung to hopes of operations in the Azores. 
On 22 May 1941, Raeder had to repeat his earlier arguments 
against occupation, but the "Fuehrer is still in favor of 
95 occupying the Azores in order to bomb the United States." 
By the summer of 1941 German objectives in the Atlantic islands, 
as in continental Portugal, had become defensive rather than 
offensive, keyed to thwarting Allied gains. 
The U. S. occupation of Iceland led the Germans to expect 
similar Anglo-American moves into the Azores and Cape Verdes. 
Due to Germany's weakness at sea, a German invasion of Iberia 
was almost the only countermove the Nazis could make if the 
Allies actually did occupy the islands. Hitler also proposed 
that an operational group of U-boats be held in readiness to 
strike back if the Allies occupied the Azores, Madeira, or the 
96 Cape Verdes. But both Raeder and Admiral Karl Doenitz, 
Commander of the U-boats objected to this diversion of the 
97 
inadequate U-boat force, and Hitler withdrew his proposal., 
After the Allied landings in Morocco and Algeria, Hit-
9 8 
ler's interest in the Azores declined. The German naval 
^^Conference of 22 May 1941, as cited in ibid., 1:65. 
^'^Conference of 25 July 1941, as cited in ibid., 2:14. 
^^Karl Doenitz, Memoirs: Ten Years and Twenty Days (Lon­
don: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1959), pp. 229-231. 
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authorities realized there was no longer a chance o£ attacking 
the Azores. Raeder's report to Hitler on 22 December 1942 
included the following: 
The Portuguese islands are exclusively at 
the disposal of our enemies who use them 
as a base under the protection of a neutral 
flag. It is not strategically necessary 
for us to occupy these islands at the moment, 
although we would like to establish our own 
air bases there.99 
The wistful mention of German air bases in the Azores is the 
last indication of German hopes to use those islands. Raeder 
must have realized that no such operation was any longer pos­
sible. The German's worst fears about the Azores came true 
some months later, when the Anglo-Portuguese Azores base agree­
ment was signed. It appears the Germans learned of the agree­
ment only when it went into effect on 12 October 1943. Their 
only countermeasure was a diplomatic protest delivered to 
Salazar on 15 October. There was no bombing raid on Lis­
bon, not even, as in 1916, a declaration of war. Nothing 
could better illustrate the depths to which German fortunes 
had sunk. 
Strategic Location and Portuguese Neutrality 
War in the twentieth century developed dimensions far be­
yond the military and diplomatic limits it possessed earlier. 
University Press, 1949), p. 151. 
99 
Conference of 22 December 1942, as cited in Germany, 
Naval High Command, Fuehrer Conferences, 2:143. 
^^^Survey of International Affairs 1939-1946, 9:339. 
137 
It became "total," to use the common expression. Total war 
is waged on economic, intelligence, and psychological fronts 
-â s—we tl—a-s--e-n -bat-tl-e-fi-e-lrds-aTid-at̂ conf-er-e-nce~t ab"i"es ; 
As has been demonstrated, Portugal played an important 
role in the strategic maneuverings of both sides, while being 
fortunate enough to remain uninvolved in the actual fighting. 
Neutrality spared Portugal the destruction and misery in­
flicted on most European nations, but could not totally iso­
late her from a war raging on all sides. In fact, neutral 
status made Portugal all the more attractive a territory for 
the practitioners of some newer aspects of global war. Not 
merely neutrality, but strategic location, for Portugal's 
position enabled her to fill some roles other European neu­
trals could not. 
Of Europe's neutrals, Portugal, because of her location, 
had the best communications with both sides and with the out­
side world. Shielded from German-controlled territory by 
Spain, she was in easy touch with the Americas. The Trans-
Atlantic Clipper service, flying boats owned by Pan-American 
Airlines, used Lisbon as its European terminal during the war 
years. Portugal's capital became a European crossroads. In 
the words of the most authoritative study of the wartime neu­
trals : 
After a period of bewilderment and acute 
anxiety Portugal emerged as the chief re­
maining link between llitler's Europe and 
Great Britain and the Americas. British and 
American, as well as German and Italian air­
lines called at Lisbon, the American Export 
138 
Lines kept up passenger and cargo sailings 
until December 1941, and Spanish and Portu­
guese ships crossed the Atlantic throughout 
- —th e- war L-i s-b-on -w as--th e—e-kie-#- tt'-a-n-s 
shipment f)oint for the relief supplies for 
prisoners of war and internees dispatched 
by the International Red Cross, which 
chartered Portuguese ships for the last 
stage of the journey.101 
Portuguese neutrality thus was the interest of both sides, 
and all the more secure in consequence. The price the Portu­
guese paid was to see their country turned into an arena for 
spies. Intelligence is an indispensable war-winning weapon, 
and important information of all kinds is often most easily 
obtained on neutral soil. Portugal, with its open communi­
cations between two warring blocs and two hemispheres, be­
came an intelligence crossroads. Agents of belligerents' spy 
services used Lisbon as a message center and sometimes as a 
headquarters for espionage in the warring countries. Of all 
the aspects of war intelligence operations are the least docu­
mented and the most likely to be distorted by rumor and delib­
erate misinformation. Nevertheless, it is easily established 
that Portugal was a key area for intelligence activities. The 
German army spy service, the Abwehr, for instance, used Lisbon 
10 2 as its base for espionage in Britain. The British used a 
double agent in Lisbon to feed falsified intelligence to Ger­
many after they captured the entire German spy network in 
% 
^°^Ibid., 9;320-321. 
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10 3 
Britain. When the United States entered the business of 
xvartime espionage, one of the first overseas offices was in 
104 ^ 
- Iri s bo n̂ m -f ciTTxraT'y, "~19"̂ '2 ." 
liconomic warCarc is often waged in neutral countries. 
In relation to neutrals, economic warfare has two major ob­
jectives: gaining control of strategic raw materials and 
manufactured goods and preventing their export to the enemy, 
and use of neutral territory as a passageway through an eco­
nomic blockade or preventing use in that way by an enemy. 
Since Portugal had little in the way of strategic raw ma­
terials to offer, her most important role in economic war­
fare was in relation to the Allied blockade of Axis Europe. 
With her Atlantic ports and islands, her extensive colonial 
empire, and her commerce with the Axis powers, Portugal could 
not be ignored in any attempt to cut off the Axis from the 
outside world. Before June, 1940, Portuguese commerce with 
Germany could be carried on only by sea; but after that date 
goods could be transported overland to Germany by way of 
105 
Occupied France. As a result Britain found it difficult 
to interrupt traffic between Portugal and Germany by naval 
means, and had to rely on diplomacy. As Portugal's major 
C. Masterman, The Double-Cross System in the War 
of 1939 to 1945 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), 
pp. 138-140. 
Harris Smith, O.S.S., The History of America's 
First Central Intelligence Agency [Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1972), 41. 
105|y. n. Medlicott, The Economic Blockade, 2 vols. 
(London: H.M.S.O., 1952), 1:55. 
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trading partner, Britain was in a position to apply severe 
economic pressure, but negotiating with the stubborn Salazar 
was never easy. Eventually, the British relied upon pre­
emptive buying, which put pounds sterling into Portuguese 
pockets, "and in Portugal the blockade issue never lost the 
character o£ a game o£ poker between hard-faced friends . " 
Whatever hardships the blockade imposed upon Portugal, were 
more than compensated by wartime prosperity, for as one study 
concludes: 
To travellers from countries at war Portugal 
seemed an incredible oasis of peace and pros­
perity; no blackout; no ration cards; shops 
full of food and luxuries, for those who 
could afford them.107 
Portugal•came through the war as well as any European 
country, and better than most. In spite of the fact that 
"Portugal was of crucial importance to both Great Britain and 
10 8 
Germany" because of its location, it escaped being bombed 
or invaded, departing from neutrality only when and where 
such departures suited Portuguese interests. In part this 
was due to Portugal's strategic importance itself; when dan­
ger was most imminent Germany would not attack Portugal 
because of the well-founded fear that the Allies would occupy 
Portugal's Atlantic islands. And the Allies would not occupy 
^•^^Ibid., 1:528. 
10 7 
Survey of International Affairs, 9:321. 
10 8 Sweeney, "Framework of Luso-American Diplomatic 
Relations," p. 93'. 
141 
the islands first, in spite of powerful temptation, because 
of possibly unfavorable consequences in continental Portugal. 
This advantage, crucial though it was, might have been 
insufricicnt if :i t luid not been couplcd with astute diplomacy 
Slirewtl, stubborn, and cautious, Salazar exploited strategic 
location brilliantly. His highly successful wartime foreign 
policy was perhaps the greatest service Salazar rendered his 
country during all the years he was Portugal's overlord. 
CHAPTER V 
I^ORTIJGAL AND NATO 
Portugal's Entry into NATO 
The end of the war did not bring international tran­
quillity to the world--or to Portugal. The coalition that 
destroyed the Axis barely survived their enemy's destruction, 
and was soon replaced by two hostile power blocs. The re­
sulting Cold War developed in the immediate postwar years. 
It was universally acknowledged as the dominant fact in world 
politics by early 1949, when the North Atlantic Treaty Orga­
nization (NATO), a formal alliance of the western powers, was 
created under United States sponsorship. 
The United States was one of the two great protagonists 
in the Cold War struggle, the only country whose strength 
could outmatch that of the Soviet Union. It clearly had re­
placed Britain as the leading power in the Atlantic world. 
But the United States neither hoped nor wished to contain the 
expansion of the Soviet power alone. The American govern­
ment wanted to share the burden with the support of an alli­
ance of western European and North Atlantic nations. Portu­
gal was visualized as part of this grouping from the begin­
ning. 
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The western European countries, especially Great Britain, 
were, if anything, even more eager for the creation of an 
Atlantic pact than the United States, for it would end all 
chances that the United States would withdraw into isolation 
and leave them to face Russia's power alone. On 11 March 
1948, Ernest Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary, sent an 
aide memoire to the U. S. government in which he suggested 
there be concluded "an Atlantic Approaches Pact of Mutual 
Assistance, in which all the countries directly threatened 
by a Russian move to the Atlantic, could participate, for 
example. United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Eire, Ice­
land, Norivay, Denmark, Portugal, France and Spain, when it 
has a democratic regime."^ 
The name of Portugal reappears frequently in the records 
of the planning that led up to the foundation of NATO. No 
one, of course, imagined that the Portuguese could contribute 
powerful military forces to an alliance, but she could be an 
asset in another way, as Samuel Reber, an important State De­
partment official (Acting Director of the Department of 
European Affairs) pointed out in a planning conference held 
on 26 July 1948. 
In regard to Portugal Mr. Reber stated that 
this country was also important from the 
strategic standpoint, not only because of 
its position on the Iberian Peninsula, but 
also due to its possessions of the Azores. 
^U.S., Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United 
States, 1948, 9 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1972-76), 3:47. 
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Agreeing \-}ith this statement Mr. Hoyer Millar 
(Sir Frederic Hoyer Millar, a British diplo­
mat stationed at the Washington embassy) sug­
gested that Portugal might be tempted to 
enter sucli an arrangement despite its close 
ties with General Franco, if it could come 
in, as it was, on the ground floor and could 
be assured of U. S. support of the pact.2 
During another meeting held on 2 September, George Kennan, 
then an important policy planner in the State Department, in­
cluded Portugal with Iceland and Denmark as countries that 
"would be valuable in the regional arrangement primarily be­
cause of their geographic position and for the facilities 
3 
they might be able to provide in the event of hostilities." 
If the United States and its west European clients were 
eager to see Portugal as an Atlantic alliance partner because 
of her strategic location, Portugal was a willing recruit. 
Salazar's fear and hatred of Communism had not been reduced 
by the passage of time. The outcome of World War II, particu­
larly the destruction of German power and the expansion of 
Russia westward, inspired in him a positive alarm. He Con­
sidered Russia the real victor in the war.^ Salazar also 
saw positive benefits that his country could gain by partici­
pation in the Cold War. It was an advantage for a small 
country to be courted, especially to be courted by the United 
States, which had such rich gifts to offer. Considerable eco-
^Ibid., 3:203. 
I) i d . , 3:226. 
^Luc Crollen, Portugal, the U. S. and NATO (Leuven, 
Belgium: Leuven University Press, 1973), p. 40. 
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nomic benefits could be expected, and to be the ally of a 
great power could not but increase Portuguese prestige. 
Salazar had demonstrated in earlier years how well he under­
stood how to cxtract advantages from international crises: 
Indeed, disruption in Big Three Unity, a 
power vacuum and disequilibrium in Central 
Europe could only stress the need to have 
the big Western maritime powers permanently 
entangled in the affairs of Europe. In this 
case, the importance of the Atlantic would 
grow again. Atlantic islands and the Portu­
guese Atlantic-oriented coast and ports 
would continue to be valued highly.^ 
Salazar, however, moved towards alliance in the slow and 
cautious fashion which characterized his style. He did have 
some reservations about the real strength of an Atlantic alli­
ance that included France and other nations which he considered 
weak and unstable, and being a dedicated nationalist disliked 
the implications of European federation that were raised by 
the proposals for a general alliance. These misgivings were 
made plain in a statement probably written by Salazar that 
appeared in the Portuguese press on 30 October 1948.^ 
The advantages of joining the Atlantic Pact were so ob­
vious that they outweighed Salazar's doubts. On 10 June 1949 
the American Ambassador to Portugal, Lincoln MacVeigh, called 
on the Portuguese Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Jose 
Caeiro de Matta, and informed him that the Atlantic Pact was 
completely separate from any project for European federation. 
^Ibid., p. 41. 
6F.R.U.S., 1948, 3:1008, 
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and reassured the Portuguese government that no member state 
could be compelled to grant base rights to any other power 
against its will. MacVoigh also urged the Portuguese not to 
allow the exclusion of Spain from the alliance (to wliich the 
Portuguese government objected) not to deter them from joining 
7 themselves. 
On 15 March 1949 Portugal, together with Iceland, Italy, 
Denmark, and Norway, was officially invited to accede to the 
O 
Treaty. On 4 April 1949 Caeiro de Matta signed the North 
Atlantic Treaty on Portugal's behalf, and the country entered 
9 the Pact as a charter member. After joining the pact, Salazar 
took some smug pleasure in congratulating the United Sta:tes 
for finally waking up to the Russian threat. In a conversa­
tion with Averill Harriman, then acting as a special Ambassa­
dor in Europe, on 25 November 1949, he "evinced great interest 
in our [the U. S. government's] relations with the U.S.S.R. 
Why it had taken so many years, with the loss of much precious 
time, to realize what the Russians were up to."^*^ Salazar 
hoped for more tangible benefits from inclusion in NATO. 
Portugal was included in the Marshall Plan (Harriman was 
7 U.S., Department of State, Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 1949, 5 vols, to date (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1975-76), 4:19-20. 
g  
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Information Service, 
NATO Facts and Figures (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 
19 69T7 p. 21. 
^F.R.U.S., 1949, 4:285. 
^^Ibid., 4:716. 
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traveling in Europe as representative for the Economic Coopera­
tion Administration wliich distributed financial assistance 
under the Plan) and sought aid not only for metropolitan Portu-
11 
gal but for its overseas possessions. Portugal did not re­
ceive any great amount of money compared to other European 
countries, getting only $61,800,000 (as compared with over a 
billion dollars for Greece) between 1949 and 1952.^^ The 
greatest gains to Portugal from inclusion in NATO were politi­
cal, not economic. The country needed a powerful protector. 
By inclusion into NATO, Portugal came under the wing of the 
United States, the most powerful nation in the world. Al­
though the Alliance with Britain remained in force (and re­
mains in force to this day) for all practical purposes the 
United States took over Britain's old role as Portugal's 
patron. This change of allegiance was a small but graphic 
illustration of a much larger phenomenon, the replacement of 
an exhausted Britain by the United States as the paramount 
power in the Atlantic world. 
Portugal in her turn provided to the United States the 
same service she had once rendered Britain--access to stra­
tegic bases. The United States was able to retain its wartime 
landing rights in the Azores by means of an agreement signed 
^^Ibid., 4:715, 
12 . • Luc Crollen, "Portugal," in Small Powers in Alignment, 
ed. Omar De Raeymaker (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1974), 
p. 4 8. 
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30 May 1946, although formal control of the airbases at Santa 
13 Maria and Lajens was handed over to Portuguese authorities. 
The rationale for the extension of 1946 was the need for the 
United States to maintain communication wjth its occupation 
zone in Germany, but when the next extension was signed (on 
2 February 1948) the reason given was significantly differ­
ent : 
The advantages which those facilities will 
achieve for the security of Europe and for 
the re-establishment and consolidation of 
world peace as well as the indirect value 
which the same may bring about for the com­
mon defense and security.^4 
In less than two years the formal justification for Ameri­
can rights in the Azores shifted from the narrow exigencies of 
postwar occupation to a much broader concern with the multi­
lateral defense of western Europe. Thus it was symptomatic 
of a great reorientation of American foreign policy that took 
place during those years. 
The 1948 extension remained in force for three years, to 
be replaced on 5 January 1951 by the much broader "Mutual 
Defense Assistance Agreement between the United States and 
Portugal.This treaty (as renewed in later years) remains 
13 
U.S., Department of State, Department of State Bulletin 
14 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, June 2 3, 1946), 
364:1081-1082. 
^^U.S., Department of State, Department of State Bulletin 
18 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, March 14, 
1948), 454:358. 
^^U.S., Department of State, United States Treaties and 
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the basis o£ U. SPortuguese relations at the present time.^^ 
American and other NATO forces were granted full authority to 
use the Azores bases in wartime, or with mutual consultation, 
in time of peace. The two governments agreed to cooperate in 
improving and expanding the base facilities on the island, and 
1 7 American personnel were to be stationed at Lagens. 
The provision of the Azores bases was Portugal's one 
major contribution to NATO. It was an extremely important 
contribution, however. As the 1951 treaty was signed, the 
Korean War raged in the Far East, and fear of an imminent 
Russian attack on western Europe was intense. If such an 
assault were actually launched, the NATO Allies would need the 
Azores both as a transit point for aircraft bound for Europe 
and as an anti-submarine base f6r use against the large Russian 
underwater fleet. They were a cornerstone of NATO strategy in 
the 1950s. 
Portugal, after becoming a NATO member, received some 
American military assistance, but has never been asked to con­
tribute to the defense of the "Central Front" in western 
Europe. Under the terms of the NATO pact, it is required to 
maintain one infantry division for possible use on the European 
Continent, but the Portuguese military role to the alliance 
Other International Agreements, Vol. 2, Pt. 1: "Portugal: 
Mutual Defense Assistance," TIAS No. 2187, 5 January 1951 (Wash­
ington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1952), p. 438. 
^^Crollen, "Portugal," p. 56. 
^^United States Treaties, TIAS No. 2187, p. 444. 
^^Crollen, "I'ortugal," p. 57. 
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has been "Atlantic-centered," small air and naval forces to 
19 assist in patrolling the sea lanes. On 22 February 1967, 
f o l l o w i n g  I ' r a n c c ' s  w i t i i d r a w a l  f r o m  m i l i t a r y  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  
the Alliance, Iberian Atlantic Command (IBERLANT) was 
2 0 created. IBERLANT has its headquarters in Portugal, and 
its mission is to defend continental Portugal and the sea 
approaches to Europe within the area bounded by the Azores 
on the west, Madeira on the south, and the Iberian peninsula 
21 on the east. IBERLANT is a multinational force which in­
cludes contingents from the United States (its commandant is 
an American admiral), Britain, and West Germany as well as 
Portugal. Since the Portuguese army division theoretically 
available for NATO duty has never been combat-ready, partici­
pation in IBERLANT is Portugal's contribution to the military 
strength of the Atlantic Alliance. Even with American assis­
tance, the Portuguese armed forces have remained small and 
ill-equipped. Luc Crollen, a Belgian scholar who has analyzed 
the Portuguese relationship to NATO most thoroughly, wrote in 
19 7 3: 
On the whole, then, with its valuable stra­
tegically located islands, its Atlantic 
ports, and its communications facilities 
'^^Ibid., pp. 61-62. 
^^North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Letter 15 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, April 1967), 
4; 29. 
2 1 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Letter 15 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,September 
1967), 9:22-23. 
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Portugal has certainly been a most welcome 
NATO partner; certainly also, in terms of 
manpower, training and equipment the Portu­
guese armed forces have been unable to live . 
up to their commitments, since their main 
defense efforts lie overseas.22 
Portugal plays a role in NATO very much like the role it 
played as a junior partner of the British empire; not a cen­
ter of power itself, but a provider of vital ports and island 
bases due to its strategic location, which might become indis­
pensable to an ally in crisis times. 
When Portugal joined NATO and for approximately a decade 
afterward, these strategic advantages went unaccompanied by 
any serious political disadvantages. If Portugal was a dic­
tatorship (the only dictatorship in NATO at the time it was 
organized) it was a mild one, and unlike Franco's Spanish 
regime, bore no stigma of collaboration with the Axis in 
World War II. Portugal's African colonies provoked little 
controversy at a time when most of that continent was divided 
up among Britain, France, and Belgium, and expected to remain 
under European control indefinitely. 
About 1960, however, the dramatic changes in Portugal's 
relationship with NATO began to occur, largely for reasons 
which lay outside Europe. From a relatively placid and con­
tented junior partner in the Atlantic Alliance, Portugal was 
transformed into an unhappy dissident. The United States, 
which had won access to valuable bases at very little cost 
22crollen, "Portugal," p. 64. 
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when Portugal entered NATO, soon found itself trying to 
reconcile serious contradictions in its foreign policies 
as a result of Portuguese actions. 
Strategic Asset, Political Liability -
Portugal in the 1960s 
Beginning in 1956, Europe's retreat from its overseas 
empires, which had begun in Asia immediately after World 
War II, started in Africa as well. Within less than a decade, 
Britain, France, and Belgium abandoned their west African hold­
ings, sometimes reluctantly cooperating with the inevitable, 
sometimes eagerly divesting themselves of costly burdens. In 
an amazingly short time, a multitude of independent sovereign­
ties replaced a few great empires. 
Portugal defied the anti-colonial trend. Stubbornly she 
clung to her great African colonies, in the face of world 
disapproval and armed revolt. The defense of Portugal's 
imperial holdings became the major preoccupation of Salazar's 
regime. It affected foreign and domestic policy alike. From 
1961 onward Salazar poured all the resources his country could 
muster into wars against nationalist guerrillas first in 
Angola, then in Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea. He judged 
his allies on their willingness to suppor't his overseas 
struggles and found them wanting. Disenchantment with NATO 
followed. 
Salazar's stubbornness created an excruciating policy 
153 
dilemma for the United States government. 1961, the year of 
armed rebellion in Portuguese Africa, was also the year 
John F. Kennedy entered the White House. Kennedy had as one 
of his centra] foreign policy goals, the improvement of Ameri­
can relations with, and the increase of American influence in, 
the new states of Africa and Asia. He regarded these countries 
as the principal battleground between the United States and the 
2 3 
Soviet Union. No such goal could be achieved if the United 
States backed Portugal's colonial wars in Africa. Failure to 
support Portugal, however, would also involve penalties. At 
first glance it might not seem that a tiny ally like Portugal 
could exert enough leverage to alter America's "Third World" 
policy. But Portugal had one powerful weapon at its disposal, 
the Azores base--and the 1951 Agreement would expire on 31 
December 1962. 
After a decade the Azores remained a critical link in 
America's worldwide base network. Dean Acheson, former Sec­
retary of State, architect of containment, and an extremely 
influential advisor to the Kennedy administration, referred 
to the Azores in 1961 as "an air base which is, perhaps, the 
2 5 most important one we have anywhere." Acheson opposed 
2 3 
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1965), p. 509. 
^"^Crollen, "Portugal," p. 75. 
2 5 
Dean Acheson, "Fifty Years After," Yale Review 51 
(1961);8. 
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American involvement in the Angola issue, and was supported 
by the State Department's Bureau o£ European Affairs. In 
the summer of 1961, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the President's 
military advisors, declared that the Azores would be essential 
2 6 to American security if trouble broke out in Berlin. 
The Portuguese Foreign Minister, Dr. Franco Nogueira, 
took the first opportunity available to drop hints that Ameri­
can access to the Azores might depend upon a more favorable 
attitude towards Portugal, and play off the Pentagon and State 
2 7 Department Europeanists against the Africa supporters. The 
Kennedy administration found itself compelled to follow an un­
comfortable middle course, trying to avoid outraging the Third 
World countries and mortally offending Portugal at the same 
time. The great arena of anti-colonial agitation was The 
United Nations, and here the United States was most often faced 
with a decision on the Portuguese issue. Early in the Kennedy 
administration the United States voted favorably on a Liberian 
resolution advocating Angolan self-determination both in the 
Security Council on 15 March 1961, and in the General Assembly 
? 8 
on 20 April. By the end of 1962 the U. S. government was 
abstaining on U. N. resolutions calling for the imposition of 
an arms embargo and economic boycott on Portugal although the 
United States refused to permit the use of any military equip-
^^Schlesinger, p. 562. 
^^Crollen, "Portugal," p. 75. 
^^Ibid., p. 73. 
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ment supplied to Portugal for NATO purposes in Africa. As 
Luc Crollen pointed out, "In fact, the Pentagon's fear of 
jeopardizing the Azores base had actually determined the 
2 9 
limits of Kennedy's Africa policy." The United States re­
fused to endorse Portuguese colonialism, or to give it any 
material support. The American government quietly pressured 
the Portuguese to moderate its policies. But the United 
States also refused to undertake any effort to force Portugal 
out of Africa, or to be a party to any such efforts sponsored 
by others. This attempt to balance strategic and political 
considerations could hardly satisfy either Portugal or the 
Afro-Asian countries, but was probably the only policy the 
available options would permit. It is an unusually clear 
example of the constraints on the foreign policies of even 
the mightiest power, and of the disproportionate bargaining 
strength of a small state which both possesses a strategic 
location, and knows how to use it. The strategic advantage 
afforded the United States by its base in the Azores was 
very tangible, and weighed in the balance at least as much 
as the vague and uncertain benefits conferred by "world pub­
lic opinion." In the end the fact that the Portuguese pres­
ence in NATO was a strategic asset was more important to the 
American government than that it was also a political li­
ability. 
29 
Ibid., p. 76. 
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The equivocal American policy did score one clear gain--
continued American base rights in the Azores. The 1951 Agree­
ment was informally renewed on 4 January 1963. The Portu­
guese exacted a stiff price for continued American use of the 
Azores--a loan of $48, 750 , 000, a gift of $ 13, 750, 000 - - and 
-Z Q 
acquiescence in Portugal's African policies. 
Friction between the U. S. and Portugal lessened under 
Kennedy's successors. Neither Lyndon Johnson nor Richard 
Nixon paid as much attention to African opinion as Kennedy 
had, and valued the Azores base highly. The third extension 
of the original 1951 Agreement took place on 9 December 
31 1971. In return for use of the Lajens base, the U. S. 
3 2 
government agreed to pay Portugal some $435,000,000. 
In spite of the tenacity with which the United States 
clung to its airfield in the Azores, some considered that the 
base was in fact becoming obsolescent, as the size and range 
33 
of aircraft increased. Events late in 1973, however, of­
fered dramatic evidence to the contrary. The fourth major 
war between Israel and its Arab neighbors broke out on 
^^Ibid., pp. 86- 87. 
31 
U. 5., Department of State, Department of State Bulle­
tin 66 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, Janu­
ary 3, 1972), 1697:24. 
3 2 
Newsweek. "Portuguese Guinea--A Propaganda War?", 
27 December 1971, p. 28. 
^•^Crollen, "Portugal," p. 54. 
157 
34 6 October. On 15 October the United States launched a 
35 major airlift to rosupply Israel with munitions. Threat­
ened with an Arab oil embargo, all European countries re­
fused landing rights to American planes bound for Israel--
all, that is, except Portugal. Jet transports carrying muni­
tions were allowed to refuel in the Azores--thus enabling 
them to carry heavier cargoes. Skyhawk fighter-bombers bound 
for Israel landed at Lajes, refueling again from U. S. air-^ 
3 6 
craft carriers in the Mediterranean. The Portuguese assisted 
the airlift even after the Arab oil embargo was imposed upon 
3 7 them, an action quite in keeping with the centuries-old 
Portuguese tradition of scrupulous adherence to the terms of 
their alliances. During the tense days of the "Yom Kippur" 
war, the strategic value of the Azores was dramatized as it 
had not been since World War II. 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger paid an official 
visit to Portugal almost immediately after the end of the 
3 8 
war (17-18 December 1973). At the Azores base, whose value 
^'^Marvin Kalb and Bernard Kalb, Kissinger (Boston: Little, 
Brown, 1974), p. 459. 
35 
Facts on File Yearbook, vol. 33 (New York: Facts on 
File, Inc. , 1973), p. 859. 
^^New York Times, 25 October 1975. 
^^Ibid., 11 November 1973. 
7 O 
'U.S., Department of State, Department of State Bulle-
tin 70 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, Janu­
ary 14 , 1974) , 1803:26. 
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had just been emphasized was due to lapse in February, 1974, 
39 
negotiations began for its renewal. Before a new agreement 
could be reached, however, the first political changes in 
five decades--cataclyamic changes--took place in Portugal. 
Serious problems were created for the United States and 
Portugal's other NATO partners. Overnight, Portuguese poli­
tics became a major American concern. 
Antonio Salazar, for all his remarkable abilities, in 
the end joined the lengthy list of despots who lived and 
ruled too long. On 17 September 1968 he suffered a near-fatal 
stroke which left him comatose and paralyzed.Ten days 
41 later Salazar was succeeded as premier by Dr. Marcelo Caetano. 
4 2 
Never recovering completely, the old dictator died 27 July 1970. 
The "Estado Novo" did not long outlive Salazar. Its 
foundations had decayed away. Under Salazar, Portugal had en­
joyed political stability at the price of repression and eco­
nomic stagnation. The poorest of western European states, 
postwar Portugal depended heavily on tourism and the migration 
of workers to more prosperous countries for economic survival. 
39 U.S., Senate, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Portugal 
in Transition (Washington, C.D.: Government Printing Office, 
T975J , p. 12. 
'^'^New York Times, 18 September 1968. 
41 
Ibid., 27 September 1968. 
42 
Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1969 and 1970, 
vol. 17 ^LondoTT: Kees ing ' s Pul^l i cat ions , Ltd. , 1969-1970), 
p. 24108. 
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The regime was finally ruined by the colonies to which 
Salazar clung so obstinately. By 1974 an array of 200,000 
men was locked in stalemate with African nationalist guer-
4 3 
rillas in all three mainland colonies. In the end the 
burden was more than Portugal could bear. More immediately 
dangerous to the government was the alienation of its ulti­
mate support--the armed forces. Faced with the prospect of 
endless war, influenced by the Marxist doctrines of the very 
enemies they were fighting, the younger officers turned 
44 against the regime. Caetano, a well-meaning but half­
hearted reformer, had none of Salazar's prestige. 
On 25 April 1974 Caetano was overthrown by an almost 
bloodless military coup.^^ The new government, an interim 
military regime controlled by the "Armed Forces Movement," 
pledged decolonization, establishment of democracy, and social 
reform. It also proclaimed its continued adherence to its 
46 
international engagements, "especially with N.A.T.O." 
The "Revolution of Flowers" was almost universally wel­
comed both at home and abroad. The establishment of democracy 
and the withdrawal of Portugal from its futile colonial cam-
4 3 
Kenneth Maxwell, "The Thorns of the Portuguese Revolu­
tion," Foreign Affairs 54 (1975):253. 
'^^New York Times, 26 April 1974. 
4 5 
Portugal in Transition, p. 1. 
'^^Portugal, Ministry of Mass Communications, Provisional 
Government, the Men and the Programme (Lisbon: Minis try of 
Mass Communications, ̂ 974) , pT TT. 
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paigns were objectives which Portugal's allies could happily 
support. Within months the new government, run by military 
men with little political experience, drifted alarmingly 
close to chaos and left-wing extremism. Especially disturb­
ing to Portugal's allies was the rapid growth in power and 
influence of the Portuguese Communist Party, newly emerged 
from the underground.^^ The Communists were well organized 
and had many supporters in the Armed Forces Movement. 
The specter of a Communist-controlled Portugal raised 
some alarming possibilities. Politically, it meant increas­
ing pressure on the unstable states of southern Europe--
Spain, Greece, and above all, Italy, moving them toward the 
extreme left. Strategically, the loss of the Azores bases 
would severely damage the military capabilities of the NATO 
alliance. Soviet access to the islands was the most night­
marish possibility of all. 
It soon became clear that the Azoreans were not in sym­
pathy with the leftward drift of mainland Portugal. The 
islanders, as often in their history, were out of step with 
Lisbon,. There was little left-wing sentiment in the Azores. 
The islanders were strongly tied to the United States, not 
only by economic benefits derived from the Lajes base, but 
the large Azorean immigrant communities in New England and 
California. A movement for Azorean independence arose, and 
^^"Portugal Moves to the Left," Orbis 19 (1975):14. 
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for the first time since their discovery it seemed possible 
4 8 
that the islands might secede from Portugal. 
In Portugal itself increasingly bitter strife between 
the various factions which had emerged after the revolution 
threatened civil war. The crisis came on 25 November 1975 
when a left-wing coup, in which the Communists and their 
allies in the government were implicated, was crushed. The 
influence of the left has declined greatly since. The vic­
tory of the anti-Communist Socialists in subsequent elections 
and the recent election of General Ramalho Eanes, who put 
down the November coup, as President of Portugal, has eased 
NATO concern with Portuguese problems. But no one is yet 
certain that the Portuguese revolution is over; the country 
still faces difficult economic problems. Its violent phase 
does seem to have ended--while it lasted world attention was 
fixed on Portugal and the Portuguese islands, whose vital 
role was brought forcefully to the notice of the other NATO 
powers, a role which was based on the importance of their 
strategic location. 
^^Time, "The Azores: Unrest in a Way Station," 18 August 
1975 , pT~TS. 
CONCLUSION 
During the Second World War Portugal's 
position on the edge of the Atlantic pre­
vented its association with the Fascist 
powers, and kept it neutral in the first 
phase of the war. An Atlantic orientation 
obliged it to grant base facilities in the 
Azores to the major Western Powers, Great 
Britain and the U. S., at the very moment 
the Axis's Atlantic and Mediterranean 
power position had weakened considerably. 
With the emergence of the Cold War and 
the increasing fear of a major conven­
tional Soviet attack on Western Europe 
in the late forties and early fifties, 
the strategic importance of Portugal's 
Atlantic islands and continental coast 
increased tremendously. Portugal became 
a vital component in Western Containment 
policy and in the Pentagon's plans for 
an aerial encirclement of the Soviet 
U n i o n . . . .  1  
Thus, Luc Crollen summarized admirably Portugal's role in 
world affairs during some recent and eventful years. Con­
tained within this short passage are phrases which can be 
applied, however, to a much wider time span: "Portugal's 
position on the edge of the Atlantic;" her "Atlantic orien­
tation," the "strategic importance of Portugal's Atlantic 
islands and continental coast" are the keys to much of Portu­
gal's history. Not so much her internal history, although 
domestic events and external pressures never remain uncon-
^Crollen, "Portugal," p. 95. 
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nected for long, but certainly her international history, 
her role in the European and Atlantic community have been 
determined by her location. 
The definition of strategic location offered at the 
beginning of this study emphasized the importance of geo­
graphical position as a factor in history. A distinction 
was made between temporary and permanent strategic location, 
the latter being the condition of being so situated that 
location alone affects the outcome of a series of histori­
cal situations. Strategic location is most important when 
it involves the control of communication, the routes of 
movement and transportation that are utterly vital to civi­
lized life. The Portuguese case is one of the best examples 
available of the influence of strategic location on the con­
trol of communications. The Portuguese were the pioneers of 
oceanic transportation, a role they could hardly have played 
if they had not first possessed a territory excellently 
suited to maritime ventures, and in the course of those ven­
tures discovered and colonized a group of islands at the 
crossroads of the North Atlantic. 
No one planned it that way, of course. Portugal's 
origins and early history were as much the creatures of 
happenstance as those of any nation, but location allowed 
Portugal some crucial advantages which were exploited skill­
fully at critical times in her history. The developments 
which permitted Portugal to lead the way into the Atlantic 
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Ocean are inseparable from her position at the southwestern 
corner o£ Europe. From their historical experience, such 
Portuguese empire builders as Afonso de Albuquerque derived 
a keen appreciation of the power inherent in properly situ­
ated islands and coastal harbors. Strategic bases were tlie 
linchpins of Portuguese dominion in the Indian Ocean, the 
foundation of Portugal's century of greatness. 
The Portuguese empire, however, is not much more than 
an episode compared with the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance. The 
link between Portugal and Britain was the most enduring in 
European history, and the prime example of an alliance based 
on strategic advantages. Britain and Portugal were not held 
together by natural affinities. In the fourteenth century 
the two societies were somewhat similar, both being feudal 
monarchies, but over the centuries they drifted apart. 
Eventually they became as dissimilar in their politics, 
economies, and social structures as any two states in Europe. 
The economic advantages each country gained from the Alliance 
were not decisive, being merely by-products of the political 
alliance. Portugal could have sold her wine and sardines 
elsewhere; to Britain Portugal was a profitable but not in­
dispensable market. 
The Alliance was so enduring because it was based on 
permanent strategic factors. To Britain Portugal offered 
two, things--the use of the splendid harbor of Lisbon and an 
entryway into the Iberian peninsula whenever a British presence 
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there was desired, and the use herself (or the denial to her 
enemies of the use, which might be equally important) of 
Portugal's islands as bases to control the Atlantic seaways. 
Thus the two roles, one associated primarily with continental 
Portugal, the other witli the Azores, that Portugal played in 
Britain's maritime•strategy. 
And what did Portugal gain in return? Protection. Sel­
dom strong enough to stand alone against outside threats, 
Portugal always had a powerful ally to which she could turn. 
On the only occasion in Portuguese history that such a threat 
arose and England could not offer aid, the crisis after King 
Sebastian's death in 1571, the result was national disaster 
for Portugal and ultimately increased danger for England. 
When Portugal won back her independence the Alliance with 
Britain was swiftly revived, and endured as long as Britain's 
power remained. Thereafter, Portugal was shielded by Britain, 
sometimes against her Spanish neighbor, but also against Louis 
XIV, Napoleon, and Hitler. 
Portugal paid a price for British protection. It is not 
always comfortable to be a client-state. She submitted to 
British economic dominance, and mostly during the early nine­
teenth century, some British involvement in her internal 
affairs. But for Portugal it was a price worth paying. To­
tally untrammeled national sovereignty is an abstraction and 
not a reality, especially for small states. In practice the 
British were willing to tolerate almost any Portuguese regime 
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that would observe the Alliance. Client status was greatly 
to be preferred to the most likely alternative, absorption 
into Spain. And as Salazar has been only the latest Portu­
guese ruler to prove, even the weak have tlieir assets, which 
can win them much if exploited skillfully. And Portugal's 
great asset was strategic location. 
When the United States replaced Britain in her time-
honored Atlantic role, Portugal almost immediately began to 
play the same part, for the same reasons, in the American 
scheme. Demonstrably Portugal's strategic value was not 
simply a by-product of British greatness. No one can pre­
dict what will befall Portugal and her islands in the future. 
But it is a safe assumption that their strategic location, 
significant from the age of the caravel to the age of the 
C-5A transport plane, is in no danger of losing importance 
soon. 
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